done, both here, and in his explanation of the word cause; or to claim it more distinctly as a part of his system. Yet these plain and forcible declarations are unscrupulously overruled, to a coincidence with what the Reviewer has elsewhere decided to be, the principles of Edwards' philosophy.

This very summary disposal, however, of the marked language of Edwards, does not entirely satisfy even the Reviewer himself. He evidently feels some lingering embarrassments, of which this reasoning does not entirely relieve him. He makes, therefore, a still more labored effort, to 3 deprive Edwards of the benefit of this important distinction. With what a ruinous fatality to his own cause the effort is attended, we shall now endeavor to show.

The Reviewer contends against this language, as he has already done in the instance of the determination of motion, that there is no propriety in supposing two causes to be concerned in the production of an effect. "Every effect is particular and limited. It must necessarily be one thing and not another, have certain characteristics and not others; and the cause which determines the phenomenon, may be supposed to determine likewise all its properties. The cause of a particular motion, for example, must, in producing the motion, give it likewise a particular direction." "Selection is the attribute of the cause, and answers to particular determination in the effect. There must necessarily be one object chosen and not another. Thus, if fire be thrown among various substances it selects combustibles, and produces phenomena accordingly." "Volition must have an object; something is willed or chosen; particular determination and direction are therefore inseparable from every volition, and the cause which really gives it a being, must necessarily give it character and particular determination." This language denies all influence of occasional causes. There is but one cause which influences the effect, and this determines both the phenomenon and those attending peculiarities, or properties, which Edwards has attributed to a totally different one. The nature of fire is a sufficient reason for its uniform selection of combustibles; and so the nature of the will is a sufficient reason for its selection of the volitions to which it gives existence.

Now it must be admitted, that the nature of fire does constitute a sufficient account of the fact, that it always selects

combustibles; and that, for the reason that its nature qualifies it to select nothing else; and the implication is most obvious, that in Prof. T.'s view, the will as a cause is precisely similar, and selects the volitions it does for the very same reason that its nature qualifies it to select no others. There is, in the view of Edwards, a difference between these two kinds of causes, which renders an account that is satisfactory in the one case, unsatisfactory in the other. The existence of this difference, the Reviewer denies. Edwards supposes that the soul is a peculiar cause, having power, in given circumstances, to produce either of two effects, and asks, when one is produced, for the reason why it did not produce the other; Prof. T., on the contrary, considers that there is nothing peculiar about this cause, it produces its effect just as fire does, and it is inadmissible to ask for any other cause, to give to that effect its particular determination.

It certainly would be both idle and unjust, to assert that Prof. T. adopts the system of the physical necessity of volition, but his argument against Edwards on this point, does involve that doctrine. He distinctly denies the propriety of attributing any thing in the effect to any thing but the efficient cause, and maintains that it is by the necessity of its nature an attribute of every cause, to produce its effect, and determine all the attending properties of it, by itself alone, and that in this respect the will resembles all other causes. He studiously and repeatedly denies that any thing like an occasional or final cause is essential to volition. Again and again he declares, and apparently deems it highly important to declare, that the will "may act without reference either to reason or passion;" (p. 226) and that when it does thus act, or when it obeys either of them, it is improper to ask for any reason why it did not act otherwise. He asks (p. 239) "What moves the will to go in the direction of the reason? Nothing moves it; it goes in that direction because it has power to go in that direction. What moves it to go in the direction of the sensitivity? Nothing-it goes in that direction because it has power to go in that direction." Why, when it goes in one direction" it did not go in the other, is a question the Professor has not thought worthy of an answer; or rather it is a question which he deems it improper to ask. So far is he from admitting that an occasional cause is essential to any act of volition, that he expressly denies it, and

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labors to prove the contrary. He admits that it follows from his view of the will as "a power arbitrary and contingent," that it can act without any dictate of reason or any excitement of emotion to induce its action. In the example which he gives to prove this possibility, the selection of one of the sixty-four squares of a chess-board, he maintains that it is for the advocates of necessity to show a connection, between the square selected and the dictate of reason or emotion. His happy scheme is embarrassed with no such difficulty. "In making this selection," he says, (p. 246) "it appears to me that there is an entire indifferency as to which particular square is selected; there is no command of the reason, there is no affection of the sensitivity, towards one square rather than another, and yet the will does select one of the squares." That is, there is no inducement to select this-no motive for its selection-no preference of it over another, and yet the will prefers it-in other words, that the will prefers without having any preference, or any ground of preference. Truly this "power arbitrary and contingent" is not inappropriately named. The Reviewer tells us too, on p. 226, that the only escape from necessity is in this conception of the will as a power which " may act without reference either to reason or passion"-that is, that whoever maintains that previous inclination, or inducement, is essential to voluntary action, maintains in effect the absolute, and unavoidable, necessity of volitions !

