Survival and Consolidation: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1918-1921

Etukansi
McGill-Queen's Press - MQUP, 1992 - 502 sivua
With victory in sight, the Bolsheviks turned their attention to the consolidation of power within the former Russian empire. When they took power in 1917, the Bolsheviks believed their revolution had to spread beyond Russia or perish. Neither happened, and in the spring of 1921, at the end of hostilities, they stood alone in the wreckage of the former Tsarist empire. The Bolsheviks had, in Lenin's words, "won the right to an independent existence." This entirely unforseen situation surprised both them and their enemies. Debo shows, however, that nothing predetermined that Soviet Russia would, at the end of the civil war, enjoy an "independent existence" -- or even exist at all. He suggests that a wide range of circumstances contributed to the eventual outcome of the war and that it could have ended indecisively. In his evaluation of the Soviet diplomatic achievement, Debo describes their successes with Britain, Poland, and Germany, their continuing difficulties with Romania, France, and the United States, and the threat from the Far East. This diplomatic success, he maintains, was the result of Soviet victory in the civil war and the patient pursuit of realizable objectives.
 

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Sisältö

Introduction
3
Soviet Russia the German
11
The Soviets propose peace
22
and the Bullitt Mission
34
Soviet policy
55
Soviet Russia and the final months
71
Soviet nationalities
85
Ukraine
106
Soviet policy
213
AngloSoviet negotiations
248
The preliminary peace of Riga
272
The treaties
311
in Southwest Asia 19201921
344
The creation
374
Conclusion
400
Notes
419

A dress rehearsal for an agreement
119
The Soviet
147
the Caucasus 19191920
168
Attempted peace
191
Bibliography
471
Index
493
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