Upon the principles of liberty and equality, it would seem that this distinct part of the old kingdom should have a free choice. upon the subject of the revolution. The American confederacy, as well as I recollect, demanded not the co-operation of Georgia until she, some time after the commencement of our opposition to Britain, voluntarily joined her sister colonies; nor did we, during the war, claim the allegiance of Canada; and our connection. with these colonies in a common subjection under the British monarchy was as complete, and locally more so, than France and the French islands under the French monarchy. To this, it may with some plausibility be said, that the American rise was not a revolution of the national supreme power, but only a separation of a part from it, and, therefore, not applicable in the present instance. Granting this, we have a more recent one, which the principle of this objection renders certainly applicable. In our late change of government, when a sufficient number of States had adopted a new form to give it effect, the constituted power did not claim right of government over the two nonadopting States, until they, voluntarily, re-considered the subject and adopted. There can be no doubt but, that at the time of this event we were an entire nation, bound together under one government, and that the change was a revolution of the national supreme power, as completely as that which has taken place in France. I should suppose that, should these islands elect to place themselves in a situation independent of the French republic, or even under the protection of any other power, such election would be in perfect consistency with the avowed principles of that republic; and when we consider the actual situation of the islanders, as well in regard to the nature of their property, as their dependence upon foreign protection, it is highly probable that, if they be taken by any of the maritime powers, now combined against the French, the event will be a consequence of their desiring it. Upon the second consideration, it must be concluded, that each of the contracting parties had regard to the extent of its engagement, and relied as much on mutual good faith in reasonable constructions of, as compliances with the stipulation contained in the treaty; and it would seem that, upon either involving itself in war by voluntary acts, which cannot be supposed to have been contemplated at the time of contract, there can be no equitable claim upon the other for performance. Could it be at the time of the treaty in contemplation of the United States, that a revolution, such as has happened in France, was possible, and that the new power, before organizing itself upon a rational form, would be crusading it after the liberties of other countries, and by that means arming all Europe against it? Had they foreseen that such was to be the state of French affairs, would they have bound themselves to guarantee the islands under the consequent wars? I presume that had the United States at any time after the peace thought proper to attempt the freeing of Canada from Britain, or the Spanish colonies from Spain, neither the king, nor even the republic of France, would have thought we had a reasonable claim upon that nation for a participation in the war, on account of her having, in general terms, guaranteed our liberty and independence as well in government as commerce. Upon the third consideration, could our attempting a compliance with the treaty, produce good to the French cause? We have not, nor had we at the time of the contract, a navy-the only means by which the islands can be protected against naval powers; we could, therefore, give no immediate defence in that quarter. We might attack Canada, and, upon the same principle, the Spanish colonies also; but any offensive operation would, at once, involve us in war with these, and all the combined powers; this must inevitably interrupt our trade, which neither America nor France is in a situation to protect, and prevent those supplies of provisions now sent to Europe, of which France is in greater need than any of her enemies. This consequence would follow, even should no part of the forces destined to act against the republic, be diverted to act in America; and should such diversion take place, the scene here would be so considerable as to interrupt our agriculture, and abridge, if not totally prevent, a surplusage of provisions for exportation. These would undoubtedly be the consequences to France from any attempt on our part to assist her as an ally; and, it does appear to me, that her true policy, if she shall be in temper to reflect on it, is, to be vigilant in keeping the United States clear of the war, leaving them to enjoy of the mare liberum as fully as possible. This is the only country from which she can expect supplies of provisions, and if we can retain the free use of the seas she will be more certain of receiving them in the course of trade, than by a feeble attempt of government to supply her against the fleets of her enemies. The consequences to the United States, from an attempt to comply with the treaty, need not be mentioned. They must be evident to all who think at all on the subject; nor will any one whose happiness is connected with that of his country, be willing to encounter them, but under the pressure of inevitable necessity. This, I am inclined to think, will not occur, if we are wise. The inhabitants of the United States ought to rejoice that, being no longer adventurers for their own liberties, they are too