Sivut kuvina
PDF
ePub

Grounding falls under the same designation, if extraordinary, as shown above, but not so, if it takes place in the ordinary course of navigation. Collision is a peril of the sea, irrespective, as it would appear, of the question whether it was caused by negligence or inevitable accident (o). Damage to the ship by the violent action of the winds and waves, or to the cargo, by water admitted into the hold through the straining of the vessel in heavy weather, is likewise recoverable under the same designation. It must not however be supposed that perils of the seas include all the casualties which a vessel may experience in the course of her voyage, for so comprehensive a meaning, if admissible, would reduce all the other clauses, expressive of the risks insured against, to mere surplusage. Accordingly, it would appear that loss directly caused by the fire of an enemy is not recoverable as by a peril of the sea (p), and the same conclusion was expressly arrived at in the case of damage caused to a vessel by being blown over in graving dock by a gale of wind (q). In another case, where a vessel was hove down on the beach to be cleaned, and fell over and sustained injury in consequence of the bilge shores by which she was supported having been swept away by the advancing tide, it was held that the damage was not caused by a peril of the sea, as the vessel was ashore when

machinery having been negligently left open, flowed into the hold, and damaged the cargo. Upon an action being brought for the recovery of the loss under the policy, it was held that the damage was caused by the perils of the seas, or a similar peril, falling under the general clause, "all other perils, losses, &c." Brett, M. R. (then Brett, J.), in the course of his judgment, observed: "The question is the same as it would have been if, by the falling of a mast through the vessel, or other negligent act of the crew, the vessel had sunk in deep water, and [ think the loss sufficiently comes within the doctrine of one happening by a vis major, and is within the meaning of the policy a loss caused by the perils insured against."

(0) There is a difference in the interpretation given to the clause "". "perils

[ocr errors]

of the seas in the policy and bill of
lading, respectively, on this point. It
was expressly decided in Smith v.
Scott (4 Taunt, 125) that a collision
brought about by the gross neglect on
the part of those in charge of another
vessel was a peril of the sea within the
meaning of the policy; and there
seems little reason to doubt that the
conclusion would have been the same
if the negligence causing the collision
had been that of the crew of the vessel
insured. On the other hand, it has
been held that, under the contract of
affreightment, a collision only amounts
to a peril of the sea where it occurs
without negligence on the part of any
person. Woodley v. Mitchell, L. R. 11
Q. B. 47.

(p) Arnould, 4th ed., p. 690.
(q) Phillips v. Barber, ibid., 685.

the accident happened to her (r). These instances will serve to show the limitation which is to be placed on the meaning of the clause under consideration, though the exclusion of such casualties as those last specified, is not in general of any practical import, as they would fall under one of the other clauses expressive of the perils insured against.

The peril next enumerated is "men-of-war," but for the sake of considering that casualty in conjunction with others of the same class, it is deferred until after the risk of "fire" has been commented on.

IV.-FIRE.

Fire may arise from a variety of causes-from lightning, the spontaneous combustion of the cargo, the negligence of the master or crew, the acts of enemies, or the precautionary measures of rulers, as in the case of a vessel burnt by the municipal authorities for fear of being infected (s).

The underwriter is liable for loss occasioned by fire, whether its origin is inexplicable, or it can be assigned to one of the above-named or some other kindred cause, with the exception of combustion generated through the inherent defect of the subject insured, or in consequence of the goods having been shipped in a damaged state; but if the combustion is originated by seadamage sustained by the goods after shipment, it is covered by the policy; and, however the fire may have been occasioned, if it extend to other goods which are unconnected with the cause of the disaster, or to the ship herself, the underwriter is responsible (t).

Damage to cargo caused by pouring water into the hold, scuttling the ship, or taking other extraordinary measures to extinguish a fire, is recoverable in general average (u); or it

(r) Thompson v. Whitmore, 3 Taunt. 227.

(s) Emerigon cites such a case; see Marshall on Insurance, 2nd ed., p. 494.

() For the authorities, see Arnould,

4th ed., pp. 694, 5; Phillips, 4th ed., § 1094.

(u) The Whitecross Wire & Iron Co. v. Savill, L. R. 8 Q. B. D. 653; Stewart v. The West India & Pacific Steamship Co., L. R. 8 Q. B. D. 88; Ex.

may be claimed direct in the first instance under the policy, if the latter include the risk of particular average. If, however, a package is on fire, and water is poured upon it to extinguish the fire, no allowance is made in general average for any damage by water to the package so affected, but the loss is particular average. The reason for this exception in practice appears to be, that an article which is ignited is deemed to be virtually lost, so that the act of pouring water upon it involves no sacrifice, but is intended to reduce the loss or effect a salvage.