There can be no question here, which is on the side of liberty, Edwards, who deems no account of volition satisfactory, which does not specify the mind as the cause of voluntary action, and the motive as the cause, ground, or reason, why the mind exerts such an act, and not a different one, or his Reviewer, who affirms that an occasional cause is not essential to volition, but that volitions do actually take place without it; and that the will selects its effect, just as fire selects combustibles. There can be no question here, whose system admits the distinction between efficient and final causes, which Prof. T. denies to Edwards and claims for himself. We cannot help comparing with this loose and superficial talk, the manly and wholesome reasoning of Edwards

"Now let it be considered what this brings the noble principle of human liberty to-viz. a full and perfect freedom and liableness to act altogether at random. What dignity or

privilege is there in being given up to such a wild contingence as this? to be perfectly and constantly liable to act unintelligently, and as much without the guidance of understanding, as if we had none, or were as destitute of perception as the smoke that is driven by the wind."

It matters not that Prof. T. has said that cases of this nature are rare and trifling; he expressly admits the possibility of choice without any previous inducement, and expressly affirms that this possibility is essential to liberty of volition, out of which admissions this "wild contingence" must of necessity grow. Indeed, were the Reviewer correct in his view of Edwards, and were there no alternative between the two, we should hesitate to adopt the scheme of "arbitrary" volition here commended to our acceptance; and should need to deliberate, before we could decide, whether the fatalism he has attributed to his author, gloomy and pernicious though it be, were not preferable to this emasculated scheme of aimless, unintelligent, hap-hazard contingence, which is all that Prof. T. would allow us in its stead.

The length to which this article has already grown, forbids us to protract it; and therefore we leave unnoticed, with some regret, other representations of the philosophy of Edwards, the correctness of which we are quite as unwilling to admit, hoping perhaps to allude to some of them, in a future examination of those portions of Prof. Tappan's work, to which this is but an introduction.

We are consciously free from all intention to misrepresent Prof. T.; for we agree with him in the general scope of his philosophy. Our remarks have been called forth by a simple desire to vindicate Edwards from charges which we are confident are unfounded, and to promote, in a degree which we are sensible is a very humble one, successful investigation. In the present state of our knowledge of this subject, every effort which calls to it the attention of thinking men, is a contribution for which science should be grateful. We rejoice therefore in the manly energy of the work before us, and honor its author for the independence with which he has forsworn all allegiance to Edwards, or to any other man. We cannot, however, consider him successful in this portion of his labors; and we regret that an effort so vigorously made should have suffered so severely from the want of a sober discrimination. Whoever claims that all the truth is on either

side of this great and protracted controversy, will doubtless secure for his views a partisan advocacy, but doubtless also a partisan opposition, and will leave the subject as unsettled as he found it. There is too much of this about our author. He has allowed himself to be misled by that inveterate prejudice, connected with the words necessary, impossible, &c., against which Edwards so earnestly warns his readers; and has thus formed impressions of the Inquiry which it does not in justice authorise; and the ardent effort he has made to vindicate these unfounded impressions, has forced him into the fallacies we have exposed. His work is thereby deprived of much of its value. It comes before the disciples of Edwards with an original improbability upon its face, which renders it to them almost incredible, and absolves them in their own view, even from the necessity of giving it a hearing.

It is ever to be remembered, in investigations of this nature, that seldom does a man like Edwards frame a system which is in all respects erroneous; and that it is by a close examination of the systems of antagonist authors, and a careful discrimination of the errors from the facts of each, that the principles which all are laboring to discover, shall yet take rank among the ascertained certainties of metaphysical sci

ence.

ARTICLE III.

BAPTISM.

By Rev. Edward Beecher, President of Illinois College, Jacksonville, Illinois.

[Continued from Vol. VI., page 56.]

GOD in his providence seems to be exciting unusual attention to the long continued debate as it regards the mode of Baptism. On this subject, two opposing systems are in conflict. One based on the performance of a specific act-i. e. immersion-the other on indicating an effect, i. e. purification. Each of these systems tends to results peculiar to itself. By these results the true nature of each system will be evolved, and in consequence of them its soundness will be