offenses other than the ones for which they were surrendered, then this is a part of "the supreme law" which every court in this country is bound to apply in any case involving the question. This immunity, as we have previously shown, is secured in the extradition treaty of the United States with France; and hence, Lagrave, who was surrendered under that treaty, was, by "the supreme law," entitled to its benefit. It was for a specified purpose, and that alone, that he was surrendered; and it was only in reference to that purpose that any jurisdiction could be acquired over his person without violating the treaty, unless he committed some crime subsequently to his surrender, or chose to remain in this country. So the General Term of the Supreme Court held; and this decision, though reversed, seems to us the only one consistent with the treaty, and, hence, with "the supreme law of the land." him by the law of the land. Judge Fancher, when this case was before him, held that the whole extradition "proceeding was unauthorized and illegal." See 14 Abb. Pr. R. (N. S.) 333. If so, the treaty, both as a compact and a law, precluded any jurisdiction over Lagrave as against his right of asylum in the country from which he had been illegally removed. His arrest and delivery in France were contrary to the treaty, and his arrest and detention in this country were no better. He had a right by the law of the treaty to show this fact. 8. The Chief Judge further says: "The right of exemption from prosecution [for other than the extradition charge], if it can be said to exist at all, is based upon the good faith of the government, which is necessarily uncertain, and is a political and not a judicial question." We have in this statement a mixture of truth and error. It is true that such a right, if secured by treaty, cither expressly or by implication, binds the good faith of the government accordingly, and is, in this sense, based upon that faith, because it is in the compact. The government cannot in good faith institute a prosecution for any but the extradition charge. And yet it is just as true in this country that the right, if secured by treaty, is also secured by law, since the treaty itself is a law; and hence, the question, when an extradited party is arraigned for trial, whether the right exists or not under the treaty, is a question of law, and, as such, "a judicial question," no matter what course the government, as a prosecutor, may pursue in the case. The duties and powers of the court, and the rights of the accused party by the supreme law of a treaty, do not de 7. The Chief Judge further says: "The indictment [of Lagrave] was for burglary in the third degree under our statute, and clearly not within the treaty; but it is not for the defendant to raise this question. The government of France had power to surrender him for any offense, and even if deceived and defrauded, the defendant cannot interpose in its behalf. The question of good faith is for the two governments." It is quite true that, as to "the question of good faith" between the two governments, Lagrave was not the official representative of either; yet it is to be borne in mind that France delivered him up, not in the exercise of its general "power to surrender him for any offense," but under proceedings in pursuance of a treaty, and on the charge of burglary, which the French authori-pend upon the question whether the government, in ties must have supposed to be the burglary provided for and defined in the treaty. Such, however, was not the fact as to the crime charged against him; and on this point these authorities were mistaken, and but for this there would have been no delivery. Lagrave was delivered for the common law offense of burglary as set forth in the treaty, and for that alone; and this was not the offense charged. could not, of course, be tried for the offense in respect to which he was surrendered, since there was no indictment against him charging that offense: and he should not have been held, detained or tried upon any other ground, since by the terms of the treaty, and, hence, by "the law of the land," no jurisdiction had been acquired over him for any other purpose. He To take advantage of the mistake, committed by the French authorities, as to the nature of the charge pending in this country, and use the jurisdiction thus acquired for a purpose different from the one for which it was intended to be granted, was not only to violate the treaty itself as a compact between the two governments, but to disregard the rights of the surrendered party as secured to prosecuting that party, is observing or violating the obligations of the treaty under which he was surrendered. The treaty being a law, the court is bound to protect him against any invasion of his rights as secured by it. The remark of the Chief Judge may be true in countries where the construction of treaties is a purely political question; but, so far as it denies the judicial character of the matter referred to, it is not true in the United States, and cannot be, unless it is also true that extradition treaties are excepted from that provision of the Constitution which makes treaties of the United States a part of "the supreme law of the land." No one surely will pretend that the Constitution contains any exception in respect to this class of treaties. Their character as laws is just as clear and complete as that of treaties on any other subject. 