MS. REMAINS of the EMPEROR NAPOLEON, brought from St. Helena, and published by Santini, his Valet.

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(Concluded from our last.) THOUSAND follies were committed at Berlin at the time of the declaration of war. A few headstrong youths went so far as to sharpen their sabres under the very windows of the French Ambassador: it was probably in order to save us the trouble of putting a fine edge upon them, for a few days afterwards these very sabres no longer belonged to their masters, who came and modestly deposited them at our feet.

My van-guard encountered the Prussians. The king's brother who commanded them, a brave soldier, was killed while fighting sword in hand with a quarter-master; a part of the enemy were cut to pieces; those who remained were our prisoners, and very few escaped. I then put myself as the head of the army, as the Prussians waited for me at Jena. This was one of the most glorious days of my life. The Prussian army was annihilated; and soon after this much boasted kingdom was on the brink of being no longer reckoned among the European powers.

France had now to make up for all the gold which for the last twenty-five years she had lavished in Prussia. I drew large sums out of it; but they were never equivalent to what she had received from us during the time we had the misfortune of dreading her power.

I had great designs on Prussia; and it was not until some days after the peace of Tilsit that I abandoned them, out of friendship for the Emperor Alexander, who nevertheless was ignorant of my intention.

I knew from the best sources that the majority of the Prussians were much inclined towards a less despotic government. I had arranged every thing in a manner so as to offer a constitutional monarchy to Prussia,through the medium of its principal magistrates; I should have left them under no restraint whatever, and without interfering with them in the least; they would thus have chosen that form of government which best suited them.

At the battle of Austerlitz, the Russians were so terribly in disorder, that it was sufficient for me to ma

nœuvre on their left extremity and on their centre, in order to compel them to lay down their arms. I did nothing out of respect for the Emperor of Austria. The Russians were at liberty to withdraw; I was generous, Alexander repaid me with ingratitude; but some time after he made common cause with the Prussians, and again marched against me.

The battle of Eylau was one of the most sanguinary in which I had ever commanded. The Russians there showed themselves worthy of their adversaries; the French performed prodigies of valour. I remained master of the field, but it cost me dear; two more such victories, and I should have been obliged to recross the Rhine and commence a new campaign.

The victory of Friedland was less dearly purchased and much more decisive. It brought on the peace of Tilsit, surnamed by the soldiers "the peace of three Emperors," because in fact three emperors were present to ratify it.

This peace, which saved the King of Prussia, (for whom I was preparing to cut out work in his own states,) I should not have consented to, had I not previously had occasion to captivate the esteem and the friendship of the young Emperor Alexander, and that, with a view to the great designs which I had formed on the Spanish house of Bourbon.

Under the head of the "Spanish war," are some valuable and highly interesting facts; he thus introduces the subject:

I occupied the throne of the Bourbons; nothing was more natural than that all who formed part of this family should continually be disposed to injure me one time or other.

To expel this family from the thrones of Europe, was most certainly the best thing I could do for my own safety and that of my successors. In fact, as long as a Bourbon occupied a throne,that crown which I had received by the general consent of the nation, would always have been in a very precarious state. This is, no doubt, a truth apparent to all; a truth flowing from the sceptre I had acquired, and which all the reasoning in the world will not metamorphose into sophistry. Now, should the impartiality of my contemporaries be joined to

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that of future generations, in order to sanction this truth, what will then become of the vulgar accusation of excessive ambition? It will share the same fate with all the false judgments of the ignorant; the world will despise it, in order to render homage to truth.

Charles the Fourth, it is true, conducted himself greatly to my advantage. Would his son have imitated him? I know not; but even should I have been certain of it, that would not have done away with the necessity of expelling him from the throne. I wished to build for ages, and the very existence of my edifice was menaced by the existence of a Bourbon king.

If I had no reason to complain of Charles the Fourth personally, it was not the same with his government. Far from seeing that the Continental blockade was severely maintained in terms of our conditions, it protected the English smugglers with all its power. This was calculated to afflict me in the tenderest part. However this was, I should have checked my disappointment for some time longer, had not the troubles which suddenly sprung up in that kingdom, imperiously marked the favourable moment for the execution of my projects.

