French republicanism, long smothered, again burst forth, and framed a constitution suited to the utmost verge of modern democracy; the greatest length which the framers of the new constitution deemed it safe to go, was to concede the elective franchise to 220,000 persons in all France. They had had, under the Constituent and Legislative assemblies, full experience of the evils of an extension of the right of voting to a more numerous and inferior class, and well knew that, under the name of freedom, it in truth establishes the worst kind of tyranny.

By the proposed new constitution, the elective franchise is to be extended in this country to 1,000,000 voters; onehalf of whom are to receive this privilege now for the first time. The population of France is 30,000,000-that of the British empire, 22,000,000; France, therefore, receives one voter in every one hundred and forty souls-Great Britain one in every twenty-two. In other words, the new constitution of Great Britain is to be about seven times as popular as the new constitution of France.

Republican France deems it only safe to lower the elective franchise to a person paying two hundred and fifty francs, or about £10, of direct taxes. Monarchical England lowers the qualifications to £10 householders, most of whom do not pay ten shillings in the year of direct taxes. Ten pounds a-year of direct taxes in France is equivalent, from the difference in the value of money in the two countries, to about £15 in this country; and a man who here pays £15 a-year in direct taxes is certainly, at an average, worth £300 a-year. The general income of £10 householders probably will not exceed £60. The French system, therefore, lowers the right of voting to a minimum of £300 a-year; the English to a minimum of £60. In other words, in this view the new constitution of England is to be five times. more democratic than that of France.

Considered with reference to the population, therefore, and the national wealth combined, the new constitution of Britain is to be six times more democratic than that of France.

There are, in England and Wales, fifty-two counties, returning one hundred and four members, and, by the new constitution, there are to be in the United Parliament about

four hundred and thirty English members. The new county members are to be fifty-four, therefore there will be one hundred and fifty-eight county members, and two hundred and seventy-two for boroughs. In other words, the borough members will be to the county not quite as two to one. In Scotland, there are to be twenty-eight county members, and twenty-two for boroughs. In Ireland, there are to be one hundred and three members, of whom sixty-two are for counties, and forty-one for boroughs. Thus, in the Imperial Parliament there will be, upon the whole, three hundred and thirty-five members for boroughs, and only two hundred and forty-five for counties, that is, the borough members will be to the county as three to two nearly.

All

Under the present constitution, the close borough seats represent the whole intelligence and wealth of the empire which is not engrossed by the county representation. the ablest statesmen who have sat in Parliament for the last half century, have obtained their places through these boroughs. "The use of such members," says Lord John Russell, "is incalculable."* The important and weighty interests of the East and West Indies, of Canada, of the shipping interest, of foreign commerce, are thus enabled to obtain a due representation in the legislature; and an immense empire of 120,000,000 of inhabitants, embracing all the quarters of the globe, is held together under a legislature placed in a little island in the German Ocean.

Who are to be the principal electors under the new sysstem? The £10 householders over the whole island-in other words, the most democratic, and, at the same time, the most venal class in existence. Persons of this class, whose incomes vary from £50 to £60 a-year, are of all others those who, in periods of tranquillity, are most accessible to corruption. Mr Hunt, who professes himself the representative of that class, has made this declaration in the House of Commons, which coincides with universal experience; and added, that so strongly is he impressed with this truth, that rather than have the new constitution without the ballot, he would go on with the House of Commons constituted as it at present is. He supports the Reform Bill, being well assured that, if it passes, the

* LORD JOHN RUSSELL on the Constitution, p. 209.

vote by ballot, and all that the Radicals wish, will speedily follow.

Small boroughs, containing four or five thousand inhabitants, are, of all others, the most easily bribed, because they are too large to be entirely under the dominion of the proprietor, and too small to be beyond the reach of external wealth. They are the places where men of fortune strive to outbid each other, by the promise of a large gratuity to each elector. It is unnecessary to refer to examples of so well-known a fact. Every man's experience must furnish him with instances of its application. Lord John Russell's bill may be entitled " A bill for the extinction of the close, and the increase of the venal boroughs."

