XI. THE MASTER'S NAME, &c.

Whereof is Master, under God, for this present Voyage, or whosoever else shall go for Master in the said Ship, or by whatsoever other Name or Names the same Ship, or the Master thereof, is or shall be named or called.

Provision is made in the policy for the insertion of the master's name, partly, it is to be presumed, as a means of distinguishing the ship insured from others of the same name, and partly, because the personal character and professional reputation of the captain are not infrequently taken into account by the underwriters in the estimation of the risk; but, in practice, the blank left for that purpose is rarely filled up.

In immediate sequence to this blank, are the words "or whosoever else shall go for Master in the said ship," by which the substitution of another master for the one named in the policy is provided for.

Thus, in case the person originally mentioned to the underwriter as the master of the vessel is prevented from going in her, and another is substituted for him, the insurance is not vitiated, even though the original name may have been inserted in the policy, and may never have been altered, provided that the assured has acted throughout in good faith (b).

Again, if the master resign his command, or become incapacitated during the voyage through sickness, and another is appointed in his place, the validity of the insurance is not compromised by the change (c).

The latter part of the clause provides for the contingency of error in the spelling or description of the master's name, or the vessel's, or of a change in the latter, all of which are harmless, providing the underwriter is not misled as to the identity

(b) Arnould, 5th ed., p. 345.

(c) Emerigon, cited in Arnould, 5th ed., 346.

of the vessel. Thus, an American ship, called the "President," was named in the policy by mistake "The American ship President;" but the underwriter not having been misled as to the identity of the vessel he had engaged to insure, it was held that he was still bound by the contract (d).

But a mistake in the ship's name, however innocently made, will vitiate the policy, if it materially mislead the underwriter as to the character of the risk (e).

In the event of a change of master during the course of the voyage, it should not be such as to augment the risk of the underwriter; as, for instance, by appointing a belligerent in place of a neutral in time of war (ƒ).

XII-COMMENCEMENT OF THE RISK ON GOODS.

Beginning the Adventure upon the said Goods and Merchandises from the loading thereof aboard the said Ship

When does the risk on goods commence? From their loading on board the ship. This is the substance of the clause just quoted. It is generally supplemented in writing by the words as above, which refer back to the preceding description of the voyage, and point to the port of departure as the port of loading.

The terms of this clause suffice to cover the marine risk from its inception, where the ship lies alongside a wharf or quay to load her cargo; but, where the ship lies off shore, and the cargo is conveyed to her in lighters, they fail to protect the goods on their passage from the shore to the ship. Accordingly, it is usual to append to the printed form the words

(d) Le Mesurier v. Vaughan, sce Marshall, 2nd ed., p. 314.

(e) Ionides v. The Pacific Fire &

Marine Insurance Co., L. T. Rep. v. 25, p. 490,

(f) Arnould, 4th ed., p. 326.

"including all risk of craft," or some similar clause (g), so that the goods may be covered from the moment of their leaving terra firma. The same object may be attained by altering the terms of the clause to the following, in which form it appears in many of the companies' policies :-"The insurance aforesaid shall commence from the time when the goods and merchandises shall be laden on board the said ship, or vessel, craft, or boat, as above." In either of the above ways, the terms of the policy may be extended so as to bridge over the hiatus between the shore and the ship, and the marine risk will then be covered from its inception, provided that the insurable interest in the goods has commenced. If, however, the property in the goods does not pass to the assured until a certain point in the process of shipment, the policy will not attach until that point is reached; as, for example, where, by the terms of a contract for the purchase of a cargo of rice, no interest in the rice passed to the buyers until the shipment of the cargo was completed, it was held that the latter had no insurable interest in the cargo, while in course of shipment (h).

In a policy of insurance on cargo, at and from a specified port "beginning the adventure upon the said goods and merchandises from the loading thereof" it is implied that the port of departure and the port of loading are identical, that is, that the goods will be shipped at the port from which the vessel is to start; and it has been repeatedly held that a compliance with this condition is essential to the validity of the insurance (i). So rigidly was this rule of construction formerly applied by the Courts, that a policy on goods insured "at and from Gottenburg to the ship's port or ports of discharge in the Baltic" with the clause "beginning the adventure from the loading thereof on board the said ship," was pronounced void because the goods were not shipped at Gottenburg, though both the assured and the underwriter were aware that there was a

(g) Such as "Including all risk of craft and lighterage to and from the vessel, each craft or lighter to be deemed a separate insurance."

(h) Anderson v. Morice, 3 Asp. Mar. L. C. 291.

(i) For the cases, see Arn., 4th ed., pp. 357-361.

previous insurance on the goods from London to Gottenburg of which the policy in question was merely a continuation (k).

The practical injustice resulting from a grammatical interpretation of the clause under review, without regard to the intentions of the parties, has been recognized in later decisions, and the recognition has led to a relaxation of the rule that the port of departure is to be regarded as the port of loading, whenever there is anything in the form of the policy or in the circumstances of the case to warrant a different conclusion. Thus, if the policy be for a trading and bartering voyage, with liberty "to touch, stay, and trade" at any ports in the course thereof, if there be anything in the terms of the policy to indicate that a prior loading was within the contemplation of the parties, or if the cargo, though originally laden at a port without the scope of the policy, be discharged and reshipped at the port of departure, in whole or in part, so as to constitute a constructive loading at that port, the Courts will not insist upon an absolute compliance with the rule (1). In the absence, however, of anything in the terms of the policy, or in the circumstances of the case, whereupon a modified reading of the clause may be founded, a strictly grammatical interpretation will be adopted, upon the principle stated by Lord Denman in Rickman v. Carstairs, that "the question in this and other cases of the construction of written instruments is, not what was the intention of the parties, but what is the meaning of the words they have used." Accordingly, the proper way of avoiding any such difficulty is to exercise care in the framing of the policy, so that where it is intended to cover goods shipped at some place other than the port of departure, that intention may clearly appear by the terms used. This may be done, upon the suggestion of Lord Ellenborough, by the addition of the words "wheresoever laden" to the ordinary loading clause; and it has been held that a policy with the words "beginning the adventure on the said goods from the loading thereof on board the ship wheresoever," covered goods

(k) Spitta v. Woodman, ibid.
(1) For the cases, see Arnould,

4th ed., pp. 359-363; Marshall, 2nd ed., pp. 322, 323.

laden prior to arrival at the port of departure (m). The same end is attained in the case of policies on trading adventures to the coast of Africa and back, by the insertion of the clause "outward cargo to be considered homeward interest twenty-four hours after the vessel's arrival at her first port of discharge;" or, "the outward cargo to be deemed homeward interest on this policy until bartered, sold, or exchanged” (n).

XIII-COMMENCEMENT OF THE RISK ON SHIP. Upon the said ship, etc.

To render this clause intelligible, it is necessary to connect it with the preceding words "beginning the adventure," to interpret the "etc." as a compendious mode of expressing the tackle, apparel, and other subsidiary portions of the ship already enumerated, and to append the words, "as above."

The paraphrase will then read thus: "Beginning the adventure upon the said ship, with all her tackle, apparel, ordnance, munition, artillery, boat, and other furniture, as above."

It is now clear that the risk on ship commences "at" the port of departure. The time of its commencement has already been defined in commenting upon the expression “at and from."

XIV.-CONTINUANCE AND END OF THE RISK. And shall so continue and endure, during her Abode there, upon the said Ship, etc.; and further, until the said Ship, with all her Ordnance, Tackle,

(m) In Gladstone v. Clay, 1 M. & S. 418.

(n) Joyce v. The Realm Marine Insurance Co., L. R. 7 Q. B. 580.