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I was at peace with the North. The Emperor of Russia and myself had secret conferences together, but I was not yet sufficiently acquainted, to confide in him. However, I urged him gently, and in a manner calculated to inspire confidence. It was not without success; for he frankly told me, that, had the affairs of Europe permitted him, he wished, once for all, to put it out of the power of the Turks to alarm his dominions. Now, it appeared to me, this was the favourable opportunity for confiding to him my designs on Spain. I communicated to him the motives which determined me: they appeared to him conclusive; and he told me, (these are his own words): "I should act towards them in the same way, (J'en ferais de même)." We then took a mutual oath-he, that he would injure me in nothing respecting my war with Spain; and I, that I would do nothing against him in the war which he projected against the Turks. If it happened otherwise, it is not the less true, that we both kept our good faith.

The ridiculous ambition of Godoy, Prince of Peace, had put every thing

topsy-turvy in the royal family; the Queen, who was the soul of the councils, saw matters only superficially. Charles IV. being old and infirm, subscribed to every thing. The political ignorance of Godoy, and his ridiculous ambition, had alienated, all hearts from him. His intrigues and connexions had placed the royal family at drawn daggers with its chief. The opportunity was excellent, and I seized upon it; nevertheless, I had no intention of acting so suddenly against the Spanish Bourbons, who had put themselves in my power; but two memoirs which Savary brought to me from Madrid, on the moral, political, and financial situation of Spain, decided me in placing the royal family in private confinement. My armies then entered Spain; among the generals who commanded them there were great captains, but the eye of the master was required there more than any where else. 1 never forgave myself for not conducting this war myself: it is a great blot in the history of my enterprizes; for by confining myself exclusively to that great work, by directing it myself, 1 should have conducted it successfully, and Spain would not have been the theatre of so many horrors. The means which, at this epoch, were in my power, are a guarantee for this assertion.

Napoleon next alludes to his Brothers.

Among the causes of the reverses and disappointments which I had experienced, either in Spain or elsewhere, I ought to include the almost entire nullity of my brothers, except Lucien, who might have rendered me great services, had I not, from his illwill towards me, been constrained to remove him. The other three had neither capacity nor strength to govern the kingdom of Yvetot. The necessary consequence was, that all the labour devolved upon me; this has given rise to the report, that in bestowing sceptres upon them, I only intended to make use of them as my lieutenants. This assertion, whatever may have been the facts to support it, is entirely false. It is true, I transmitted instructions to my brothers, and even gave them orders, but (and the proofs are not wanting,) their incapacity, and, at times, their ill-will, forced me to act thus towards them. A monarch, it will be said, ought only to govern

his people in the sense of their interests and of their genius. This is morally true for all other princes; but it will not be denied that the case was very different with respect to my brothers. Certainly had the new kings of Spain, Naples, and Holland, wished to govern conformably to the wishes and to the tastes of their people, they would immediately have broken off with me; even, perhaps, had they been forced to make common cause with my enemies. What, then, would have be come of their thrones, which they could only have possessed so long as they could be supported by the strength and the glory of mine? It would have experienced the fate of the throne of Naples, when Murat abandoned my cause in order to please his subjects. It is thus that in politics two and two do not always make four.

The war in Spain was prolonged; I thought I should thus tire out the patience of the Spaniards; but I was deceived. This people, (I only render it justice) in its misfortune, showed itself superior to all other nations, ancient and modern; there never was but one opinion on that subject. Among this people an unanimous and natural desperation was diffused into all classes of both sexes. A virgin and a prostitute, an honest man and a robber, all united, without repugnance, in killing aFrench man: this effected more than ten armies. Had the French, in 1814, only been one half inspired in a similar manner, the allies would never have returned to their homes. This is the more true, as independent of our desperation, we should have had more than what the Spaniards had, viz. an army of old soldiers ready to form itself from the remains of our armies. On the other hand the idea of an invasion had united all hearts among the Spaniards; but the French became disunited at the approach of the allies: this was, it is true, the work of some men whom history will either proclaim traitors or honest men.

Perhaps also, and to be just towards the French, power is not given to every nation to arm themselves with equal desperation; to make abnegation of every thing, of their property, of their lives, of their dearest affections, in fine, to burn their houses in order to throw fire-brands at the heads of their enemies; all this has been done by the Spaniards.

Then follows a fragment, entitled "Josephine and Marie-Louise." It is MONTHLY MAG. No. 362.

valuable from the tribute paid to the former.

The mortal whom events, and perhaps, also, the eternal decrees, call to the government of natious, is, without contradiction, the man who belongs the least to himself. I was, more than all others on a throne, a man of this character; I owed more to the French than my royal predecessors; I was elected by the people, and not its master, by birthright; I had placed France in the first rank of European powers. This was imposing; but, in order to secure its stability, I required an heir, and, in this respect, Josephine was hopeless.

