66 XV. 1776 dred pounds current money." These electors were CHAP. to elect by ballot "six out of the gentlemen residents of the eastern shore," and "nine out of the 1783. gentlemen residents of the western shore" of the Chesapeake bay; the fifteen " gentlemen thus chosen constituted the quinquennial senate of Maryland, and themselves filled up any vacancy that might occur in their number during their term of five years. This is the most deliberate measure which was devised to curb or balance popular power, and marks the reluctance with which its authors parted from their institutions under the crown of England. Each state had its governor or president, as in the days of monarchy; but the source of his appointment was changed, and his powers abridged. In the four New England states he was chosen directly by all the primary electors, which is the safest way in a republic; in New York, by the freeholders who possessed freeholds of the value of two hundred and fifty dollars; in Georgia, by the representatives of the people; in Pennsylvania, by the joint vote of the council and assembly, who were confined in their selection to the members of the council; in the other six states, by the joint ballot of the two branches of the legislature. Except in Pennsylvania, a small property qualification was usually required of a representative; more, of a senator; most, of a governor. New York required only that its governor should be a freeholder; Massachusetts, that his freehold should be of the value of about thirty-three hundred dollars; New Hampshire required but half as CHAP. much; South Carolina, that his plantation or freeXV. hold, counting the slaves "settled" upon it, should 1776- be of the value of forty-two thousand eight hundred dollars in currency. 1783. In New York and Delaware the governor was chosen for three years; in South Carolina for two; in all the rest for only one. South of New Jersey the capacity of reëlection was left unrestricted; in those states which were most republican there was no such restriction; in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, a governor was often reëlected for a long succession of years. In the declaration of independence, the king was complained of for having refused his assent to wholesome laws: the jealousy fostered by long conflicts with the crown led to the general refusal of a negative power to the governor. The thoughtful men who devised the constitution of New York established the principle of a conditional veto; a law might be negatived, and the veto was final, unless it should be passed again by a majority of two thirds of each of the two branches. New York unwisely confided the negative power to a council, of which the governor formed but one; Massachusetts in 1779 improved upon the precedent, and placed the conditional veto in the hands of the governor alone. In her provisional form South Carolina clothed her executive chief with a veto power; but in the constitution of 1778 it was abrogated. In all the other colonies the governor either had no share in making laws, or had only a casting vote, or at most a double vote in the least numerous of the two branches. The legislative branch was the centre of the sys- CHAP. XV. tem; nowhere had the governor power to dissolve 1776the legislature, or either branch of it, and so appeal 1783. directly to the people; and on the other hand, the governor, once elected, could not be removed dur ing his term of office except by impeachment. In most of the states, all important civil and military officers were elected by the legislature. The scanty power intrusted to a governor, wherever his power was more than a shadow, was still further restrained by an executive council, formed partly after the model of the British privy council, and partly after colonial precedents. In the few states in which the governor had the nomination of officers, particularly in Massachusetts and New Hampshire, they could be commissioned only with the consent of council. In New York, the appointing power, when the constitution did not direct otherwise, was confided to the governor and a council of four senators, elected by the assembly from the four great districts of the state; and in this body the governor had "a casting voice, but no other vote." This worst arrangement of all, so sure to promote faction and intrigue, was the fruit of the deliberate judgment of wise and disinterested statesmen, in their zeal for securing administrative purity. Whatever sprung readily from the condition and intelligence of the people, had enduring life; while artificial arrangements, like this of the council of appointment in New York and like the senate of Maryland, though devised by earnest statesmen of careful education and great endowments, pined from their birth, and soon died away. XV. 1783. CHAP. The third great branch of government was in theory kept distinct from the other two. In Con1776- necticut and Rhode Island, some judicial powers were exercised by the governor and assistants; the other courts were constituted by the two branches of the legislature. In Massachusetts and New Hampshire, the governor, with the consent of council, selected the judges; in New York, the council of appointment; but for the most part they were chosen by the legislature. In South Carolina, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, a judge might be removed, as in England, upon the address of both houses of the legislature, and this proved the wisest practical rule; in New York he must retire at the age of sixty; in New Jersey and Pennsylvania the supreme court was chosen for seven years, in Connecticut and Rhode Island for but one; in Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina, the tenure of the judicial office was good behavior; in Maryland, even a conviction in a court of law was required before removal. Powers of chancery belonged to the legislature in Connecticut and Rhode Island; in South Carolina, to the lieutenant-governor and the privy council; in New Jersey, the governor and council were the court of appeals in the last resort. The courts were open to all, without regard to creed or race. The constitution of Massachusetts required a system of universal public education as a vital element in the state. The measure was a bequest from their fathers, endeared by a long experience of its benefits, and supported by the reflective XV. 1776 judgment of the people. As yet, the system was CHAP. established nowhere else except in Connecticut. Pennsylvania aimed at no more than "to instruct 1783. youth at low prices." The difference between the two systems was infinite. The first provided instruction at the cost of the state for every child within its borders, and bound up its schools in its public life; while the other only proposed to dole out a bounty to the poor. How to secure discreet nominations of candidates for high office was cared for only in Connecticut. There, twenty men were first selected by the vote of the people; and out of these twenty, the people at a second election set apart twelve to be the governor and assistants. This method was warmly recommended by Jay to the constituent convention of New York. Thus far the American constitutions bore a close analogy to that of England. The English system was an aristocracy, partly hereditary, partly open, partly elective, with a permanent executive head; the American system was in idea an elective government of the best. Some of the constitutions required the choice of persons "best qualified," or "persons of wisdom, experience, and virtue." These clauses were advisory; the suffrage was free, and it was certain from the first that water will not rise higher than its fountain, that untrammelled elections will give a representation of the people as they are; that the adoption of republican institutions, though it creates and quickens the love of country, does not change the nature of man, or quell the fierceness of selfish passion. Timid states |