lature. The electors, composed-or, what is the same thing, for the most part composed-of a certain class in society, cannot sympathise with other bodies; they are careless as to their complaints, indifferent to their welfare, swayed probably by an adverse interest; and the inevitable consequence is, that the ejected classes become discontented, and public dissatisfaction goes on accumulating, till it terminates in a convulsion.

Nothing but the great inequality in the representation has so long preserved the British constitution from this catastrophe. It is of no importance in whom the right of voting is vested if, however, it is placed in any one class exclusively, the constitution must be of ephemeral duration. Had it been exclusively vested in the peers or the greater landholders, the increasing discontents and expanding ambition of the middle orders must long ago have overturned the Government. Had it been vested in the forty-shilling freeholders, their indifference to the wants of the manufacturing and commercial classes would have led to a similar result. Had it been confined to the nomination boroughs, British freedom would have been crushed in the grasp of the aristocracy. Had it been everywhere extended to the potwallopers, that freedom would have been torn in pieces by the madness of the democracy. It is the combination of all these powers in the formation of the representation, which has so long preserved entire the fabric of the constitution, because it has given to each interest a direct and immediate access to the legislature, without being indebted for it to the tolerance or indulgence of the other classes. The nobility place their younger sons in the House by means of the nomination boroughs, and rest in peace, satisfied that they will be at their posts to defend the interests of the higher classes of society. The merchants sway the votes of the smaller boroughs in which they possess an ascendency, and find their way into Parliament through the influence of commercial wealth. Colonial opulence purchases its share of the nomination boroughs; and, entering at what is called the gate of corruption, defends the interests of millions of our distant subjects. The agricultural class return the county members; and the Radicals, triumphant in the great towns, are satisfied with their victory, and return

an adequate share of the whole representation. Nothing but this unequal, heterogeneous, and varied representation could so long have held together the varied and conflicting interests of the British empire.

No human wisdom could have framed such a system. Its utility could not have been anticipated, a priori. Its irregularity would have displeased a theoretical statesman. It is just for this reason that it has been so durable, because it was not formed on abstract principle, but on practical experience; because each class which required a share in the representation, has, in the lapse of time, discovered an inlet which conferred it; and the fabric, moulded into the requisite form by the wants of successive generations, has afforded shelter and accommodation to its numerous and varied inmates.

It is evident, however, that, under such a system, one class might become preponderating; the aristocracy might have usurped the share of the people, or the people might have overthrown the necessary authority of the aristocracy. It is the complaint of the Reformers that the former has been the case; that a majority of the House is returned by the nominees of individuals whose interest is adverse to that of the rest of the empire. Let us consider whether this is the

case.

The proof of the aristocracy being too powerful in the legislature, is of course to be found in the measures it adopts, and the tendency of the elections which create it. If the House of Commons has of late years been inclined to abridge the liberty of the subject, increase the privileges of the aristocracy, crush the freedom of the press, then it is manifest that the aristocratic class has become too powerful in the legislature. If the result of elections has been to increase this tendency; if with every successive Parliament a fresh addition is made to the already overwhelming influence of the great families; then it is plain, that the system of representation does not afford an adequate check against the danger, and that a change in the mode of election-in other words, a Parliamentary Reform, is necessary.

But if the reverse of all this has been the case; if the influence of the aristocracy has been sensibly and evidently

VOL. I.

B

declining; if the measures of Parliament are daily becoming more favourable to public freedom, and the remnants of ancient severity are fast wearing out of our statute-book, then it is evident that no change in the composition of the House of Commons is requisite. If each successive election adds to the strength of the popular party in the legislatureif multitudes of boroughs are throwing off the yoke of authority and returning democratic candidates, instead of those who heretofore commanded their suffrages; then it is plain that the system of representation stands in need of no amendment, at least on the popular side, and that under the subsisting inlets to democratic ambition a sufficient number of members in that interest find an entrance.

That the last of these alternatives is the fact, is matter of proverbial notoriety. The Reformers were themselves the first to proclaim it, when they announced, with such satisfaction, the unprecedented number of boroughs which were thrown open-in other words, gained over to the democratic influence, at the election which preceded the fall of the Wellington Administration. The last election has demonstrated its truth beyond the possibility of dispute; because the democratic influence has become so overwhelming, that the Conservative party has been reduced, at one blow, from 300 to 230 members, and a majority of 136 has voted the adoption of a new and highly democratic constitution.

