THE CHRISTIAN REVIEW. NO. LI....SEPTEMBER, 1848. ARTICLE I DUGALD STEWART, AS AN INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHER. Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. In four volumes. By DUGALD STEWART. THE labors of Mr. Stewart in Intellectual Philosophy are comprised in four volumes quarto; the first three are termed "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind;" the fourth consists of Philosophical Essays. In the first two volumes, however, he considers what are strictly denominated the elementary powers of the human mind. It is, therefore, in these that Mr. Stewart's philosophical character is most clearly seen. We shall accordingly review, somewhat at length, the principal topics discussed in these volumes, that thus our opinion of Mr. Stewart as an intellectual philosopher may be the result of a careful examination of his works. Mr. Stewart first takes up the subject of perception. He gives the conclusions of Dr. Reid concerning the kind of knowledge we gain by perception, as well as the manner of gaining it, referring to that author for minute details. He next presents a concise historical view of all the numerous theories concerning our conceptions, which have been devised by philosophers from Aristotle to Berkely. What he assigns as the cause of these theories seems to us to be rather the very essence of them. VOL. XIII.-NO. LI. 28 "In their formation," he says, "their authors were influenced, first by principles of philosophizing borrowed from physics; and, secondly, by a conviction of the immateriality of the soul, which induced them to employ agents as spiritual as possible." Now is not this precisely what they did, rather than a reason for it? They speculated upon the phenomena of perception, or (what they considered) physical principles; and they created at pleasure, ideas, images, phantasms, forms and species, etc., al! of a semi-spiritual nature. May not the true cause of their pursuing this course be traced to two sources? viz. the tendency of the human mind to indulge in speculation; and, the peculiar difficulty of attending closely to the phenomena of which they were conscious, in order to obtain true data from which to draw their conclusions? And is it not from this last named cause that the science of mental philosophy has advanced so slowly in comparison with other sciences, rather than because, as Mr. Stewart alleges, it was accidentally "classed with the vain disquisitions of the schoolmen ?" In order to prove their theories, the existence of materio-spiritual images was assumed without proof! The early geologists pursued a similar course, when in order to account for well-known facts, they assumed without foundation facts entirely anomalous and unnatural. Mr. Stewart separates causes into two great classes, "physical and efficient." But this, in our opinion, is a distinction without a difference. Efficiency or power, and invariable antecedency are the two elements which always enter into our notion of a cause. The control of the will over the muscles is doubtless the occasion on which this idea is suggested to the mind. Afterwards, the idea of cause is inseparable from that of power exerted by an intelligent agent. Hence the old mythologists multiplied divinities to an almost indefinite extent, that there might be a sufficient number to energise and carry forward the whole system of things. Hence the use of metaphorical language when we speak of things without life; hence too, pantheism, etc. The chapter upon Attention is highly instructive. The criticisms are ingenious and pleasingly philosophical; at the same time they are expressed with that ease and elegance which always characterize the author's style when he treats of the less difficult subjects. In the chapter on Conception, the difference between memory and conception is defined with considerable clearness. The language, however, is far from being concise. The whole subject is not presented in a clear and well-defined manner; and there is also an apparent want of coherency between the different parts. Thus, on one page our author points out the impropriety of saying that a painter forms a likeness of his friend from memory; yet in a few pages subsequently, he tells us that a "portrait painter traces the form of the human body from memory." Now evidently in this last case a general conception of the human form is all that the painter requires; and, according to a distinction which he himself had just before made, memory does not enter into simple conceptions. Mr. Stewart next takes up the subject of Abstraction. This is one of the characteristic and most important of our intellectual faculties. Accordingly we should expect to find it treated with that care which its importance deserves, and with all the ability which the writer might possess. The subject, as a whole, should be clearly presented, and all its constituent parts should be accurately described. Whether abstraction be an elementary power, or a combination of simple ones-what conditions are necessary to its most successful action-the different de. grees in which this faculty is developed at different periods of one's life, and in different stages in the progress of society-the precise way in which our notions of genera and species are formed, and also an account of the formation of abstract and metaphysical terms the relation which this faculty sustains to our apprehension