9. The Chief Judge also adverts to the case of Caldwell, 8 Blatchf. C. C. R. 131, decided by Judge Benedict, and to the opinion of the law officers of the British Government in the case of Burley. We considered in a previous article the decision in the first of these cases, and simply here refer to what was then said, with the remark that the case arose under a treaty with Great Britain, while that of Lagrave arose under a treaty with France. As to the opinion of the law officers of the British Government, in the case of Burley, it is to be observed that that government, in the Winslow correspondence, rejected the opinion altogether, and declared that it was not a correct construction of the extradition stipulation between Great Britain and the United States. It is not a little remarkable that the Chief Judge should, in 1874, quote this opinion as an authority, when the English Extradition Act of 1870 had entirely set it aside as a false opinion. One would suppose that, as to the proper construction of the treaty between the two governments, the British Parliament in 1870 was quite as good authority as the law officers of the crown in 1864. We offer this comment upon the several points contained in the deliverance of Chief Judge Church, not to call in question the authority of the decision made by the Court of Appeals, but for the purpose of showing that neither the decision nor the logic in support of it is consistent with the extradition treaty of the United States with France. As between the two decisions, that of the General Term of the Supreme Court, though reversed, seems to us the one which this treaty both sustains and demands. The other case in which the same question was judicially considered is that of The State v. Hawes, arising in the criminal court of the county of Kenton, in Kentucky, August, 1877, and reported in the Amer. Law Times Rep., vol. 4, p. 524. Hawes was demanded from the Dominion of Canada on four indictments, charging him with as many acts of forgery, and by the Canadian authorities he was delivered up on three of them, one of the four not being regarded in Canada as furnishing a sufficient ground for delivery. He was brought to trial on two of these indictments and acquitted; and the other two were dismissed on motion of the attorney for the Commonwealth. The acquittal and the dismissal therefore disposed of all the charges on which he had been extradited. There were, however, other indictments pending against Hawes, charging him with embezzlement, an offense for which he was not and could not have been extradited. Upon one of these indictments a motion was made to bring him to trial; and whether he could be so tried was the question which came before Judge Jackson for decision. After stating the case, the Judge proceeded to say: "And now the question is raised by the motion under consideration, whether this court can now detain Hawes for trial of this or the other indictments pending against him, for offenses charged to have been committed prior to his extradition, and for which he was not extradited." Having shown that this country recognizes no international extradition except as provided for by treaty, and also quoted that section of the Constitution which makes treaties a part of "the supreme law of the land," the Judge further said: "By the constitution and law of Kentucky, the prisoner (Smith N. Hawes) stands indicted for the offense of embezzlement, and he should be tried therefor and punished, if found guilty, according to law, or acquitted if his guilt is not proven to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt, unless by the provision of the treaty of 1842, heretofore referred to, it is illegal to go into the investigation of the case at this time. If there be a treaty governing the subject, that treaty as it now is, and not as it may be by subsequent conventions or high joint commissions between the high contracting parties, is now to control. I am bound to take judicial notice of the treaty concluded at Washington on the 9th of August, 1842, between the United States and Great Britain." Having quoted the treaty, the Judge then remarked as follows: "If, by the terms of this treaty, either expressed or implied, the prisoner, Smith N. Hawes, cannot be tried for any offense for which he was not extradited, then, although he may be within the bar of this court, or in jail under the control of this court, as this court is bound to regard that treaty, it is outside of its jurisdiction to proceed with the trial, as the supreme law of the land' otherwise provides; and this whole question hinges upon the construction of the treaty." And as to this question of construction, we have the opinion of the Judge in the following extract: "By the terms of the article of the treaty now under consideration, it is only for certain offenses that extradition will be permitted by either government. Embezzlement is not one of those offenses. * * * * * * * It is urged in argument that there is no positive stipulation against the trial of a non-extraditable offense. Why mention any offenses if a party can be tried for any and