to suppose, that He had respect to Himself, as His last and highest end in this work; because He is worthy in Himself to be so, being infinitely the greatest and the best of beings."

But the fact that He makes Himself an ultimate end of His operations, and even the highest end, does not prove that He does this, to the exclusion of all other ultimate ends. President Edwards, in the introduction of the work just referred to, distinctly states, that "two different ends may be both ultimate ends, and yet not be chief ends. They may be both valued for their own sake, and both sought in the same work or acts, and yet one be valued more highly, and sought more than another." "Though the chief end be always an ultimate end, yet every ultimate end is not always a chief end." "A chief end is opposite to an inferior end. An ultimate end is opposite to a subordinate end."

There is one argument, however, sometimes applied to this subject, which, if it were valid, would go to show, that in the work of creation, God could have in view no other ultimate end but Himself. It is said, that before God began to create, there was nothing else in existence; and therefore, nothing else which could be made an end in creating. President Edwards observes, that "merely in this disposition to diffuse Himself, or to cause an emanation of His glory and fulness, which is prior to the existence of any other being, God cannot so properly be said to make a creature His end, as Himself." "This disposition or desire in God, must be prior to the existence of the creature, even in intention and foresight." Very true; the disposition or desire, the subjective motive to create, must be prior to the existence of the creature. But how does it follow from this, that the ultimate end to be obtained must be in the Creator alone? What absurdity is there in supposing, that a God of overflowing and boundless benevolence should purpose to give existence to intelligent beings, for the sake of the happiness which they would enjoy, if created and rendered obedient to His laws? If the good which is aimed at, as the final result of a course of measures, be future; why may not the existence of the beings who are to possess this good, be future also? The objective motion to action is always future. It is some good to be obtained by acting, or the continuance of some good already in possession.

There is another argument of Edwards, which seems.

almost to annihilate the good of the created universe, as an ultimate end of the Creator's works. He is "infinitely the greatest and best of beings. All things else, with regard to worthiness, importance, and excellence, are perfectly as nothing, in comparison of Him." "To determine what proportion of regard is to be allotted to the Creator, and all His creatures taken together, both must be, as it were, put in the balance. In this case, the whole system of created beings would be found as the light dust of the balance." All this is very true. But does it imply, that the created universe, comprising numberless systems of worlds, with their countless hosts of living and intelligent beings, is in any danger of being overlooked, in the benevolent regards of Him without whose notice, not a sparrow falls to the ground? Can we admit, that their highest welfare is too insignificant to be made an ultimate end by the Creator, "if we consider," as Edwards himself observes, "the degree and manner in which He aimed at the creature's excellency and happiness, in His creating the world; viz. the degree and manner of the creature's glory and happiness, during the whole of the designed eternal duration of the world He was about to create; which is in greater and greater nearness and strictness of union with Himself,-in constant progression, throughout all eternity?" "The good of the creature itself, if viewed in its whole duration, and infinite progression, must be viewed. as infinite."

In endeavoring to show that God makes Himself His end in His works, he observes, that "He values and loves things accordingly as they are worthy to be valued and loved. But if God values a thing simply and absolutely for itself, and on its own account, then it is the ultimate object of His value. He does not value it merely for the sake of a farther end to be obtained by it." In connection with this he adds, "Whatsoever thing is actually the effect or consequence of the creation of the world, which is simply and absolutely good and valuable in itself, that thing is an ultimate end of God's creating the world."

These observations are applied, by Edwards, to the purpose of proving that God's last end, in creating the world, was His own glory. Are they not also applicable to the holiness and happiness of the created universe? Is not this a good which is valuable in itself, on its own account? Is it

not so regarded by God; and not merely for the sake of a farther good to be obtained by it? Is it not an effect or consequence of the creation of the world; and therefore, according to Edwards' own mode of reasoning, an ultimate end of the creation? This is not inconsistent with its being also subservient to a higher end, the glory of God. For, as Edwards observes, "a thing sought may have the nature of an ultimate, and also of a subordinate end; as it may be sought partly on its own account, and partly for the sake of a farther end." He states that "the happiness and salvation of men was an end that Christ ultimately aimed at, in the labors and sufferings he went through, for our redemption, and consequently, by what has been before observed, an ultimate end of the work of creation." He holds, however, that "the glory of God, and the emanation and fruits of his grace in man's salvation," are not to be understood as two distinct things; as we shall see more particularly as we proceed.