of principles, laws and general doctrines-whether the eternal forms, essences and ideas of the old philosophers do not correspond with what we denominate general laws, inherent and essential properties-the peculiar characteristics which mark those who possess this faculty in an eminent degree to what extent and in what manner it may be cultivated-all these points and others which may be connected with them, should be thoroughly investigated and satisfactorily decided. The reader would then be able to compass the entire subject; and to do this is always peculiarly gratifying to an inquiring, truth-seeking mind. Instead of this, however, but few things are fully deter mined. The boundary lines between what is true and what is not true, and between the known and the unknown, are not distinctly drawn. Much space is taken up in giving an account of the opinions of the old philosophers, and in rehearsing the points of dispute between the Nominalists and the Realists; all which has the effect rather to mystify than to illumine the real subject under consideration. Mr. Stewart takes sides with the Nominalists; and in the heat of the discussion, he so far forgets himself as to make statements, which, if interpreted literally, are entirely absurd. Thus he affirms that "when we employ general terms in our reasonings or reflections our thoughts are engaged only with the words;" and that, were it not for these general signs we never could reason except concerning particulars." Here no distinction is made between the effect and its cause. Mere words and signs should be distinguished from that peculiar power of the mind by which signs are formed and charged with meaning. Again, he charges Dr. Cudworth with writing what is "whimsical, extravagant, and altogether unintelligible," when that learned author says, "The mind contains in itself virtually, as the future plant or tree is contained in the seed, general notions or exemplars of all things, which unfold and discover themselves as occasions invite and proper circumstances occur." Now if the truth of this statement does not commend itself to one's own consciousness, the severe judgment which Mr. Stewart pronounces upon it, would seem just. But for ourself, we can say with Dr. Price, "we entertain a very different opinion of it." The idea is very similar to what has often occurred to our own mind, and something closely analogous to it, has doubtless occurred to every one who reflects upon the subjects of his consciousness. Here, if we mistake not, is the foundation of the ideal theory of the ancients. Now that general terms convey ideas to our minds, it ought not to be necessary to assert. When the words man, animal, lion and ship are heard, they generate distinct notions; into which enters all that is essential to the existence of innumerable particulars. So when the abstracts, friendship, virtue and vice are employed, they give rise to conceptions, which comprehend all that is peculiar to their corresponding concrete expressions. Hence abstract and general terms are like the These precious metals or the essential oils, into which, in a small space is concentrated great value or surprising virtue. It is not difficult to perceive, however, that the use of these terms would give rise to much misapprehension and confusion. For this there are two causes. are, first, the inherent imperfection of language; and, secondly, the almost infinite variety of degrees in which the power of abstraction is possessed and exercised by different individuals. Hence precise language and exact definitions are of the first importance in all discussions relating to abstraction. Hence the injurious influence of sects and parties in Philosophy as well as in Religion. Their effect is to attract attention to names, rather than to things; prejudice is thus excited, and the truth is lost sight of. We cannot doubt that this chapter would have been far more valuable to mental science, if our author had said nothing about the Nominalists or the Realists, and had attended only to those phenomena, of which our minds are conscious when abstract ideas are formed. Memory and the principles of association upon which memory chiefly depends, are among the less abstruse powers of the human mind. Aristotle reduced the principles of Association to three classes, viz.-Resemblance, Contrast, and Contiguity. Hume extended the meaning of the latter term so as to include Time as well as Space, and also added to Aristotle's list the principle of Cause and Effect. This is doubtless as far as the classification is susceptible of being carried. Hence original investigation was not demanded so much as expansion and illustration. This, Mr. Stewart does in the fifth and sixth chapters of this volume, in a highly interesting and instructive manner. The importance of Memory and the influence of the several principles of Association upon the intellectual character, and the manner in which they are called into exercise by the varied professions, are set forth with much clearness and beauty. The seventh and concluding chapter of this volume treats" of Imagination." In giving an "Analysis of Imagination," Mr. Stewart exhibits a deficiency in discrimination, which has heretofore been noticed. Thus he designates Conception, Abstraction and Taste as the elements which constitute Imagination. But of what avail would these be, without the power of combination? And 28* VOL. XIII.NO. LI. |