free enjoyment of theirs. Hence all those evils of mutual violence, rapine, and slaughter, that, in a state of nature, must needs abound amongst equals. Because, though man, in this state, was not without a law which exacted punishment on evil doers, yet the administration of that law, not being in common hands, but either in the person offended, who being a party would be apt to enforce the punishment to excess; or else in the hands of every one, as the offence was against mankind in general and affected the good of particulars not immediately or directly, would be executed remissly. And very often, where both these executors of the law of nature were disposed to be impartial and exact in the administration of justice, they would yet want power to enforce it. Which, altogether, would so much inflame the evils above mentioned, that they would soon become as general and as intolerable as the Hobbeists represent them in that state to be, was it not for the restraining principle of RELIGION that kept men from running into the confusion which the appetite of inordinate self-love necessarily produces. But yet religion could not operate with sufficient efficacy for want, as we observed before, of a common arbiter, who had impartiality enough fairly to apply the rule of right; and power to enforce its operations: So that these two PRINCIPLES were in endless jar; in which justice generally came by the worst. It was therefore found necessary to call in the CIVIL MAGISTRATE, as the ally of Religion, to turn the balance, Jura inventa metu injusti fateare necesse est, Thus was Society invented for a Remedy against Injustice and a Magistrate by mutual consent ap pointed, pointed, to give a sanction to "that common measure "to which, reason teaches us that, creatures of the same rank and species, promiscuously born to the "same advantages of nature, and to the use of the same faculties, have all an equal right*." Where it is to be observed, that though society provides for all those conveniences and accommodations of more elegant life, which man must have been content to have done without, in a state of nature, yet it is more than probable that these were never thought of when society was first establishedt: but that they were the mutual violences and injustices, at length become intolerable, which set men upon contriving this generous remedy. Because evil felt has a much stronger influence on the mind than good imagined: and the means of removing the one is much easier discovered than the way to procure the other: and this by the wise disposition of nature; the avoiding evil being necessary to our existence; not so, the procuring pleasure. Besides, the idea of those unexperienced conveniences would be, at best, very obscure: And how unable men would be, before trial, to judge that society could bestow them, we may guess by observing how little, even now, the generality of men, who enjoy those blessings, know or reflect that they are owing to society, or how it procures them; because it doth it neither immediately nor * Locke. Though the judicious Hooker thinks those advantages were principally intended when man first entered into society: This was the cause (says he) of men's uniting themselves at first into politique societies. Eccl. Pol. L. i. § 10. His master Aristotle, though extremely concise, seems to hint, that this was but the secondary end of civil society; and that that, which we here make to be so, was the first. His words are: yovoμím pìr év To av ivener, Boa di Tv. Pol. L. i. c. 2. directly. directly. But they would have a lively sense of evils felt; and would know that society was the remedy, because the very definition of the word would teach them how it becomes so. Yet because civil society so greatly improves human life, this improvement may be called, and not unaptly, the secondary end of that convention. Thus, as Aristotle accurately observes in the words quoted below, that which was at first constituted for the sake of living, is carried on for the sake of happy living. This is further supported by fact. For we see that those savage nations which happen to live in peace out of civil society, never think of entering into it, though they feel all the advantages of that improved condition in the neighbouring colonies round about them. CHA P. III. OF THE NATURAL DEFECTS OF CIVIL SOCIETY; AND THE NECESSITY OF APPLYING RELIGION TO REMEDY THOSE DEFECTS. CIVIL Society thus established; from this time, as the Poet sings, absistere bello, Oppida cœperunt munire, et ponere leges, Ne quis Fur esset, neu Latro, neu quis Adulter. But as before, bare RELIGION was no preservative against civil disorders; so now SOCIETY alone would be equally insufficient. I. 1. For, first, its laws can have no further efficacy than to restrain men from open transgression; while what And what is done amiss in private, though equally tending to the public prejudice, escapes their censure. man, since his entering into society, would greatly have improved his practice in this secret way of malice. For now an effectual security being provided against open violence, and the inordinate principle of self-love being still the same, secret craft was the art to be improved; and the guards of society inviting private men to a careless security, what advantages it would afford to those hidden mischiefs, which civil laws could not take notice of, is easy to conceive. 2. But, secondly, the influence of civil laws cannot, in all cases, be extended even thus far, namely, to the restraining of open transgression. It cannot then, when the severe prohibition of one irregularity threatens the bringing on a greater: and this will always be the case, when the irregularity is owing to the violence of the sensual passions. Hence it hath come to pass, that no great and flourishing community could ever punish fornication, or vague lust, in such a sort as its ill influence on society was confessed to deserve: Because it was always found that a severe restraint of this, forced open the way to more flagitious lusts. 3. Thirdly, The very attention of civil laws to their principal object, occasions a further inefficacy in their operations. To understand this, we must consider, that the care of the state is for the WHOLE, under which individuals are considered but in the second place, as accessaries only to that whole; the consequence of which is, that, for the sake of the body's welfare, some individuals are often left neglected. Now the care of Religion is for PARtiCULARS, and a Whole has but the second place in its its concern. This is only touched upon to shew, in passing, the natural remedy for the defects, I am here endeavouring to account for. 4. But this was not all: There was a further inefficacy in human laws. The Legislator, in enquiring into the mutual duties of citizens arising from their equality of condition, found those duties to be of two kinds. The first, he intitled the duties of PERFECT OBLIGATION, because civil laws could readily and commodiously, and were of necessity required, to enforce their observance. The other he called the duties of IMPERFECT OBLIGATION; not that morality doth not as strongly exact them, but because civil laws. could not conveniently provide for the observance of them; and because they were supposed not so immediately and essentially to affect the welfare of society. Of this latter kind are gratitude, hospitality, charity, &c. Concerning such, civil laws, for these reasons, are generally silent. And yet, though it may be true, that these duties, which human laws thus overlook, may not so directly affect society, it is very certain, that their violation brings as sure, * Regium Imperium a Sacerdotali in eo maxime distat, quod illi non solæ singulorum civium rationes commissæ sint, sed totius reipublicæ salus; unde fit ut in cives etiam invitos ad fovendum totius reipublicæ corpus, jus illi competat-Quod aliter se habet in episcopali ministerio, cui ecclesiæ sollicitudo ita est commissa, ut singulorum saluti præcipue invigilare debeat, nec curare possit universum corpus aliquorum membrorum pernicie. PETRUS DE MARCA, De concordia sacerdotii et imperii. Epistola ad Cardinalem de Richelieu: Nous aurons occasion de citer souvent ce fameux ouvrage, écrit à la requisition du Cardinal de Richelieu. Nous l'indiquerons par le nom de l'Auteur, prelat aussi zélé pour sa religion que pour son prince. Il mourut peu de tems après sa nomination à l'Archevêché de Paris, où il étoit parvenu par son mérite et par le discernement de son Roi. French translator. though |