As Edwards endeavors to prove that God makes Himself His ultimate end in His works; others hold that the good of the creation is exclusively the final object of what He does. The late Dr. Samuel Austin, in an able dissertation* "respecting the end which God had ultimately in view in creating the world," calls in question the supposition, that God could be, in any respect, "His own end, in the creation of the world." He fully agrees with President Edwards, in his representation of "the incomparable and ineffable excellence of God, and the worth of His being, as the original and immutable source of all other beings;" and he adds, "It seems perfectly suitable, that He should ever respect this infinite worth and excellence of His own nature." "But the question is, whether this respect which God is allowed to have for Himself be not one thing, and the end He had in view in creating, another, in perfect agreement with it indeed, but distinguishable from it, as any two objects are distinguishable. Could His respect for Himself be a respect to any thing attainable? Is there any thing attainable in regard to God himself? Could any thing be added to Him, from that which should wholly proceed from Himself?-Is not His

* In a volume of Dissertations published at Worcester in

original, immutable all-sufficiency absolutely inconsistent with such an idea? His hoppiness is original and unalterable; it is incapable of increase or diminution. God's excellency inherently considered, and His respect to this excellency of His nature, were the same before creating, that they were afterwards."

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This is very true. But does it follow, as the writer affirms, that they must have been the same, if He had not created; that His personal enjoyment or happiness, as, in any sense, a future and attainable object, could not have been more or less His end in creating?" Does not His excellence, in some measure, consist in His purpose to create, and in actually creating, for the sake of conferring happiness on the beings created? Does not His own blessedness consist, in part, in the prospect of the bliss which the obedient subjects of His immeasurable kingdom will forever enjoy? Have we any reason to believe that His happiness is independent of His attributes and works? "Let what will be God's last end," says President Edwards, "that, He must have a real and proper pleasure in; whatever be the proper object of His will, He is gratified in. He is not indifferent whether His will be fulfilled or not.-And if He has a real pleasure in attaining His end, then the attainment of it belongs to His happiness." This does not imply, that there is any increase of God's happiness, by His works of creation and providence; -any addition to what He has forever possessed. For His eternal purpose renders the glory and blessedness of His created kingdom as certain, as it will be when in actual existence; and His omniscience makes it as present to His view, to be ever the object of His complacence and delight. There is no increase of His happiness, as there is no addition to the objects of joy before His mind. According to Dr. Austin's own view of God's infinite benevolence, He takes great delight in the holiness and happiness of His creatures. But let it be supposed, that nothing had been created, would God then have possessed this joy which He now finds in contemplating the excellence and enjoyment of His creation? Or would this his joy continue, on the supposition, if it be not irreverent to make the supposition, that the created uni

* Pages 35, 36, 37.

verse should cease to exist? President Edwards observes, that, "in some sense, it can truly be said, that God has more delight and pleasure, for the holiness and happiness of His creatures." May not the continuance of this delight and pleasure be one ultimate object of His works of providence and redemption? But how can He rejoice in the highest good of His creatures, without making that also an ultimate end to be attained?

This brings us to the last of the three suppositions before stated, concerning the ultimate end for which God created the world, viz. that it was either for Himself alone, or the good of the created universe, or both together. How could one of these be made an ultimate end, without the other? How can God make that in which He has no pleasure an ultimate end; and how can He fail of making His own future pleasure an ultimate end? "According to the Scriptures," says President Edwards, "communicating good to the creatures is what is in itself pleasing to God; and this is not merely subordinately agreeable, and esteemed valuable on account of its relation to a farther end-but what God is inclined to, on its own account, and what He delights in simply and ultimately." How could communicating good to the creatures be pleasing to God, if this good itself were not an object which He values on its own account? President Edwards, after quoting several passages of Scripture expressing strongly the love and grace of God to man, observes, "If our good be not at all regarded ultimately, but only subordinately; then our good or interest is, in itself considered, nothing in God's regard or love." Again, "The Scripture represents Christ as resting in the salvation and glory of His people, when obtained, as in what He ultimately sought, as having therein reached the goal at the end of His race; obtained the prize He aimed at." "That God uses the whole creation, in His whole government of it, for the good of His people, is most elegantly represented in Deut. xxxiii. 26. The good of men is spoken of as the ultimate end of the virtue of the moral world. If the good of the creature be one end of God in all things He does, and so be one end of things that He requires moral agents to do-these things may be easily explained; but otherwise, it seems difficult to be accounted for, that the Holy Ghost should thus express himself, from time to time." The way in which Edwards en