166 Ch. 17. 1772 Partition Treaty signed. SIGNING AT PETERSBURGH Frederick declared, that 'he should constantly labour to defend the States of the republic in their integrity.' But I am not aware that the professions of these sovereigns were ever regarded in any other light than as ebullitions of gratuitous hypocrisy. They deceived nobody, nor was it necessary that anybody should be deceived. In August, 1772, the Partition Treaty was executed at Petersburg; and in the following month, the demands of the Alliance were communicated formally to the Government at Warsaw. The time for dissimulation had gone by; and the pretexts, therefore, under which these claims were veiled, hardly afforded a decent covering for rapacity. The Empress Queen and the King of Prussia invented or revived some fabulous pretensions of their predecessors five hundred years before to the several portions of the territory of the Republic, which they respectively appropriated. Catherine, indeed, disdaining the vulgar pretexts of invaders, was content to urge a practical ground, which, on the surface, appeared not wholly untenable. She said that the anarchy of Poland was dangerous to neighbouring States. But if anything could aggravate the outrage, it was rendered more poignant by this cruel and insulting mockery. During her whole reign, Catherine had laboured by every art and intrigue, and when these were ineffectual, by open violence, to perpetuate those very disorders, the existence of which she now affected to make the justification OF THE PARTITION TREATY. of her crime. The elective monarchy, the liberum veto, the religious discords which every Pole who desired regular government sought to abolish, had been kept up by the machinations of the Czarina, as evils which could not fail to work the ruin of the Republic, and secure the triumphs of her policy. 167 Ch. 17. 1772 ment of By the scheme of spoliation which the con- Apportionfederated Powers concluded with the solemn territory. formalities of public law, each appropriated an extent of territory proportioned to his dominions. Russia acquired Livonia and other provinces covering more than 3,000 square miles. Austria had Galicia with part of Podolia and Cracow, comprising 2,500 square miles. Frederick obtained no more than 900 miles of territory, but including Pomerania and the country of the Vistula, which enabled Prussia to assume the position of a firstrate Power. The armies of each potentate immediately occupied the soil of the Republic according to their allotted divisions. Thus was accomplished, by regular compact, without any resistance on the part of the helpless victim, and with the passive assent of Europe, this act of audacious rapine. I can add nothing to, I would abate nothing from, the language of execration with which every friend of freedom, nay, every lover of truth and honesty, has loaded the Treaty of Partition. My immediate concern is to enquire whether any part of the infamy which covers the principals in this transaction can 168 CONDUCT OF THE Ch. 17. justly attach to the other Powers of Europe, and more especially to England, who may have seemed to sanction it by a tacit acquiesence. 1772 Policy of Policy of France, indeed, had done her utmost to frustrate the designs of Russia; and, by instigating the Ottoman Porte to declare war against the Czarina in 1768, she had in fact created a diversion which retarded the fate of Poland for a few years. But it was hardly by regard to the balance of power, still less by sympathy with the liberties of the Republic, that the Court of Versailles was actuated in taking this course. The preponderance of Russian influence in Poland seems to have been but little considered as a question affecting the independence of other European States; and France herself had, for the last two hundred years, competed with Russia for the government of Poland, and would doubtless have been restrained by no sentiment of compunction from sharing in the spoil of that country, had circumstances favored such a design. The ruling motive of French policy at that time, was the prospect of retaliating upon England the humiliation and reverses of the late War; and it was on account of the friendly relations which subsisted between Petersburgh and London, rather than from any speculations as to the balance of power, that France endeavoured to thwart the policy of Russia. The policy of this country was determined by similar considerations. The humiliation of the House of Bourbon was the single aim of British FRENCH GOVERNMENT. diplomacy, as it had been the sole object of the late War, which, but for domestic jealousy, would, in the general opinion, have accomplished its purpose. No statesman of the time, no public man either in or out of Parliament, no public writer, as far as I am aware, ever expressed an opinion adverse to this view of our foreign policy. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that such was the policy suited to that period. Among the indirect means of counteracting the Family Compact, none appeared so effectual as the aggrandisement of Russia. That was the opinion of Chatham, who certainly beyond any other statesman of his age, if not of any period, understood the interests of England, and upheld her ascendancy in the scale of Europe. Burke, acutely sensitive as he was to oppression and wrong, while reprobating the iniquity of the transaction and the violence with which it was attended, felt bound to admit that the immediate effect of the Partition was to lower France by elevating Russia and Prussia in the balance of Power.b The Secretary of State administered a severe rebuke to the Ambassador at Constantinople for his officiousness in urging the Porte to continue the war against Russia, which had been instigated by France for the purpose of effecting a diversion in favour of Poland. The nation itself was wholly indifferent to the wrongs of a people of whom they knew little or nothing, b Annual Register, 1772. 169 Ch. 17. 1772 170 Ch. 17. 1772 CONDUCT OF THE whose case they did not understand, and whose fate was a subject of as little interest as that of any barbarous, or semi-barbarous race at the extremity of the globe. The ministers both of France and England were inferior men; but though Louis may have thought, that, had Choiseul been in power, an event so disastrous to the interests of France might have been prevented, it is certain that the Partitioning Powers would not have been turned from their purpose, which they were fully prepared to accomplish, except by force of arms. France indeed did affect to make warlike demonstrations, but it was notorious that she was in no condition to prosecute hostilities against either of the great military monarchies, whose alliance was cemented by the strongest bonds of interest. England, too, stood in need of rest to recruit her military strength, impaired by the prodigious efforts of the Seven Years' War. Still, for an adequate object, she could have rallied her powers; nay, even in a worthless quarrel, she might, as aforetime, have awakened the vigour and energy which had too often been wantonly displayed; but neither England, nor any other nation, ever undertook hostilities merely to defend another sovereignty from aggression. It has been a common practice, indeed, to make use of such a pretence in a declaration of war; while the real, if not obvious, motive has been interest or ambition. In the most recent instance, the independence of Turkey was menaced by Russia: we took up arms avowedly to maintain |