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CHAP. ish troops struggled through a deadly shower of bullets to climb the rocky hill-side. For fifteen minutes they met with a most determined resistance, especially from the men of Maryland and Delaware. In the American camp it seemed that the British were worsted; but just then, Rall, who, acting from his own observation and judg ment, had brought up two regiments by a more southerly and easier route, ordered his bugles to sound, and decided the day by suddenly charging the Americans on their flank. Macdougall, attacked in flank and front by thrice his own numbers, still preserved his communications, and conducted his party over the Bronx by the road and bridge to Washington's camp. Of stragglers only about eighty were taken. The loss of the Americans in killed and wounded was less than a hundred, while that of the English and Hessians was at least two hundred and twenty-nine.

CHAPTER XI.

FORT WASHINGTON.

OCTOBER 29-NOVEMBER 16, 1776.

XI.

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THE Occupation of Chatterton hill enfeebled CHAP. Howe by dividing his forces; and he waited two days for four fresh battalions from New York and 1776. two from New Rochelle. Washington employed the respite in removing his sick and his stores, strengthening his position, and throwing up strong works on higher grounds in his rear.

A drenching rain in the morning of the thirtyfirst was Howe's excuse for postponing the attack one day more; in the following night, Washington, perceiving that Howe had finished batteries and received reënforcements, drew back his army to high ground above White Plains. There, at the distance of long cannon-shot, he was unapproachable in front; and he held the passes in his rear. His superiority as a general was manifest; but under the system of short enlistments his strength was wasting away. The militia would

Oct.

CHAP. soon have a right to go home, and did not always XI. wait for their discharge. To the To the several states 1776. was reserved the sole right to issue commissions ; if this had been seasonably done, troops whose time was nearly at an end might have engaged again ; "it was essential to keep up some shadow of an army," and for all that "not a single officer was yet commissioned to recruit."

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Thus far Howe had but a poor tale to tell; he must do more, if he would not go in shame into winter-quarters. Putnam, whose division had been the last to leave New York island, had an overweening confidence in the impregnability of Fort Washington, which he had raised; on his parting request, Greene, whose command now extended to that fort, had not scrupled to increase its garrison by sending over between two and three hundred men. The regiments which Washington had assigned to its defence were chiefly Pennsylvanians under the command of Colonel Magaw, who, from love of country, had passed from the bar of Philadelphia to service in the army.

On the last day of October, Greene, who was as blindly confident as Putnam, wrote to Washington for instructions; but without waiting for them, he again reënforced Magaw with the rifle regiment Nov. of Rawlings. On the second of November, Knyphausen left New Rochelle, and with his brigade took possession of the upper part of New York 5. island. On the fifth, Howe suddenly broke up his encampment in front of Washington's lines, and moved to Dobbs' ferry; the American council of war which was called on the sixth at White Plains

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,, 1776.

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agreed unanimously to throw troops into the Jer- CHAP. seys, but made no change in its former decision "to retain Fort Washington as long as possible. Nov. That decision rested on an order from congress; to that body, therefore, Washington, on the day of the council, explained the approaching dissolution of his own army, and "that the enemy would bend their force against Fort Washington, and invest it immediately." But congress left their former orders unchanged. "The gentry at Philadelphia loved fighting, and, in their passion for brilliant actions with raw troops, wished to see matters put to the hazard."1 Greene was possessed with the same infatuation; when, on the sixth, three vessels passed the obstructions in the Hudson, he wrote to Washington, "that they were prodigiously shattered from the fire of his cannon;" and at the same time, reporting that Rall had advanced with his column to Tubby-hook, he added: "They will not be able to penetrate any further."

Washington saw more clearly. Cares of every sort overwhelmed him, but could not daunt his fortitude, nor impair his judgment. His first object was to save the garrison at Fort Washington, and the stores at Fort Lee; and on the eighth he gave to Greene his final instructions, overruling the order of congress with modesty yet with clearness: "The passage of the three vessels up the North river is so plain a proof of the inefficacy of all the obstructions thrown into it, that it will fully justify a change in the disposition. If we cannot prevent vessels from passing up, and the 1 Mifflin to R. Morris, 21 Nov. 1776. MS.

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CHAP. enemy are possessed of the surrounding country,

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XI. what valuable purpose can it answer to attempt to 1776. hold a post, from which the expected benefit can8. not be had? I am, therefore, inclined to think that it will not be prudent to hazard the men and stores at Mount Washington; but, as you are on the spot, I leave it to you to give such orders, as to evacuating Mount Washington, as you may judge best, and so far revoking the order given to Colonel Magaw to defend it to the last. So far as can be collected from the various sources of intelligence, the enemy must design a penetration into Jersey, and to fall down upon your post. You will, therefore, immediately have all the stores removed, which you do not deem necessary for your defence."

Having thus disposed of the question of Fort Washington by revoking the order to defend it to the last, and providing, as he believed, for its evacuation, and having ordered "immediate" preparations for evacuating Fort Lee, he turned his 9. mind to other duties. On the ninth, he began sending with Putnam to the Jerseys five thousand troops, of which he was himself to take the command. On the tenth, Lee, who, with about seven thousand five hundred continental troops and militia, was to remain behind till all doubt respecting Howe's movements should be over, was warned, in written orders, to guard against surprises, and to transport all his baggage and stores to the northward of Croton river, with this final instruction: "If the enemy should remove the greater part of their force to the west side of Hudson's

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