every thing not mentioned? When nations enumerate, do they not exclude every thing not enumerated? Here we have by this treaty a mutual agreement that certain offenders, and none others, may be extradited, to be tried. * * * Now if there be any thing agreed upon between the two high contracting parties, it was, that for the offenses therein enumerated, and for no other, there was to be a mutual surrender. For nothing else could such a demand or surrender be made; and when so made it is monstrous that there should be a trial for any thing else. If there be any thing in the doctrine that when you enumerate rights or privileges, you are held to strictness as to the rights enumerated, and that every thing else not enumerated is not included, then it follows, as a logical sequence, that the treaty here having provided only for extradition as to certain cases and under certain circumstances and proof, the right of asylum is to be held sacred as to any thing for which the party was not and could not be extradited. I do not mean to say that he [Hawes] may not hereafter be tried; but what I mean to say is that, in the face of the treaty herein referred to, he is not to be tried until there is a reasonable time given him to return to the asylum from which he was taken." * * ** Judge Jackson disposed of the case in accordance with these views, and gave the prisoner the opportunity of returning to Canada by ordering his discharge from custody, which he immediately improved. The ground taken was that the treaty, considered as a compact between the two governments, contemplates that the person delivered up under it shall be tried only for the extradition charge or charges, and that, considered as a law, the treaty gives him a legal right against any other trial which it is competent for him to present to a court, and which that court is bound to recognize and secure. The jurisdiction of the court to try Hawes on the charge of embezzlement, though complete under the constitution and laws of Kentucky, was, according to Judge Jackson, precluded by "the higher law" of the treaty. will dispose of it contrary to law, and contrary to the Constitution of the United States. We can readily understand how a court may decide that a treaty does not,, as a matter of fact, secure immunity against trial for any but the extradition offense, and on this ground proceed to try the party on other charges; but we cannot understand how an American court can refuse to consider the question, treat it as non-judicial, and dismiss it as a mere matter of "good faith" on the part of the government, when presented in the pleading of the extradited and accused party, or exclude the right of such immunity provided it be secured by treaty. If thus secured, it is secured by "the supreme law,” which every judicial officer is sworn to obey in adjudicating upon the rights of parties. Chief Judge Church, in the Lagrave case, argued, in some parts of his deliverance, against the existence of any such right by treaty, and, in other parts, against the right of the accused party to present the right to a court as a ground of defense, even if it does exist. With all due respect to that distinguished jurist, we must, in the light of the previous argument, regard him as incorrect in both positions. The extradition treaties of the United States secure the right by an implication so clear that its denial is not consistent with them; and the Constitution of the United States makes these treaties a law in respect to that right, and that law is a proper basis for a plea as to the offense for which an extradited This differs very widely from the doctrine of Judge Benedict in the cases of Caldwell and Lawrence, and from that of the New York Court of Appeals in the case of Lagrave, while it entirely accords with the view taken by the General Term of the Supreme Court in the latter case. We regard it as sound law. Treaties in this country are laws for the government of courts, both State and Federal; and it is their duty, alike in civil and criminal actions, to apply them in determining the rights of parties in suits before them, whenever they affect those rights. The fact that they are compacts between nations, and, as such, the subjects of diplomatic consideration and construction, does not change their char-party may be put on trial. acter as laws, or release courts from the obligation of taking cognizance of them, and giving effect to them, when individual rights are involved in them, or guaranteed by them. They are not to be dismissed on the theory that they are mere compacts 66 with which judicial tribunals have nothing to do. They are laws for the regulation of courts, and laws in respect to the interests and claims of parties whose rights they affect. The Supreme Court of the United States, in the early case of Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199, asserted and applied this principle, and has repeatedly affirmed it in subsequent cases. An accused party, when called to plead to an indictment, has the legal right to appeal to the whole law applicable to his case. If he can show that the indictment has not been found according to law in any essential particular, then it is not a legal accusation; and this fact appearing, no court has the right to put him on