XVII. 1777. CHAP. ships of the line and frigates, he could have no efficient navy, for want of proper nurseries of seamen. The war department was in the hands of an indolent chief, so that its business devolved on O'Reilly, whose character is known to us from his career in Louisiana, and whose arrogance and harshness were revolting to the Spanish nation. The revenue of the kingdom fell short of twentyone millions of dollars, and there was a notorious want of probity in the management of the finances. In such a state of its navy, army, and treasury, how could it make war on England? The aged king wished to finish his reign in unbroken tranquillity; Florida Blanca and Galvez saw that Spain was not in a condition to embroil itself with the greatest maritime power of the day unreserved assurances of a preference for peace were given to the British minister at Madrid, and repeated by the Spanish embassy in London, and it was declared that an American emissary should not be allowed to appear in Madrid. A letter was sent to stop Arthur Lee at Burgos, where he must wait for Grimaldi, who was on his way to Italy. They met1 on the fourth of March, with Gardoqui as interpreter, for Lee could speak nothing but English. Grimaldi, who describes him as an obstinate man, amused him with desultory remarks and professions: the relation between France and Spain was intimate; the Americans would find at New Orleans three thousand barrels of powder and some 1 I have, in MS., Arthur Lee's Grimaldi's account at second-hand, own account of the interview, and also in MS. " XVII store of clothing, which they might take on credit; CHAP. Spain would perhaps send them a well-freighted ship from Bilbao; but the substance of the inter- 1777. view was, that Lee must return straight to Paris, and wait there for instructions to Aranda, which instructions were never to come. At Madrid, Florida Blanca, even though it implied a censure of the court of France, repeatedly made a merit with the British government of having refused to receive an American emissary. "All attempts of the like kind from agents of the rebellious colonies will be equally fruitless: so spoke Florida Blanca to the British minister again and again "in the strongest manner;" "his catholic majesty is resolved not to interfere in any manner in the dispute concerning the colonies;" "it is and has been my constant opinion, that the independence of America would be the worst example to other colonies, and would make the Americans the worst neighbors, in every respect, that the Spanish colonies could have." In all this there is no room to doubt that he was sincere; for the report of the French ambassador at Aranjuez is explicit, "that it was the dominant wish of the catholic king to avoid war, that he longed above all things to end his days in peace." 2 "2 Yet the Spanish court was irresistibly drawn towards the alliance with France, though the conflict of motives gave to its policy an air of uncertainty, weakness, and dissimulation. Its boundless 1 Letters in cipher from Lord Grantham to Viscount Weymouth, 17 March, 20 March, and 26 May, 1777, and many others. 2 D'Ossun to Vergennes, 15 May, 1777. Compare Flassan, Histoire Générale de la Diplomatie Française, vii. 177, note. XVII. CHAP. colonial claims had led to disputes with England for one hundred and seventy years, that is, from the 1777. time when Englishmen planted a colony in the Chesapeake bay, which Spain had discovered, and named, and marked as its own bay of Saint Mary's. It was now perpetually agitated by a morbid and extravagant, though not wholly unfounded jealousy of the good faith of British ministries; and it lived in constant dread of sudden aggression from a power with which it knew itself unable to cope alone. This instinctive fear and this mortified pride gave a value to the protecting friendship of France, and excused the wish to see the pillars of England's greatness overthrown. Besides, the occupation of Gibraltar by England made every Spaniard her enemy. To this were added the obligations of the family compact between the two crowns, of which Charles the Third, even while eager for a continuance of peace, was scrupulous to respect the conditions and to cherish the spirit. Hence the government of Spain, treading stealthily in the footsteps of France, had, under the administration of Grimaldi, given money to the insurgents, but only on the condition that France should be its almoner and that its gifts should be shrouded in impenetrable secrecy. It neglected or reproved the hot zeal with which Aranda counselled war; it still suffered American ships, and even privateers with their prizes, to enter its harbors; but it assured England that everything which could justly be complained of was done in contravention of its orders; and it listened with interest to the vague and delusive proposition of that power for a gen XVII. 1777. eral disarming.1 Fertile in shifts and subterfuges, CHAP. Florida Blanca sought to avoid on either hand a frank, ultimate, irrevocable decision, and evaded everything like an agreement for an eventual war with Great Britain. His first escape from the importunity of France was by a counter proposition for the two powers to ship large reënforcements to their colonies: a proposition which Vergennes rejected, because sending an army to the murderous climate of Saint Domingo would involve all the mortality and cost of a war, with none of its benefits. Florida Blanca next advised to let Britain and her insurgents continue their struggle till both parties should be exhausted, and so should invite the interposition of France and Spain as mediators, who would then be able in the final adjustment to take good care of their respective interests. To this Vergennes could only reply that he knew not how the acceptance of such a mediation could be brought about; and in July he unreservedly fixed upon January or February, 1778, as the epoch when the two crowns must engage in the war, or have only to regret forever the opportunity which they would have neglected.* 1 Vergennes to D'Ossun, 28 February, 1777. MS. 2 D'Ossun to Vergennes, 31 March, 1777. Montmorin to Vergennes, 23 December, 1777. MSS. 3 Florida Blanca to De Aranda, 7 April, 1777. D'Ossun to Vergennes, 8 May, 1777. MSS. 4 Mémoire communiqué au roi, le 23 Juillet, 1777. MS. CHAP. CHAPTER XVIII. ENGLAND PREPARES FOR THE CAMPAIGN OF 1777. JANUARY-MAY, 1777. THE year 1777 opened with a declared division XVIII. of opinion in the British ministry on the conduct 1777. of the war; Lord North formally proposed to his friends in parliament, as his system, the restoration of America to the condition of 1763. The tardy avowal was followed by an intrigue of some of his colleagues to eject him from the cabinet; and though the intrigue failed, the policy of the Bedford party was still paramount. The conduct of the war on the side of Canada was left entirely to Lord George Germain; the chief command and the planning of the next campaign within the United States remained with Howe, who was strong in the support of Lord North and the king. Lord North's Address in the Public Advertiser of 24 January, 1777. Noailles to Vergennes, Jan uary, 1777. Compare Colonel Walcott's report to Howe, 11 March, 1777. MS. |