326

Ch. 21.

1776

Results of the capture.

PHILADELPHIA CAPTURED.

the other column, under General Knyphausen, charged in front. A simultaneous attack, so well planned and so ably executed, might well have prevailed against veteran troops and experienced generals; but Sullivan, who commanded against Cornwallis, had been misled by false information, was surprised; and Stirling, his second, proved incompetent for a duty which required the utmost promptitude and military skill. Assailed in front and rear, the Americans gave way; and the defeat soon became an utter rout. The loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, was supposed to have been about thirteen hundred men, besides seven or eight guns. Washington, however, effected a retreat in good order with the portion of his army which he could keep together, and brought off the principal part of his artillery and baggage. He even attempted still to resist the progress of the enemy, but he was again outflanked, and a fortnight after the battle of Brandy-wine, Cornwallis's division took possession of the city of Philadelphia. The Congress had retired first to Lancaster, and then to York Town.

The capture of Philadelphia, had it followed promptly the capture of New York, might have crushed the insurrection; but now it was considered rather an embarrassment to the British, than a serious blow inflicted on the American cause. The delay of a year had afforded the Americans time to prepare for such an event

ADVANTAGE OF PHILADELPHIA.

calmly, and to appreciate its real importance. They had no means of defending the city, and the raw, ragged levies of Washington could hardly encounter the well disciplined and well equipped battalions of Howe. The province of

1776

Pennsylvania was chiefly in the interest of the
Crown; and while the possession of Philadelphia
would give no great military advantage to the
enemy, a large garrison would be required for its
defence. The chief advantage of Philadelphia
was its position on the Delaware, and the Ameri-
cans, in anticipation of the event which had
óccurred, had taken the precaution of obstructing
the navigation of the river by sinking chevaux de
frize, and by erecting forts in and upon the banks
of the channel. To reduce these forts, and to
open
the communication of the Delaware, Gene-
ral Howe had detached a portion of his army.
The main body of the royal army was encamp- Battle of
ed at Germantown, a long straggling village, about
six miles from Philadelphia; and Washington,
encouraged perhaps by the success of Trenton,
quitted his intrenchments at Skippock Creek,
about sixteen miles distant, and hastened by a
night-march to surprise the British cantonments.
The plan was well arranged and well executed;
and, but for an accident, would probably have been
successful. The Americans drove back the regi-
ments in advance of the British position, and
forced their way to the village, the possession of
which would have enabled them to separate the

327

Germantown.

328

Ch. 21.

1776

of Burgoyne.

AMERICAN DEFEAT AT GERMANTOWN.

two wings of the royal army, and to march upon Philadelphia. But just at this crisis of the engagement, a thick fog came on; the obscurity confused the movements of the Americans, but enabled the royalists to recover from their surprise. The advantage of discipline was speedily asserted. The British rallied, formed, and occupied the posts of defence. The Americans, on the other hand, were thrown into disorder; they mistook each other for the enemy; a panic, such as will sometimes seize veteran armies, spread through their ranks, and they fled from a field which they had all but won. The Americans, though they suffered more in the pursuit than in the action, brought off all their guns; the woody character of the country favored their flight; and though the attempt had failed, the result was not on the whole discouraging. For an army of recruits - hastily levied, without generals, and so destitute of necessaries, that a large proportion was shoeless, destitute of tents, and short of ammunition a — their conduct was highly promising. Within a month they had fought two pitched battles, besides being engaged in minor affairs, and showed at least that they were not incapable of holding their own in the open field.

Capitulation In the meantime, an event of the utmost importance had taken place; - an

an event which

A WASHINGTON's Letters to President of Congress in the Autumn of 1777.

SIR GUY CARLETON.

ultimately proved decisive of the war. This was the capitulation of Burgoyne's army at Saratoga.

329

Ch. 21.

1776

military

The masterly operations of Sir Guy Carleton in Carleton's the spring of 1776, by which the invading army ability. had been driven out of Canada, remained to be completed by the capture of Crown Point and Ticonderoga, of which the Americans had taken possession. These strong forts, of which the first was situated at the base of Lake Champlain, and the other at the head of Lake George, commanded the communication with the northern colonies by the channel of the Hudson; and being taken, there was nothing to prevent the junction of Carleton's army with the army under Howe. Such an event would have placed the whole of the northern provinces under the control of the royalists, and transferred the seat of war, if it had been possible in such a position of affairs to maintain the war, to the southern states.

on the lakes.

Accordingly, vigorous preparations were made Operations to equip a fleet for the attack on the lake forts; but the autumn was far advanced before the preparations were completed. Carleton, however, a very different officer from Howe, suffered not an hour to be lost; and in the middle of October, an armament, consisting of ships of war and transports, moved down Lake Champlain. Arnold, with equal vigour, had made every effort within his means to dispute the passage of the royal fleet. He collected a few ships, not, indeed, equal to the

330

Ch. 21.

1776

General Carleton superseded.

NAVAL ACTION ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN.

squadron which he had to encounter, but still formidable in the hands of such an able and energetic commander. The weight of metal, however, was in favour of the British; and British seamen, under the direction of skilled commanders, were more than a match for a few schooners and galleys, manned by fishermen, and officered by captains of militia. Nevertheless, the Americans made a gallant defence; and it was not until they had lost three of their heaviest ships and seventy men, that they gave way. Arnold, with his usual vigilance and resource, escaped with the remnant of his little squadron during the night; but a gale of wind dispersed his flotilla, and ultimately he reached Ticonderoga with only three ships.

It was then too late in the season to undertake the reduction of Ticonderoga. Leaving the fleet, therefore, to guard the passage of Lake Champlain, Carleton withdrew his army into Canada for winter quarters.

But before the return of spring, an unfortunate and ill-advised change had been made in the northern command. The able and experienced general, whose skill and vigilance had baffled the design upon the accomplishment of which the enemy had justly set the highest importance, was removed from the direction of affairs. Sir Guy Carleton was, for some unassignable reason, deprived of the command in Canada, in favor of General Burgoyne. There was no comparison to be made between the capacity and the services of