trial upon such a charge. And so, if a trial upon an indictment is precluded by a treaty of the United States, which in that event would be a part of the law applicable to the case, and superior to any State law, strange would it be if the party had no right to appeal to this law as a ground of defense. He has the right as a matter of law; and if the court ignores such a plea altogether, and treats the case as if no such right existed, then it I FURNISHED APARTMENTS. DON'T see that law rubbish is worse than any other sort. It is not so bad as the rubbishy literature that people choke their minds with. It doesn't make one so dull." This sapient remark of Mr. Rex Gascoigne (one of George Eliott's latest friends) is the excuse for the appearance, at this season of rubbishy magazine articles, of this olla podrida of cases. Many a young bachelor, and many a young feme sole, is just now contemplating the advisability of taking a furnished house, or, at the least, furnished apartments. To such young people we would extend the following words of advice, warning and information, based upon the experience of bygone days. Imprimis, to avoid all possibility of future disputations with the owner of the furnished lodgings or house (as the contract concerning them is one concerning an interest in lands, within the purview of the Statute of Frauds) it is well to follow Mr. Woodfall's advice, and have the agreement reduced to black and white. In it should be specified the amount of rent, the time of entry, the length of notice to quit required, and other necessary particulars; and do not neglect to have affixed a list of the goods and chattels in the apartments. Woodfall's Landlord and Tenant, 8th ed., 173. "Tis well to see that the taxes and the rent (unless the landlord owns the house) are paid up and are likely to be kept so, for one's own personal belongings will be liable for his rent and taxes; unless, indeed, the local habitation chance to be in New England, New York, or some one of the other States of the Union where the power of distress no longer exists. Parsons on Contracts, vol. II, 517. Of course a man does not take much with him except his books, but his wife takes her clothes, her cat and her bird, and none of these are exempt from a landlord's warrant. Wearing apparel cannot be seized for debt but it can be for rent, unless in actual use. Mr. Baynes helped to decide this point. In 1794 he was eight weeks in arrears for his furnished lodgings, so a bailiff appeared on the boards, and took his raiment and that of Mrs. B., although part of it was actually in the washtub at the time, and Lord Kenyon, before whom the matter came, said that it was all right. Baynes v. Smith, 1 Esp. 206. The same judge, in another case, decided that a landlord could take the clothes belonging to a man's wife and children, while they, the clothes screens (as Carlyle calls them), not the clothes, were in bed, and which the bipeds-thus left naked-were in the daily habit of wearing, on the ground that they were not in actual use. Bisset v. Caldwell, 1 Esp. 206 n. As for the cat, Coke said, ages ago, that pussies could not be distrained, because in them no man could have an absolute and valuable property; but that reason is not applicable to costly Angoras, and cessante ratione cessat et ipsa lex. Woodfall says a bird may be taken (p. 284). Unfortunately the poor creature seized upon cannot make the other tenants or lodgers pay their share toward the debt. Hunter v. Hunt, 1 C. B. 300. Because this right to distrain is a grievous remedy, in some places only the goods of the debtor himself are allowed to be taken, and not those of an undertenant. Parsons, vol. I, 518; Archer v. Wetherell, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 112. If any new furniture is to be placed in the rooms by the landlord, and the intending lodger desires it done, the agreement had better be put into writing; for then no rent is payable until the promise is fulfilled. Medielen v. Wallace, 7 A. & E. 54; Vaughan v. Hancock, 3 C. B. 766. Fortunately, when one gets settled in his abode, he need not care if the water pipes in his rooms leak through the floors and injuriously affect the property of the tenant below, provided the defect was not known to him, and could not have been detected without examination, and there has been no negligence on the tenant's part, for he is not bound at his peril to keep the water in the pipe. Ross v. Fedden, 7 Q. B. 661. The occupant of an adjoining apartment may, and probably will, if he has any æsthetic sensibilities, object to a stove pive going from your room to the chimney in his; but if there had been one there before his arrival in the house, the strong arm of the law will nullify his opposition, for then he took his room subject to the easement of the black cylindrical smoke conductor and its necessary hole in the chimney, and he cannot cause your kettle to cease from singing or your pot from bubbling because his sense of the sublime and beautiful is offended. Culverwell v. Lockington, 24 C. P. 611. Sometimes in these latter days of shoddy and of shams the boiler attached to the kitchen stove will explode with terrific uproar, doing considerable damage to the nerves of the inhabitants, and slight injury to the coarser