When, either by a known or agreed usage, or by the express terms of the contract, the risk of a transit or deposit on land is included in a marine insurance, the underwriters are responsible for loss by fire to the property while so situated. For instance, if goods are discharged for the common safety, or to repair the ship, and warehoused at a port of refuge, the risk of fire in the warehouse is covered by the terms of the policy. The same rule applies to policies on ship, as will appear by the following case:-A ship in the Chinese trade having arrived in the Canton river to clean and refit, the sails, yards, rigging, and other movable furniture were, in accordance with the usage of the trade, placed in a warehouse, or store-house, called a banksaul, built for that purpose on a sand bank, and while so deposited were destroyed by fire. The loss was held to be recoverable under the policy (x).

An explosion of steam, caused by the bursting of a marine boiler, though not identical with fire, is a peril of a sufficiently like kind to be covered by the clause comprehending “ all other perils, losses, and misfortunes" (y). Brett, L.J., in the course of his judgment in the case just cited, observed :—“ If the clause enumerating the particular perils insured against in this policy contained only the words 'perils of the sea,' I should think that this would not be a peril of a like kind with those

Ch. 362; Achard v. King, 2 Asp.
Mar. L. C. 422.

(x) Pelly v. The Royal Exchange Assurance Co.; see Park on Insurance,

P. 45.

(y) West India & Panama Telegraph Co. v. Home & Colonial Marine Insurance Co., 4 Asp. Mar. L. C. 341.

specially enumerated. Unless the special clause had contained the word 'fire,' I think this would not be a peril of a like kind. I have had some difficulty in bringing my mind to see that it is a peril of a like kind to those enumerated, so as to bring it within the general phrase; but on consideration I think it is similar to the perils specified, in this way: an explosion often ends in fire, and fire often causes an explosion which blows up the deck. In this way, I think there is sufficient likeness to enable us to say that an explosion, although it is only an explosion of steam, is within the general terms of the policy."

It appears reasonable to hold that where, owing to accidental circumstances, the ordinary fires used to heat the boilers in a steamer operate in an extraordinary manner, any damage occasioned thereby is recoverable as a loss by "fire" under the policy. A case of this kind occurs, when either through a short supply of water in the boilers, or other inadvertent mishap, the fire acts with such intensity upon the furnaces as to cause them to collapse. A loss arising under such circumstances is, as it would seem, properly recoverable as a particular average occasioned by fire, and is in practice so treated.

V.-WAR RISKS.

Men-of-War, Enemies, Pirates, Rovers, Thieves, Letters of Mart and Countermart, Surprisals, Takings at Sea.

The common feature in this category of perils is violence at the hand of man. The underwriter takes upon himself the burden of all loss or damage thus occasioned, whether it consist of injury to the vessel's hull, spars and rigging, by an enemy's shot or shell, or by other hostile acts, or the total destruction of the property insured, by the operation of the

same causes.

As, however, merchant vessels are not in general able to

offer a successful resistance to the attack of an armed ship, the casualty which most frequently results from hostilities is capture. Capture, in the proper signification of the term, is the forcible appropriation of property by an enemy or belligerent with intent to keep it (z).

The policy covers all losses directly occasioned by capture or seizure, whether legal or illegal, by mutinous passengers or slaves, regularly commissioned vessels of war, privateers, or pirates, with the single exception already mentioned, viz., capture of enemy's property by British ships in time of war (a).

The words "Men-of-war" and "Enemies" obviously refer to those who, authorised by a prince or sovereign state, make war in the mode sanctioned by the law of nations, as distinguished from "Pirates," "Rovers," and "Thieves," who are unauthorised depredators (b).

Letters of Mart, or Marque (c), were commissions granted by the sovereign to those of his subjects whose property had been seized by subjects of other states, authorising the former to indemnify themselves for the loss sustained by making reprisals. Letters of Countermart were contrary letters issued in favour of those threatened by such reprisals, authorising them to resist the privateers furnished with letters of marque.

66

66

(2) The following definitions of the term capture" have been given :"Capture' would seem properly to include every act of seizing or taking by an enemy or belligerent "-per Lord Fitzgerald in Cory v. Burr, 8 App. Cas. 405. 'Capture means the hostile seizure of goods with intent to deprive the owner of them ❞—per Brett, L.J., in Rodocanachi v. Elliott, L. R. 8 C. P. 649. 'By capture is meant the taking possession of property with the purpose of appropriating it to the captor's own use, by which it is distinguished from a mere detention, with the design of ultimately liberating the property, as in the case of an embargo "-Phillips, 4th ed., § 1108. "Capture," as applied to the subject of marine insurances,

66

[ocr errors]

may be said to be a taking of the ship or goods belonging to the subjects of one country, by those of another, when in a state of public war"-Park, p. 73. 'Capture is when one makes himself master of a ship in the act of war, or in a spirit of depredation, and with intent to deprive the true owner of her Emerigon on Insurances, translated by Meredith, p. 353.

(a) See Arnould, 4th ed., 696, where the authorities are collected. (b) Emerigon, 413.

(c) The word is derived either from the Spanish marcha, or from the old French word marches, which signified the frontiers of a state. Letters of marque gave the recipients authority to pass beyond the frontiers of another state. Emerigon, 440,

« EdellinenJatka »