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In other words, it is a bill to close the avenues which admitted the greatest statesmen of whom England can boast; "which afforded an entrance," in Mr Shiel's words, "to the dignified energy of Chatham, the splendid oratory of Pitt, the impassioned eloquence of Fox, the learned humanity of Romilly, the philosophic wisdom of Mackintosh, the gifted energy of Burke, the grasping intellect of Brougham;" which still furnishes a safe and secure channel of representation to all the great interests of the empire, without going through the disgraceful and demoralising process of actual bribery, in order to augment boroughs which, closed against all these interests, unless when supported by gold, are open only to the dictates of urban selfishness, the cupidity of moneyed power, or the seduction of democratic ambition.

This would be the state of matters during ordinary and pacific times; but what would be its operation in periods of excitement? during those periods of periodic recurrence, when the lower orders, pressed by scarcity or thrown out of employment, are naturally disposed to turbulence, and when the democratic press, ever following in the rear of distress, like vultures on the skirts of a destroying army, stimulate, for their own base purposes, the passions which suffering has produced? Nothing can be clearer than that, in such periods, the great majority of the borough members would be returned in the Radical interest; and thus the great barrier, erected by the constitution against the inroads of democracy, would be converted into the rampart of the revolu

tionary party. In vain would the county members struggle against the successive inroads of democratic ambition during such periods of excitement. Stimulated by the revolutionary press, urged by suffering and insane constituents, the tribunes of the people, sent forward by the boroughs, would successively abolish the corn laws, the church, the funds, and every interest which promised the prospect of spoliation in this great and complicated empire. In making this prophecy, we are not indulging in unauthorised speculation ; we are only supposing that the same causes, when brought into operation in this country, would produce the same effects as they have already produced during the French Revolution.

The Lord Advocate of Scotland has asked on what principle the Conservative party can express apprehensions regarding the extension of the right of voting to £10 householders, when they bewail, in such piteous terms, the disfranchisement of the potwallopers in the popular burghs? He must have had a low opinion of the intelligence of his audience when he could broach such an argument. Is there no difference between ten Radical members and two hundred? between Middlesex, Southwark, Preston, and a few similar places, returning Radical representatives, and a hundred boroughs making such a return? The opponents of Reform make no objection to a proportion of Radical members in the House of Commons; on the contrary, their principle is that they should be there, because the Radicals, like every other interest in the state, should be fairly represented in Parliament. What they object to is, that the constitution should be so altered as to give them a majority. Mr Hume, Mr O'Connell, and Mr Hunt, form a valuable part of the House but what would be the effect of a hundred Hunts, a hundred O'Connells, and a hundred Humes?

This consideration points to the fundamental and irremediable defect of the proposed constitution, that it vests an overwhelming majority in the populace of these islands, to the exclusion of all the other great and weighty interests of the British empire. By confining the right of returning members to Parliament to 40s., and ultimately £10 freeholders in the county, and £10 householders in towns, the command of the legislature will be placed in hands utterly

inaccessible, save by actual bribery, to the approach of the commercial, colonial, or shipping interests. If such a change does not soon produce a revolution, it must infallibly, in the end, lead to the dismemberment of the empire. The East Indian and Canadian dependencies will not long submit to the rule of the populace in the dominant island, indifferent to their interests, ignorant of their circumstances, careless of their welfare. What do the £10 householders of the English boroughs either know or care about the colonial dependencies of the empire? A Radical in their neighbourhood who would promise them relief from taxes, poor-rates, tithes, and corn laws, would carry the day against all the remote or colonial interests of the world.

This evil is inherent in all plans of uniform representation, and must to the end of time render it unfit for the legislature of a great and varied empire. Being based mainly upon one class of society, it contains no provision for the interests of the other classes and still less for the welfare of the remote but important parts of the empire. The great majority of electors being the possessors of houses or shops rented from £10 to £20 a-year, that is, possessed of an income from £60 to £100 per annum, the representatives will be persons inclined to support their local and immediate interests. The remote possessions of the empire can have no influence on such men, save by the corrupt channel of actual bribery. The most valuable feature of the British constitution, that of affording an inlet through the close boroughs to all the great and varied interests of the empire, will be destroyed. The Reform Bill, in this view, may be entitled," a bill for disfranchising the colonial, commercial, and shipping interests, and for investing the exclusive right of returning members to Parliament in the populace of Great Britain and Ireland."

The Radical papers have pointed with exultation to the division on the second reading of the Reform Bill, which showed 209 members for boroughs voting against the bill, and 108 for it. It is not surprising that the division stood as it did. These members were the representatives not only of the boroughs, but of the interests, which were threatened with disfranchisement. Not the borough-mongers, but the