if they would avert the evils of bankruptcy. Now, if the views of the Reformers are well founded, and a great reduction is effected in the price of grain, and consequently in the money income of every man in the kingdom, through the free trade in corn, how are these undiminished money obligations to be made good out of the diminished pecuniary resources of the debtors in them? Mr Baring has estimated that the change in the value of money, consequent on the resumption of cash-payments, altered prices about 25 per cent; and everybody knows what widespread, still existing, and irremediable private distress that change produced. What, then, may be anticipated from the far greater change which is contemplated as likely to arise from a free trade in grain?

But, serious as these evils are, they are nothing in comparison with the dreadful consequences which would result to public credit from the change, and the widespread desolation which must follow a serious blow to the national faith.

It is well known with what difficulty the payment of the annual charge of the national debt is provided for, even under the present scale of prices; and how much those difficulties were increased by the change of prices, and the general diminution of incomes, consequent on the resumption of cash-payments. Indeed, such was the effect of that change that, had it not been counterbalanced by a very great increase, both of our agricultural and manufacturing produce at the same time, it would have rendered the maintenance of faith with the public creditor impossible. Now, if such be the present state of the public debt, even under the unexampled general prosperity which has pervaded the empire since the peace, and with all the security to the public faith which arises from the stable, consistent, and uniform rule of the British aristocracy, how is the charge of the debt to be provided for under the diminished national income arising from the much hoped-for change of prices consequent on the Reform Bill and repeal of the Corn Laws, and the increased national impatience, arising from the consciousness of the power to cast off the burden for ever?-Great and reasonable fear may be felt, whether, under any

quences of Reform, we commiserate more than that of the rural tenantry, suffering, as they will be, under diminished sales, lowered prices, and increased burdens; embittered, as that state must be, by the recollection of how large a share they have had in bringing these evils upon themselves.

The spoils of the Church, however, will afford only a temporary relief. There are 10,000 parishes in England, and the average income of these is stated at £302 a-year each. £3,000,000 a-year, therefore, will be all that can be got out of the Church; and if to this be added £2,000,000 a-year more, as the probable amount of all the mortmain and charitable bequests in the kingdom, the total sum annually available to the state will not exceed £5,000,000. But as property of every sort, and, above all, funded property, would be violently shaken by such measures, and as the immediate effect of such a panic would be to affect, in the most serious manner, commercial and manufacturing credit, it may fairly be anticipated that the revenue, under the effect of such changes, will fall off at least as much as it gains, by destroying both the Church, and the mortmain and charitable institutions of the kingdom. That this supposition is greatly under the truth, is sufficiently proved by the fact, that in France, where commercial credit was so much less extensive than it is in this country, the revenue fell, within a year after the meeting of the States-General, and before any blood had been shed on the scaffold, from £24,000,000 annually to £17,000,000, or nearly a third of its whole amount.*

Finding, then, that the Church has afforded no effectual relief, that the revenue is rapidly diminishing, that the public distress is daily increasing, and that clamorous millions are insisting for relief, the Legislature will be compelled to lower the interest, or abridge part of the capital, of the national debt. We believe that, even under a Reformed and highly democratic Parliament, such a measure as this will not be taken without extreme reluctance: the fatal consequences of infringing on public credit, in a commercial

* YOUNG's Travels, vol. i. 482.

country, must force themselves on the most inconsiderate. The character of the Legislature will, before that time, have undergone a complete change. The numerous and weighty interests, now represented by the nomination boroughs, will no longer be able to raise their voice in Parliament; and if they are, a relentless majority, representing the towns, tied down by pledges to their imperious constituents, will dispose of their opposition as effectually as the resistance to Reform has been overthrown in the present Legislature.

The measure of cutting down, or seriously diminishing the Funds, being one of great magnitude and awful consequences, will be as much disguised as possible. It will be brought forward at first in the shape of a tax on transfers, or some such measure, based on the principle of effecting an equitable adjustment with the public creditor; or possibly a paper currency, possessing a forced and legal circulation, will be issued by Government, and the dividends paid in that shape. But, in whatever way it is done, the effect will be the same public credit will be violated; and, from that instant, a fatal and irrecoverable blow is struck at the industry, and, most of all, the commercial industry of Great Britain.

