XVII. The centuries of wars for the very being of the CHAP. kingdom had thrown a halo round the profession of arms; the pride of chivalry scorned the humble virtues of industry, and even the laws cast dishonor on mechanic labor. The prelates, devoting their vast revenues to wholesale almsgiving, sanctified and perpetuated the idleness of beggary. Just when the discovery of America opened a boundless career to colonial enterprise, the house of Hapsburg succeeded to the throne of Castile and Aragon, and wasted away the resources of the united kingdoms in the animosities and wars of a foreign family. The consolidation of all Spain into one country, for which the Austrian dynasty had during two centuries vainly toiled, signalized the accession of the grandson of Louis the Fourteenth of France; but that blessed unity was gained at the too great price of the time-honored liberties of its ancient kingdoms. Charles the Third, who now held the sceptre in 1777. Spain, was the best of the Spanish Bourbons. It is touching to see the affection with which the degeneracy of his immediate successors leads Spanish historians to dwell on his memory. He was of a merciful disposition, and meant well for the land he ruled, slowly and steadily seeking the improvement of its condition; but he was more devoted to the principle of monarchy than to Spain. He was an obstinate stickler for regality against the pope; and for that he had exiled the Jesuits, and desired the abolition of their order. But under the influence of his confessor, a monk of the worst type, he restored vitality to the Inquisition, suf 1777. CHAP. fered it to publish the papal bull which granted XVII. it unlimited jurisdiction, and, by way of excuse for his consent to its arraigning, on arraigning, on most frivolous grounds, one of his best administrative officers for "atheism, heresy, and materialism," declared that "he would have delivered up to its tribunal his own son." 1 And with increase of years his conscience was sure to grow more sensitive. Feb. Spain believed herself in need of allies. Between the peoples of France and Spain there was no affection; so in August, 1761, a family compact was established between their kings. In forming this alliance not one Spaniard took part: the act was that of the Bourbon families; the agents on the part of the Spanish branch were Wall and Grimaldi, one of them an adventurer from Ireland, the other from Italy. It seemed the dawn of better days for Spain, when, in February, 1777, the universal popular hatred of the babbling, incompetent Grimaldi, quickened by the shameful failure of the expedition against Algiers, drove him from the ministry and from the country. On the eighteenth he was succeeded by Don Jose Moniño, Count de Florida Blanca. For the first time for more than twenty years, Spain obtained a ministry composed wholly of Spaniards; and for the first time since the days of Ferdinand and Isabella, a Spanish policy began to be formed. The new minister, son of a provincial notary, had been carefully educated; following his father's profession, he became one of the ablest advocates of his day, and attained administrative distinction. 1 Montmorin to Vergennes, Madrid, 24 Dec. 1777. XVII. 1777. In March, 1772, he went as ambassador to Rome, CHAP. where by his intrigues Cardinal Ganganelli wås elected pope, and the order of the Jesuits was abolished. He, too, controlled the choice of Ganganelli's successor. Now forty-six years old, esteemed for strong good sense and extensive information, for prudence, personal probity, and honest intentions, he placed his views of ambition in useful projects, and was bent upon enlarging the commerce of Spain, and making the kingdom respected. A devoted Catholic, he was equally "a good defender of regality;" he restrained the exorbitant claims of the church, and was no friend to the Inquisition. Much given to reflection, he was cold and excessively reserved; a man of few words, though his words were to the purpose. Feebleness of health unfitted him for indefatigable labor, and was perhaps one of the causes why he could not bear contradiction, nor even hear a discussion without fretting himself into a passion. To his intercourse with foreign powers he brought something of duplicity and crafty cunning. Like Grimaldi, he professed the greatest regard for the interests and welfare of France; but, unlike Grimaldi, his heart was the heart of a Spaniard. In his manners he was awkward and ill at ease. He spoke French with difficulty. For the fire and haughtiness of a grandee, he had the vanity of a man of considerable powers, who from a humble station had reached the highest under the king; and he clung 1 "Un buon regalista:" the description of Florida Blanca by his king. A "regalista" is one who in the contests between the crown and the church sides with the crown: a XVII. 1777. CHAP. to office with tenacity. His character and qualities and unfailing subservience were exactly fitted to fasten his influence on Charles the Third, and his supremacy continued to the end of the reign. But for the present, his natural slowness of decision was increased by his inexperience. By far his ablest colleague, and perhaps the ablest statesman of Spain, was Galvez, the minister for the Indies, that is, for the colonies. Like Florida Blanca, he had been taken from the class of advocates. The experience derived from a mission to Mexico had made him familiar with the business of his department, to which he brought honesty and most laborious habits, a lingering prejudice in favor of the system of commercial monopoly, and the purpose to make the Spanish colonies self-supporting both for production and defence. On entering upon office, Florida Blanca was met at the threshold by the question of the aspect of the American revolution on the interests of Spain; and as Arthur Lee was already on his way to Madrid, it seemed to demand an immediate solution. But a court which venerated the crown equally with the cross could not sanction a rebellion of subjects against their sovereign. Next, Spain was of all the maritime powers the largest possessor of colonial acquisitions; and how could its government concede the principle of a right in colonies to claim independence? And how could it give an example to England and the world of interference in behalf of such independence? Moreover, the rising state was a republic; and in addi XVII. tion to their fixed abhorrence of the republican CHAP. principle, the Spanish ministers foreboded danger to their own possessions from the example, from the 1777. strength, and from the ambition of the Americans, whom they feared to see cross the Alleghanies and prepare to contest with them the Mississippi. Whatever might betide, the Spanish government would never consent to become the ally of the insurgents, and would never harbor any sympathy with their purpose of independence. Add to this that an American alliance involved a war with England, and that Spain was unprepared for war. Equal to Great Britain in the number of her inhabitants, greatly surpassing that island in the extent of her home territory and her colonies, she did not love to confess or to perceive her inferiority in wealth and power. Her colonies brought her no opulence, for their commerce, which was soon to be extended to seven ports, then to twelve, and then to nearly all, was still confined to Cadiz; the annual exports to Spanish America had thus far fallen short of four millions of dollars in value, and the imports were less than the exports. Campomanes was urging through the press the abolition of restrictions on trade; but for the time the delusion of mercantile monopoly held the ministers fast bound. The serious strife with Portugal had for its purpose the occupation of both banks of the river La Plata, that so the mighty stream might be sealed up against all the world but Cadiz. As a necessary consequence, Spanish shipping received no development; and though the king constructed |