portions of the human frame divine. If such a thing happen in a furnished house, even though caused by the want of a safety valve, the tenant need not, at least if in New York State, rush off to attack his landlord, unless he can prove that the latter knew of the defect, or had reason to apprehend a catastrophe if the boiler was used. Taffe v. Harteau, 56 N. Y. 398. Although on one occasion the courts in the Empire State held the owner of the house liable for injuries caused by an explosion of gas arising from the pipes not being properly secured. Kimmell v. Burfied, 2 Daly (N. Y.), 155. If it happen that on a rainy day, a drip, drip, drip, a patter, patter, patter is heard in the room, and ugly splashes of water are seen descending upon a most costly carpet or valued book, 'tis useless to cry out that the landlord must pay for the mischief done by his leaky roof; for, as Baron Martin lately observed, one who takes the floor in a house must be held to take the premises as they are, and cannot complain that the house was not constructed differently. The storm may have blown off some shingles, and then, even were he bound to use reasonable care to keep the roof secure, he cannot be held responsible for what no reasonable care or negligence could have provided against. He could not certainly be considered guilty of negligence, if he had the roof periodically examined, and it was all secure when last looked at. Carstairs v. Taylor, L. R., 6 Ex. 223. But, by the way, in New York, a landlord, who himself occupied the top flat, and allowed liquids to leak through into the rooms of his tenants below, was held liable. Stapenhurst v. Am. Man. Company, 15 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 355. A layman might imagine that a landlord must keep his house in good order so that the occupaut be not damnified, but a cleric knows that the law says quite the reverse; that he is not bound to do any repairs, however necessary, except such as he expressly agrees to do; no promise is implied; nor need he do any thing, even though the main walls gape and yawn threateningly, and the pumps have to be worked several hours daily to keep the basement free from water. Arden v. Pullen, 10 M. & W. 321; Keates v. Cadogan, 10 C. B. 591; Gott v. Gandy, 2 E. & B. 845; Wiltz v. Matthews, 52 N. Y. 512; Tuffe v. Harteau, 56 id. 398. "Tis true, that, in New Hampshire, a couple of years ago, it was held that a landlord is liable for injuries accruing to his tenants if he negligently builds his house, or carelessly suffers it to continue in disrepair. Scott v. Simons, 54 N. H. 426. But then, a very high American authority tells us that the decisions of the courts of other States are entitled to more weight than those of New Hampshire. 16 A. L. J. 419. Unfortunately for the poor tenant, he must continue to pay rent, however wretched his house becomes, unless there has been an error or fraudulent misdescription of the premises, or they are found to be uninhabitable through the wrongful act or default of the landlord himself. Lyon v. Gorton, 7 Scott, 537; and perhaps even then. Surplice v. Farnsworth, 7 M. & G. 576. Even if the fire fiend swallows up the building, the landlord is entitled to his rent, just as if all had gone on as merrily as marriage bells, until regular notice to quit has been given, and the required time has rolled round. Packer v. Gibbons, 1 Q. B. 421; Fowler v. Payne, 49 Miss. 32. Of course, the length of notice required depends upon the nature of the tenancy, whether it be a yearly one, or from quarter to quarter, month to month, or week to week: a half year's or a quarter's, or a month's, or a week's notice being requisite, as the case may be. Parry v. Hazell, 1 Esp. 94; Woodfall's L. & T., 8th ed., 174. But even here judges differ, and some say that in an ordinary weekly tenancy a week's notice to quit is not implied as a part of the contract, unless there is a special usage. Huffel v. Armistead, 7 C. P. 56; People v. Geolet, 14 Abb. Pr. (U. S.) 130. Yet those who hold to this latter view think that a reasonable notice is needed. Jones v. Mills, 10 C. B. (N. S.)788. Willes, J., on one occasion said, in a half frightened sort of way, as if he knew that he was wrong, that because, in a tenancy from year to year, only six months' notice is required, therefore he could not see how it was possible that a tenant from week to week could be entitled to more than half a week's notice. Id. One cannot leave because the idea has possessed him that the landlord's goods and chattels are about to be seized for rent (Ricket v. Tulleck, 6 C. & P. 66), unless express stipulation has been made to that effect. Bethell v. Blencome, 3 M. & G. 119. In the case of furnished lodgings, all the rent is deemed to issue out of the land, none out of the tables and chairs, pots and pans. Newman v. Anderton, 2 Bos. & P. New R. 224; Cadogan v. Kennet, Cowp. 432. The law will allow a landlord to make himself disagreeable in many ways, but he cannot insist upon locking up the hall door at an early hour in the evening; for when he rents his rooms he impliedly grants all that is necessary for their free use and full enjoyment (and that, in the case of most mortals, includes the use of the hall and stairs) whenever required, and not merely when he in his