The ultimate consequences of such an event are incalculable. But some of its earliest effects may be anticipated. The moment that a serious blow is once struck at the public funds, their complete destruction is unavoidable. This must be evident to every one who considers how dependent the revenue of the empire is on the produce of the excise and customs, and how completely they rise or fall with the progress, tranquillity, and confidence of the people. But how is confidence to be maintained, industry encouraged, or commercial enterprise fostered, amidst the consternation consequent on an attack on the Funds? It is quite evident that they must all be paralysed; and that the first blow at public credit, by destroying the source from which the legitimate revenue of the country flows, must soon render their complete destruction unavoidable, even if Government had the strongest disposition to avert the catastrophe.

The Reformers maintain, that such an event is by no means to be so much deprecated as is usually imagined; that

the land and labour of the country would remain, even after such a convulsion; and that, liberated from the load which now oppresses it, the industry of Great Britain would commence a new career of splendour and usefulness. There might be some foundation for this argument if it was foreign debt which was thus expunged: but what shall we say when we recollect that it is our own capital which we are thus destroying the reservoir which sustains all the industry of the country, maintains its labour, feeds its millions, that we are closing for ever? The land and labour of the country will indeed survive the shock: but, deprived of capital, the agriculture will be unable to feed its numerous inhabitants; and, destitute of credit, its manufacturers will be obliged to dismiss their starving millions.

The moment that a national bankruptcy is either directly or indirectly declared, the Bank of England will stop payment, or, what is the same thing, discharge its engagements only in a forced and depreciated paper currency. Let us not deceive ourselves with the example of 1797: a suspension of cash payments, following an attack on public credit, will be very different in its consequences from the suspension which then took place, under a stable Government, to enable it to maintain its public faith. The dreadful catastrophe of December 1825 may afford a faint image of the terrible convulsion which then would take place.

Every Bank in the kingdom will immediately be beset then will begin the closing of those credits which sustain the present industry-the destruction of that capital which has rewarded the past labour of the country. Every post will bring the intelligence of the failure of some banking or commercial house of long-established character; and every hour augment the anxiety of agitated multitudes, eagerly seeking the rescue of their property. Then will begin the terrible, long delayed, but now inexorable accounting between debtor and creditor, all over the country. The Banks will be dunned for payment of their notes and deposit receipts, till their doors are closed, and insolvency declared: they, in return, will issue peremptory orders for the immediate calling up of their cash-accounts, enforcing their debts, with

drawing their credits. Bills will no longer be discounted; no renewals of promissory notes take place; no staving off the dismal day of payment any longer be allowed. Instant peremptory payment of every shilling that every man owed, will be imposed by inexorable necessity, even on the most humane and considerate creditors. Every man will find his whole creditors on his back at once; and how is he to provide for their payment amidst the diminished sales, suspended credit, and increasing difficulties of those who owed him money? The only class who will thrive amidst the general ruin will be the officers of the law; the only writs unceasingly in force, the capias ad satisfaciendum, or the fieri facias; and the only mansions crowded with inhabitants, the workhouses, the hospitals, and the jails.

We do not think that imagination can figure, or description exaggerate, the heart-rending, the wide-spread misery consequent on such a catastrophe. In a country such as this, where two-thirds of the inhabitants depend on trade and manufactures—that is, derive their daily bread from the sale of their produce-and where above twenty millions of souls are destitute of property of any sort, and will be reduced to beggary the moment that they cease to receive their wages, it is impossible to imagine the consequences of such a disaster. The far-famed, but as yet imperfectly understood, misery arising among the poor from the French Revolution, can convey but a faint idea of what it would produce in this country.

How are the poor-rates to be maintained, or the multitudes of starving artisans fed, during such a succession of misfortunes? When four or five millions of human beings, directly or indirectly employed on them, are thrown out of employment by the breaking up of our great manufactories, or the cessation of the working of our mines, and the universal stagnation of business, who is to feed the starving multitude? The ordinary resources-the much-tried charity of the country, the poor-rates-how burdensome soever to those who pay them, will be totally inadequate to the enormous burden. Some great and extraordinary resource must be fallen upon to meet the unparalleled suffering; and what the sovereign multitude will demand is known, by