XXII. cil of safety, "will make him peculiarly useful at CHAP. the head of your state." Schuyler wrote: "his family and connections do not entitle him to so distin- 1777. guished a preeminence." The aid of Vermont was needed; Schuyler would never address its secretary except in his "private capacity." There could be no hope of a successful campaign, but with the hearty coöperation of New England; yet Schuyler gave leave for one half of its militia to go home at once, and the rest to follow in three weeks, and then called upon Washington to supply their places by troops from the south of Hudson river, saying to his friends that one southern soldier was worth two from New England. On the twenty-second, long before Burgoyne was ready to advance, Schuyler retreated to a position four miles below Fort Edward. Here again he complained of his "exposure to immediate ruin." His friends urged him to silence the growing suspicion of his cowardice; he answered: "If there is a battle, I shall certainly expose myself more than is prudent." To the New York council of safety he wrote on the twenty-fourth: "I mean to dispute every inch of ground with Burgoyne, and retard his descent as long as possible;" and in less than a week, without disputing anything, he retreated to Saratoga, having his heart set on a position at the junction of the Mohawk and Hudson. The courage of the commander being gone, his officers and his army became spiritless; and, as his only resource, he solicited aid from Washington with unreasoning importunity. The loss of Ticonderoga alarmed the patriots of New York, gladdened the royalists, and fixed the CHAP. wavering Indians as enemies. Five counties were in XXII. the possession of the enemy; three others suffered 1777. from disunion and anarchy; Tryon county implored immediate aid; the militia of Westchester were absorbed in their own defence; in the other counties, scarcely men enough remained at home to secure the plentiful harvest. Menaced on its border from the Susquehanna to Lake Champlain, and on every part of the Hudson, New York became the battle-field for the life of the young republic; it had crying need of help; its council accepted Schuyler's excuses, and seconded his prayers for reënforcements. As commander-in-chief of all the armies of America, Washington watched with peculiar care over the northern department; in the plan of the campaign he had assigned it more than its share of troops and resources; and he added one brigade which was beyond the agreement, and of which he stood in pressing need, for the army of Howe was twice or thrice as numerous as that from Canada. In this time of perplexity, when the country from the Hudson to Maryland required to be guarded, the entreaties from Schuyler, from the council of New York, and from Jay and Gouverneur Morris as deputies of that council, poured in upon Washington. Alarmed by Schuyler's want of fortitude, he ordered to the north Arnold, who was fearless, and Lincoln, who was acceptable to the militia of the Eastern states. Beside those generals he sent, even though it weakened his own army irretrievably, still one more excellent brigade of continental troops under Glover. To hasten the rising of New England, he wrote directly to the brigadier-generals of Massachusetts and Con XXII. 1777. necticut, urging them to march for Saratoga with at CHAP. least one third part of the militia under their command. At the same time he bade Schuyler "never despair," explaining that the forces which might advance under Burgoyne could not much exceed five thousand men; that they must garrison every fortified post left behind them; that their progress must be delayed by their baggage and artillery, and by the necessity of cutting out new roads and clearing old ones; that a party should be stationed in Vermont to keep them in continual anxiety for their rear; that Arnold should go to the relief of Fort Stanwix; that, if the invaders continued to act in detachments, one vigorous fall upon some one of those detachments might prove fatal to the whole expedition. In a like spirit he expressed to the council of New York "the most sensible pleasure at the exertions of the state, dismembered as it was, and under every discouragement and disadvantage;" the success of Burgoyne, he predicted, would be temporary; the Southern states could not be asked to detail their force, since it was all needed to keep Howe at bay; the attachment of the Eastern states to the cause insured their activity when invoked for the safety of a sister state, of themselves, of the continent; the worst effect of the loss of Ticonderoga was the panic which it produced; calmly considered, the expedition was not formidable; if New York should be seasonably seconded by its eastern neighbors, Burgoyne would find it equally difficult to advance or to retreat. All this while Schuyler continued to despond. On the thirteenth of August he could write from Stillwa XXII. He CHAP. ter to Washington: "We are obliged to give way and retreat before a vastly superior force, daily increasing 1777. in numbers, and which will be doubled if General Burgoyne reaches Albany, which I apprehend will be very soon; ;" and the next day, flying from a shadow cast before him, he moved his army to the first island in the mouth of the Mohawk river. pitied the man who should succeed him, and accepted the applause of his admirers at Albany for "the wisdom of his safe retreat." For all this half-heartedness, the failure of Burgoyne was certain; but the glory of his defeat was reserved for soldiers of Virginia, New York, and New England. The first blow was struck by the husbandmen of Tryon county. 2 Burgoyne, on his return to London in 1776, played the sycophant to Germain by censuring Carleton for not having used the Oswego and Mohawk rivers for an auxiliary expedition, which he had offered to lead. Overflowing afresh with bit-* terness for this neglect, Germain adopted the plan, and settled the details for its execution chiefly by savages. To Carleton, whom he accused of being "resolved to avoid employing Indians," he he announced the king's "resolution that every means should be employed that Providence had put in his majesty's hand for crushing the rebellion." 5 The savages were, moreover, to be committed to more indulgent officers than Carleton had approved. Schuyler to Washington, 13 2 Conversation with General Bur- 3 Compare Carleton to Germain, 13 October, 1777: "to give him 4 [Burgoyne] a suitable command on the Mohawk river." 4 Précis of operations on Canadian frontier. 5 Germain to Carleton, 26 March, 1777. MS. 6 Germain to Carleton, 19 March, 1777. MS. XXII. 1777. And now Burgoyne was himself to forward the CHAP. movement of which he was confident that the dread would scatter the American army and open an unobstructed way to Albany. The force under Saint Leger, varying from the schedule of Germain. in its constituent parts more than in its numbers, exceeded seven hundred and fifty white men. For the Indians neutrality had charms, and "the Six Nations inclined to the rebels" from fear of being finally abandoned by the king. The Mohawks could not rise, unless they were willing to leave their old hunting-grounds; the Oneidas were friendly to the Americans; even the Senecas were hard to be roused. Butler at Irondequat assured them that there was no hindrance in the war-path, that they would have only to look on and see Fort Stanwix fall; and for seven days he lavished largesses on the fighting men and on their wives and children, till "they accepted the hatchet" which he gave them." "Not much short of one thousand Indian warriors," certainly "more than eight hundred," joined the white brigade of Saint Leger. In addition to these, Hamilton, the lieutenant-governor of Detroit, in obedience to orders from the secretary of state, sent out fifteen several parties, consisting in the aggregate of two hundred and eighty-nine red braves with thirty white of ficers and rangers, to prowl on the frontiers of Pennsylvania and Virginia. 6 Collecting his forces as he advanced from Mon 1 Compare Riedesel's diary. 2 Colonel John Butler to Carle ton, 28 July, 1777. 3 Colonel Butler to Carleton, 28 July, 1777. 4 Col. Daniel Claus to Secretary Knox, in Brodhead's Documents, 5 Germain to Carleton, 26 March, 6 Lieut.-Gov. Hamilton to Germain, Detroit, 27 July, 1777. MS. |