discretion may deem best. Maclennan v. Royal Insurance Company, 39 U. C. R. 515. Nor can he object to the free use of the bell and knocker; in fact, an action will lie against him if he attempts to interfere with the reasonable use of all the necessary adjuncts of his furnished apartments. Underwood v. Burrows, 7 C. & P. 26. Though, if the tenants are an undesirable class, the proprietor might, in mitigation of damages, show that he acted in this surly way for the express purpose of getting rid of his lodgers. Id. Occasionally newly-arrived tenants of furnished rooms find that all the previous occupants have not moved out; that some-small, but aldermanic in shape - have no intention of leaving. Unwilling to test the truth of the scientific assertion that these creatures all retire to their nooks and crannies shortly after midnight, these fastidious individuals eagerly inquire if they can at once quit the haunted house. It seems that they can. Long since Baron Parke said that the authorities appear fully to warrant the position that if the house is incumbered with a nuisance of so serious a nature that no one can reasonably be expected to live in it, the tenant can give it up; because there is an implied condition that the owner rents the place in an habitable state. Lord Abinger went even further, and stated that he thought no authorities were wanted to establish the point, that common sense was enough to decide it. He thought that tenants were fully justified in leaving under such circumstances. Smith v. Marrable, 11 M. & W. 5; Addison on Contracts, 375. Some gentlemen, learned in the law, have, however, thought that these judges were mistaken in this, because, in some later cases, it has been held that there is no implied warranty in the lease of a house, or of land, that it should be reasonably fit for habitation, occupation or cultivation, aud that there is no contract (still less any condition) implied by law on the demise of real property, only that it is fit for the purpose for which it is let. Hart v. Windsor, 12 M. & W. 68; Sutton v. Temple, id. 57; Searle v. Laverick, L. R., 9 Q. B. 131. But then, in some of these latter decisions the case of a ready-furnished house is expressly distinguished, upon the ground that the letting of such a house is a contract of a mixed nature, being, in fact, a bargain for a house and furniture, which, of necessity, must be such as are fit for the purpose for which they are to be used. Lord Abinger was particularly strong upon the point; he said said that "if a party contract for the lease of a house ready furnished, it is to be furnished in a proper manner and so as to be fit for immediate occupation. Suppose, said he, it turn out that there is not a bed in the house, surely the party is not bound to occupy it or continue in it. So, also, in the case of a house infested with vermin; if bugs be found in the beds, even after entering into possession, the lodger or occupier is not bound to stay in it. Suppose, again," his lordship continues, "the tenant discovers that there are not sufficient chairs in the house, or they are not of a sort fit for use (short of a leg, we presume) he may give up possession." Hart v. Windsor, supra. And so late as April in the last year of grace, Lord C. B. Kelly said it was his opinion, both on authority and on general principles of law, that there is an implied condition that a furnished house shall be in a good and tenantable state, and reasonably fit for human occupation from the very day on which the tenancy is to begin, and that when the house is in such a condition that there is either great discomfort or danger to health in entering or dwelling in it, then the intending tenant is entitled to repudiate the contract altogether. Wilson v. Finch Hatton, L. R., 2 Ex. Div. 343. Judge Shaw, of Massachusetts, says that when furnished rooms in a lodging-house are let for a particular season, a warranty is implied that they are suitably fitted for such use (Dutton v. Gerrish, 63 Mass. 94), and Abinger thought that the proprietor was bound to supply whatever goods and chattels might be necessary for the use and occupation of a house such as the one let. Across the line it has been held that the existence of a noxious smell in a house does not afford the tenant a reasonable excuse for leaving. Westlake v. De Grau, 25 Wend. 669. But my lady, the Dowager Countess of Winchelsea, found otherwise. She agreed to rent a furnished house in Wilton Crescent, London, for three months of the season of 1875 for 450 guineas; but when she arrived, with her servants and personal baggage, an unpleasant smell saluted her aristocratic nostrils, so she declined to occupy the mansion, and, ordering round her horses, drove off. On investigation, the drains were found to be in a shocking state; it took three weeks to make the place fit for habitation, and then the Countess refused to go back or pay any rent. The lawyers then had to appear on the scene and after them the judges. These latter bewigged gentlemen unanimously held that the state of the drain entitled her ladyship to rescind her bargain and refuse to pay the rent. Wilson v. Finch Hatton, L. R., 2 Ex. Div. 336. Some people object to scarlet fever and small-pox (perhaps rightly so) and do not like to take up their |