Neither ambition nor interest has been the impelling cause of my actions. I never designedly misused any power confided to me. The fortune with which I came into office, is not bettered otherwise than by that improvement in the value of property which the natural progress and peculiar prosperity of our country have produced. I retire* with a pure heart,† with undefiled hands, and with ardent vows for the happiness of a country, the native soil of myself and progenitors for four generations. FRANCE. 1796. There are circumstances which render it too probable, that a very delicate state of things is approaching between the United States and France. When threatened with foreign danger, from whatever quarter, it is highly necessary that we should be united at home; and considering our partiality hitherto for France, it is necessary towards this union, that we should understand what has really been the conduct of that country towards us. It is time for plain truths, which can only be unacceptable to the hirelings or dupes of that nation. France, in our revolution war, took part with us. At first she afforded us secret and rather scanty succors, which wore more the complexion of a disposition to nourish a temporary disturbance in the dominions of a rival power, than of an intention to second a revolution. The capture of Burgoyne and his army decided the till then hesitating councils of France, produced the acknowledgment of our independence, and treaties of commerce and defensive alli *without cause for a blush. † with no alien sentiment to the ardor of those vows for the happiness of his country, which is so natural to a citizen who sees in it. ance. These again produced the war which ensued between France and Great Britain. The co-operation and succor of France after this period was efficient and liberal. They were extremely useful to our cause, and no doubt contributed materially to its success. The primary motives of France for the assistance she gave us, was obviously to enfeeble a hated and powerful rival, by breaking in pieces the British empire. A secondary motive was to extend her relations of commerce in the new world, and to acquire additional security for her possessions there, by forming a connection with this country when detached from Great Britain. To ascribe to her any other motives-to suppose that she was actuated by friendship towards us, or by a regard for our particular advantage, is to be ignorant of the springs of action which invariably regulate the cabinets of princes. He must be a fool, who can be credulous enough to believe, that a despotic court aided a popular revolution, from regard to liberty or friendship to the principles of such a revolution. In forming the conditions upon which France lent her aid, she was too politic to attempt to take any unworthy advantage of our situation. But they are much mistaken who imagine that she did not take care to make a good bargain for herself. Without granting to us any material privilege in any of her external possessions, she secured in perpetuity a right to participate in our trade, on the foot of the most favored nation. But what is far more important, she, in return for the guarantee of our sovereignty and independence, obtained our guarantee of her West India possessions in every future defensive war. This may appear at first sight a mutual and equal advantage, but in its permanent operation it is not so. The guarantee of our sovereignty and independence, which is never likely to be again drawn into question, must hereafter be essentially nominal; while our guarantee of the West India possessions must grow into a solid advantage, increasing in importance as we advance in strength-and exposing us often to the chances of being engaged in wars, in which we may have no direct interest. However this guarantee may be regarded as nominal on our part, in this very early stage of our national power, it cannot be so in time to come. We shall be able to afford it with effect, and our faith will oblige us to do so. But whatever were the motives of France, and though the conditions of the alliance may be in their permanent tendency more beneficial to her than to us, it was our duty to be faithful to the engagements which we contracted with her, and it even became us, without scanning too rigidly those motives, to yield ourselves to the impulses of kind and cordial sentiments towards a power, by which we were succored in so perilous a crisis. Nor should we ever lightly depart from the line of conduct which these principles dictate. But they ought not to be carried so far as to occasion us to shut our eyes against the just causes of complaint which France has given or may hereafter give us. They ought not to blind us to the real nature of any instances of an unfair and unfriendly policy which we have experienced or may hereafter experience from that country. Let us cherish faith, justice, and, as far as possible, good will, but let us not be dupes. It is certain that in the progress and towards the close of our revolution war, the views of France, in several important particulars, did not accord with our interests-she manifestly favored and intrigued to effect the sacrifice of our pretensions on the Mississippi to Spain. She looked coldly upon our claim to the privileges we enjoy in the cod fisheries; and she patronized our negotiation with Great Britain without the previous acknowledg. ment of our independence:-a conduct which, whatever color of moderation may be attempted to be given to it, can only be rationally explained into the desire of leaving us in such a state of half peace, half hostility with Great Britain, as would necessarily render us dependent upon France. Since the peace every careful observer has been convinced that the policy of the French government has been adverse to our acquiring internally the consistency of which we were capable-in other words, a well-constituted and efficient government. Her agents every where supported, and with too little reserve, that feeble and anarchical system, the old confederation;—which had brought us almost to the last stage of national nothingness, and which remained the theme of their eulogies, when every enlightened and virtuous man of this country perceived and acknowledged its radical defects and the necessity of essential alterations. The truth of all this, of which no vigilant and unbiased friend to his country had before the least doubt, has been fully confirmed to us by the present government of France, which has formally proclaimed to us and to the world the Machiavellian conduct of the old governments towards this country; nor can we suspect the promulgation to have been the effect of the enmity of the new against the old government, for our records and our own observations assure us that there is no misrepresentation. This disclosure, which has not sufficiently attracted the attention of the American people, is very serious and instructive. Surely it ought to put us upon our guard—to convince us that it is at least possible the succeeding rulers of France may have been on some occasions tinctured with a similar spirit. They ought to remember that the magnanimity and kindness of France and the former government were as much trumpeted by its partisans among us as are now the magnanimity and kindness of the present government. What say facts? Genet was the first minister sent by the new government to this country. Are there no marks of a policy in his behavior, or in his instructions? Did he say to us, or was he instructed to say to us with frankness and fair-dealing-Americans, France wishes your co-operation;-she thinks you bound by your treaty -or by gratitude-or by affinity of principles to afford it? Not a word of all this. The language was-France does not require your assistance; she wishes you to pursue what you think your interest. What was the conduct? Genet came out with his pocket full of commissions to arm privateers. Arrived at Charlestown, before he had an opportunity of sounding our government, he begins to them, and to fit out privateers from our ports;-certain that this was a practice never to be tolerated by the enemies of France, and that it would infallibly implicate us in the war, our government mildly signifies to him its dis approbation of the measure. He affects to acquiesce, but still goes on in the same way-very soon in open defiance of the government;-between which and our own citizens he presently endeavors to introduce jealousy and schism. He sets on foot intrigues with our southern and western extremes, and attempts to organize our territory, and to carry on from it military expeditions against the territories of Spain in our neighborhood—a nation with which we were at peace. It is impossible to doubt that the end of all this was to drag us into the war, with the humiliation of being plunged into it without ever being consulted, and without any volition of our own. No government or people could have been more horridly treated than we were by this foreign agent. Our Executive, nevertheless, from the strong desire of maintaining good understanding with France, forbore to impute to the French government the conduct of its agent; made the personal with him, and requested his recall. The French government could not refuse our request without a rupture with us, which at that time would have been extremely inconvenient for many plain reasons. The application for the recall accordingly had full suc cess; and the more readily as it arrived shortly after the overthrow of the party (to which Genet belonged), and thus afforded another opportunity of exercising vengeance on that devoted party. But it were to be very credulous to be persuaded that Genet acted in this extraordinary manner, from the very beginning, without the authority of the government by which he was sent; and did not the nature of his conduct contain an internal evidence of the source it could be easily traced in the instructions which he published. These instructions demonstrate three things, though the last is couched in very covert terms. 1. That France did not consider us as bound to aid her in the war. 2. That she desired to engage us in it, and the principal bribe was to be large privileges in her West India trade. 3. That if direct negotiation did not succeed, indirect means were to be taken to entangle us in it whether so disposed or not. It is not matter of complaint, |