After this result without reform, what becomes of the argument, that a change in the representation has become necessary to enable the people to keep their ground against the increasing preponderance of the aristocracy? It is apparent that the argument is at an end; that the danger is now to be apprehended from the other quarter; that the risk now is, that the constitution is to be torn in pieces by the democracy; and that the wisdom of real statesmen should be incessantly directed to protecting the bulwarks which face the people. And yet this is the argument and this the time which is chosen for their demolition!

"Amidst the turbulence and disorders of faction," says Adam Smith," a certain spirit of system is apt to mix itself with that public spirit which is founded upon the love of

humanity. The leaders of the discontented party seldom fail to hold out some plausible plan of reformation, which they pretend will not only remove the inconveniences, and relieve the distresses immediately complained of, but will prevent, in all time coming, any return of the like inconveniences and distresses. They often propose, on this account, to remodel the constitution, and to alter, in some of its most essential parts, that system of government under which the subjects of a great empire have enjoyed perhaps peace, security, and even glory, during the course of several centuries together. The great body of the people are commonly intoxicated with the imaginary beauty of this ideal system, of which they have no experience, but which has been represented to them in all the most dazzling colours in which the eloquence of their leaders could paint it. These leaders themselves, though they originally may have meant nothing but their own aggrandisement, become, many of them, in time the dupes of their own sophistry, and are as eager for this great reformation as the weakest and foolishest of their followers. Even though the leaders should have preserved their own heads, as indeed they commonly do, free from this fanaticism, yet they dare not always disappoint the expectation of their followers, but are often obliged, though contrary to their principle and their conscience, to act as if they were under the common delusion. The violence of the party, by refusing all palliation, all temperaments, all reasonable accommodations, by requiring too much, frequently obtains nothing; and those inconveniences and distresses which, with a little moderation, might in a great measure have been removed and relieved, are left altogether without a remedy."*

One would have imagined that this illustrious philosopher was here portraying the history of the present Reform Bill, instead of calmly reflecting on the effects of public folly in former times; so exactly do its consequences coincide in all ages and parts of the world.

The disfranchisement of boroughs sending 168 members to Parliament-in other words, the almost total destruction of the influence of the aristocracy in the House of Commons; the reduction of 63 members from England; the

* Moral Sentiments, ii. 96, 98.

transference of the right of returning 70 new members to boroughs hitherto not represented, and almost all in the manufacturing interest; the extension of the right of voting everywhere to the £10 householders-constitute the principal features of a constitution bearing less resemblance to the British than to the visionary fabric of the National Assembly.

No such alteration has been projected since the Norman Conquest a change greater than was contemplated by Vane, Pym, or the republicans of the Long Parliamentan innovation from which Lord Somers and the authors of the Revolution in 1688 would have shrunk with apprehension, is seriously brought forward at a time when no practical domestic grievance calls for its adoption, and everything in external affairs forbids its being made the subject of agitation. We do not say that Government intend to bring about a revolution; we only assert a fact which is undeniable, as to the magnitude of the innovations which they have proposed.

In all those great changes, the close boroughs were retained as a constituent and essential part of the constitution. When the Petition of Right was framed, which practically amounted to a revolution; when the Long Parliament made open war against Charles I.; when the race of the Stewarts was finally expelled by an unanimous effort of all classes, no similar invasion of private right, no such reconstruction of the Government, was attempted. These great innovators left the representation of the country untouched; well knowing, that to disturb its proportions was to destroy the equilibrium in a way which could never be restored. Erroneous measures of finance may be departed from; oppressive laws may be altered; injurious commercial systems abandoned; but a great concession once made to the popular part of the representation, and there is no retracing our steps. The ground once lost will never be regained; the power relinquished will be seized by reckless and tenacious hands; we are launched upon an unknown sea, on which there is no return.

When the French, in consequence of the successful revolt in July, established, in Lafayette's words, "a throne surrounded by republican institutions;" when the principles of