I do not believe that in the whole universe there was a woman who suited me better than my first consort. She knew how to mingle with my tastes, my habitudes, my principles, my hu mour, and my will; all this was. natural to her; she was the person of her sex with whom, I most delighted to live with whom I have experienced more of domestic happiness. These truths, which our separation would seem to contradict, are not the less as immutable as the light. Had my first consort given me an heir, however important it was for my glory and the illustration of my family, to ally myself with the daughter of kings, that alliance would never have taken place. This acknowledgement I owe to the memory of a woman whom the French have not sufficiently known," and which my interest, perhaps, has consigned to the tomb.

Had it not formed part of my character to shew myself superior to every kind of disappointment, I would, at the time of my separation from Josephine, have proved to the French that it was on my part a great sacrifice made to their happi ness and future tranquillity. I only spoke of it slightly, and this trait of character and of firmness has unjustly placed me in the rank of the ungrateful, by those men who date my troubles from the day in which I divorced my first consort. This is one more reproach from which my conscience entirely absolves

-policy and my personal felicity. The rank of Arch-Duchess, her youth and her candour, promised me many days of glory and of happiness; soon after she bore me a son. As a man, I had no longer any thing to desire; but as a sovereign, and called to great affairs, it was otherwise. I believed that it be longed to my glory and the interest of the French, to secure them and the other nations of Europe from a great future servitude. This project, entirely in favour of the independence of the European states, was reputed the act of an insatiable ambition. The most absurd ideas were attributed to me; and that of an universal monarchy in Europe, was a project impracticable in the age in which we live. Whereas, my object was solely to prevent the Baskirs and the Cossacks from one day giving the knout to the inhabitants of Warsaw, Vienna, Berlin, and even Paris. The idea prevailed that ambition alone directed my steps towards Russia. If the other sovereigns did not immediately oppose it, the reason was, that they were not in a condition to do so; but some time later they lifted up the mask.

The observations of this great man on the war in Russia are so doubly interesting at this moment, that we hesitate not in exceeding our usual limits in order to give place to them.

The continental blockade was conceived in the interest of those nations who repulsed it, because they did not understand it; it is the fate of great enterprizes that they are beyond the understanding of the vulgar. My war against Russia, which had no other object but to deliver Europe from the chains which, with a giant-arm, the Czars were daily forging against it, has created me enemies among nations whose friendship I wished to preserve. Five years have scarcely elapsed since I marched against Russia, when already the enormous increase of her power justifies my motive in wishing to put a curb upon her ambition. Poland is now under the yoke of the Muscovites!

The slavery of Europe will commence with Turkey. I now understand the words which the Emperor Alexander addressed to me at one of our secret interviews: "As soon as the affairs of Europe will permit, I wish to put it out of the power of the Turks to alarm my dominions." The Czar will seize the first occasion to humble the

order of the Crescent. I have had proofs in my possession that the cabinet of St. Petersburg is upon the watch for every thing likely to create embarrassment to the Grand Seignor. The struggle between the two powers will not be long doubtful: for such is the defects of the Turkish government, that should one battle be lost, Constantinople will become a chapel of ease for the empire of the Czars.

There is only one power which may yet save Europe from the inevitable consequences of the success of the Russians beyond the Bosphorus, and that power is England.

Should this latter power hesitate in opposing the Czars in the dismemberment of the heritage of the Sultans, she will one day run the risk of losing a great part of her maritime superiority.* The result will be that England will not suffer the Russian flag to be established in the Ottoman Ports. It is thus that Europe will owe its independence to the rivalry of these two great powers. We may also affirm that by ably starting from this point, the political system of other governments will be found entirely traced out.

The Russians are at this day on the continent what the English are on the ocean; so that the best thing which the other nations can do, is, to encourage these two great powers to cut each other's throats. When two superb lions, the terror of the forests, happen to seize each other by the mane, very ill-advised will the other animals be in wishing to separate them; upon the destruction of the two combatants depends the safety of all.

I believe I have sufficiently proved that I had good reasons for carrying war into the heart of Russia. However I was not entirely decided until I learned that the Emperor Alexander had declared, that before the lapse of two years, Poland should become part of his dominions. I thought to prevent him. A man, who passes for being well informed on the subject, has said, that I committed a great fault in not re-establishing the kingdom of Poland upon a solid basis, by interesting the neighbouring powers in its preservation; but however specious this might appear, I did not think myself bound to do it, and the character of the Poles was the cause of it.

*This passage is the more curious, as it is dated on the 27th November, 1817.

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