XXIII. effective men under Washington, including militia, CHAP. volunteers, and the division of Sullivan, were but about eleven thousand five hundred. Congress never exacted more from Washington, and never gave him less support; but he indulged in no complaint, and his cheerful courage had root in his own fortitude. His army reflected his patriotism, and the presence of enthusiasts from Europe proved to him the good-will of other nations. There the young Marquis de Lafayette, received into his family as a volunteer without command, risked life for the rights of man. The Marquis de la Rouerie, at home the victim of a misplaced love, called in America Colonel Armand, commanded an independent corps of such recruits as could not speak English. The recklessly daring Pulaski, whose eager zeal had wrought no good for his own country, an exile from Poland, now gave himself to the New World. On the twenty-fourth of August, Washington led his troops, decorated with sprays of green, through the crowded streets of Philadelphia to overawe the disaffected; the next day he reached Wilmington just as the British anchored in the Elk with the purpose of marching upon Philadelphia by an easy inland route through an open country which had no difficult passes, no rivers but fordable ones, and was inhabited chiefly by royalists and Quakers. Until Sullivan, after more than a week, brought up his division, the American army, which advanced to the highlands beyond Wilmington, was not more than half as numerous as the British; but Howe from the waste of horses by his long voyage was 1777. XXIII. CHAP. compelled to inactivity till others could be seized or purchased. 1777. On the third of September, the two divisions under Cornwallis and Knyphausen began the march towards Philadelphia; by Washington's order Maxwell and the light troops, formed by drafts of one hundred men from each brigade, occupied Iron hill, and after a sharp skirmish in the woods with a body of German yagers who were supported by light infantry, withdrew slowly and in perfect order. For two days longer Howe waited that he might transfer his wounded men to the hospital-ship of the fleet, and purchase still more means of transportation. Four miles from him Washington took post behind Red Clay creek, and invited an attack, encouraging his troops by speeches, by his own bearing, and by spirited general orders. On the eighth, Howe sent a strong column in front of the Americans to feign an attack, while his main army halted at Milltown. The British and Germans were rejoicing over the march so wisely planned, and as it was believed so secretly executed, and went to rest in full confidence of turning Washington's right on the morrow, and so cutting him off from the road to Lancaster. But at dawn on the ninth the American army was not to be seen. Washington divined his enemy's purpose, and by a masterly and really secret movement took post on the high grounds above Chad's ford on the north side of the Brandywine, directly in Howe's path. Inferior in numbers and in arms, yet bent on earnest work, Washington disembarrassed his troops of their baggage and sent it forward to Chester. XXIII. A battery of cannon with a good parapet guarded CHAP. the ford. The American left, resting on a thick, continuous forest along the Brandywine, which be- 1777. low Chad's ford becomes a rapid encumbered by rocks and shut in by abrupt, high banks, was sufficiently defended by Armstrong and the Pennsylvania militia. On the right the river was hidden by thick woods and the unevenness of the country; to Sullivan, the first in rank after the general, was assigned the duty of taking "every necessary precaution for the security of that flank," and the six brigades of his command, consisting of the divisions of Stirling, and of Stephen, and his own, were stationed in echelons along the river. my, On the tenth the two divisions of the British arled respectively by Knyphausen and Cornwallis, formed a junction at Kennet Square. At five the next morning more than half of Howe's army, leaving all their baggage even to their knapsacks behind them, and led by trusty guides, marched under the general and Cornwallis up the Great Valley road to cross the Brandywine at its forks. About ten o'clock, Knyphausen with his column, coming upon the river at Chad's ford, seven miles lower down, halted and began a long cannonade, manifesting no purpose of forcing the passage. Washington had "certain" information of the movement of Howe; less than half of the British army, encumbered with the baggage of the whole, was in his front, and its communication with the fleet had been given up. He, therefore, resolved to strike at once at the division with Knyphausen; if nothing 1 Sparks's Washington, v. 109, correcting Sullivan's misstatement. XXIII. CHAP. more were done, a serious damage to its means of transportation would change the aspect of the cam1777. paign. As Washington rode up and down his lines the loud shouts of his men witnessed their love and confidence, and as he spoke to them in earnest and cheering words they clamored for battle. Sending word to Sullivan to cross the Brandywine at a higher ford, and thus prevent the hasty return of the body with Howe and Cornwallis while at the same time he would threaten the left flank of Knyphausen, Washington put his troops in motion. Greene with the advance was at the river's edge and about to begin the attack, when a message came from Sullivan, announcing that he had disobeyed his orders, that the "information on which these orders were founded must be wrong." The information on which Washington acted, was precisely correct; he had made the best possible arrangement for an attack; his activity and courage equalled the wisdom of his judgment; but the failure of Sullivan overthrew the design, which for success required swiftness of execution. After the loss of two hours, word was brought that the division of Cornwallis had passed the forks and was coming down with the intent to turn the American right. On the instant Sullivan was ordered to confront the advance. Lord Stirling and Stephen posted their troops in two lines on a rounded eminence southwest of Birmingham meeting-house; while Sullivan, who should have gone to their right, marched his division far beyond their extreme left, leaving a gap of a half-mile between them, so that 1 Chastellux, i. 205. XXIII. he could render no service, and was exposed to be CHAP. cut off. The other general officers, whom he "rode on to consult," explained to him the faultiness 1777. of his position, by which the right of his wing was unprotected. Upon this, Sullivan undertook to march his division from a half-mile beyond the left to his proper place on the right. The British troops, which beheld this movement as they lay at rest for a full hour after their long march in the hot day, were led to the attack before he could form his line. His division, badly conducted, fled without their artillery, and could not be rallied. Their flight exposed the flank of Stirling and Stephen. These two divisions, only half as numerous as their assailants, in spite of the "unofficerlike behavior" of Stephen, fought in good earnest, using their artillery from a distance, their muskets only when their enemy was within forty paces; but under the vigorous charge of the Hessians and British grenadiers, who vied with each other in fury as they ran forward with the bayonet, the American line continued to break from the right. Conway's brigade resisted well; Sullivan, so worthless as a general, showed personal courage; Lafayette, present as a volunteer, braved danger, and though wounded in the leg while rallying the fugitives, bound up the wound as he could, and kept the field till the close of the battle. The third Virginia regiment, commanded by Marshall and stationed apart in a wood, held out till both its flanks 1 Sullivan to Congress, 27 Sept. 1777, in Farmer and Moore's Collections, ii. 210. This letter of Sullivan's is not in Sparks, but is essen VOL. IX. 34 tial to a correct understanding of the 2 Washington's charge against |