Liberty Worth the Name: Locke on Free AgencyPrinceton University Press, 22.10.2000 - 176 sivua This is the first comprehensive interpretation of John Locke's solution to one of philosophy's most enduring problems: free will and the nature of human agency. Many assume that Locke defines freedom as merely the dependency of conduct on our wills. And much contemporary philosophical literature on free agency regards freedom as a form of self-expression in action. Here, Gideon Yaffe shows us that Locke conceived free agency not just as the freedom to express oneself, but as including also the freedom to transcend oneself and act in accordance with "the good." For Locke, exercising liberty involves making choices guided by what is good, valuable, and important. Thus, Locke's view is part of a tradition that finds freedom in the imitation of God's agency. Locke's free agent is the ideal agent. |
Sisältö
Introduction | 3 |
A Second Perfection | 12 |
FREEDOM OF ACTION | 13 |
THE NEGATIVE VIEWS | 21 |
Free Wills | 22 |
Free Volitions | 27 |
THE POSITIVE VIEWS | 31 |
The First Edition | 32 |
WHAT ARE VOLITIONS? | 88 |
A Quick Look Back | 98 |
VOLUNTARY ACTION | 99 |
The Necessity of Causation by Volition for Voluntariness | 100 |
The NonSufficiency of Causation by Volition for Voluntariness | 104 |
An Alternative Interpretation | 107 |
The Power to Act Voluntarily | 112 |
CONCLUSION | 117 |
The Second and Later Editions | 42 |
Some Consequences of the Second Edition Account | 61 |
FREEDOM OF WILL AND THE NATURAL LAW THEORY | 65 |
CONCLUSION | 71 |
Volition and Voluntary Action | 75 |
ACTION AND ACTIVE POWERS | 78 |
Passion and Proper Action | 79 |
Active and Passive Power | 82 |
Two Degrees of Attributability | 85 |
Tree Agency and Personal Identity | 118 |
CHOICE AND PERSONAL IDENTITY | 119 |
CONTEMPLATION OF TEMPORALLY ABSENT PLEASURE AND PAIN | 134 |
CONCLUSION | 139 |
Notes | 141 |
Bibliography | 161 |
169 | |
175 | |