remote from the countries which have the desperate game to play, to be brought into hazard with them. In answer to your sixth question, I suppose the ambassador from the French republic might be received, in form, without the least impropriety, upon the ground of neutrality. He comes from the prevailing authority of the nation, and it would seem that any government refusing a reception, would manifest more than a spirit of neutrality. The conduct of England on this point was followed by effective measures against the republic. The expediency of a reception in form, I have no doubt of. Upon more considerations than the mere propriety of it, it will prevent many cavils against our administration. It is proper for me to inform you that we have amongst us those who are preparing the people for such an event as a refusal, under the old story of an Eastern influence in favor of monarchy in America, consequently, unfriendly to the liberties of France. You will readily perceive that the motive for this, arises less from a zeal for the cause of France, than a desire to destroy the confidence of the people in their own government. I would be for receiving the ambassador from the French republic, and from any other of the belligerent powers, but would be publicly explicit as to a perfect neutrality. The French, I business with us not connected The debt, which it appears to suppose, have a good pretext for with a participation in the war. be understood, ought to be paid to the existing authorities, is certainly no unimportant ground of intercourse. The only chance that I can now perceive for the United States being lugged into the war is, that Great Britain may attempt to restrain, by force, the passage of their ships into the French ports with provisions, and our feeling it necessary for the public honor, to resent the injury, should such a circumstance happen. We shall, I suppose, have a delicate, and, perhaps, difficult part to act. I cannot however be very apprehensive of our being brought into the difficulty, if we evidently preserve a neutrality. If we leave our trade open to all countries, and our citizens free to visit all ports, I see not how Great Britain can have a pretext to meddle with our vessels going into France, unless laden with what are called contraband articles, or approaching places besieged, &c. Some of our hot heads throw out opinions that we should attempt, by an order of government, an exclusive exportation to France; these, however, are few and contemptible. The nation that would attempt this, without even one armed ship, and in behalf of a nation too, whose naval force is impaired, and far inferior to that of her enemies, would indeed entitle itself to the ridicule of the whole world. It is certain that France could derive no benefit from such an attempt, which she may not secure without our infringing the rights of neutrality. Having no navy, we must rely altogether, in the effort, upon her convoys; and if these could cover our trading ships, their own might, under the same convoys, pass safely home with the provisions purchased in our ports. I have, my dear sir, complied with your request in giving the result of my observations and reflections upon the present very important crisis, and have endeavored to render them worth your trouble in asking for them. Your own judgment will direct you how far to rely upon their accuracy. With every sentiment of private friendship, and the fullest confidence in your public administration, I am your affectionate humble servant, ED. CARRINGTON. MY DEAR SIR: STEELE TO HAMILTON. SALISBURY, April 30th, 1793. This morning Mr. Genet, the French Minister, set out from this place for Philadelphia. His route is by Richmond, thence to Mount Vernon, where he hopes to see the President. It will require eighteen or twenty days for him to reach Philadelphia, though he professes, and really seems to be in haste. You have heard much of this citizen, no doubt, and therefore any thing of him from me will seem superfluous; but as I am writing of the man that we are all afraid of, permit me to say that he has a good person, fine ruddy complexion, quite active, and seems always in a bustle, more like a busy man than a man of business. A Frenchman in his manners, he announces himself in all companies as the minister of the republic, &c., talks freely of his commission, and, like most Europeans, seems to have adopted mistaken notions of the penetration and knowledge of the people of the United States. He is, or affects to be, highly gratified by the affectionate treatment he has thus far experienced from the Americans, except of Charleston, where an insult was offered to a French seaman, which he attributes to the merchants, who seem in his opinion almost wholly attached to the British. The minister, notwithstanding his good-nature, spoke angrily of this insult, and for a moment deviated from his system, which I think is to laugh us into the war, if he can. The best informed men in this State, who are wholly disinterested, continue uneasy, from an apprehension that our political connection with France, and our commercial intercourse with England, will place the United States in a delicate, if not a dangerous situation during the war. My own mind has been at ease since the communication which you were pleased to make me of your sentiments on that subject in Philadelphia. This conversation having been confidential, I have never considered myself at liberty to repeat any part of it, but I have often said, on proper occasions, that the friends to neutrality and |