The Origin, Meaning and Application of the Monroe DoctrineH. Altemus, 1896 - 47 sivua |
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The Origin, Meaning and Application of the Monroe Doctrine John Bach McMaster Esikatselu ei käytettävissä - 2016 |
The Origin, Meaning and Application of the Monroe Doctrine John Bach Mcmaster Esikatselu ei käytettävissä - 2017 |
Yleiset termit ja lausekkeet
abdication act of Clay allied powers American republics announced apply the doctrine assert Austria Britain British Buchanan Cadiz circular circumstances are eminently claims consent consider any attempt continent continental powers control its political December declaration deprive our neighboring despots domestic concerns England ernment established policy Étoile Euro Europe European Government European power existing extend their system Ferdinand force form any alliance France against Spain friendly rela gress hemisphere as dangerous Holy Alliance Holy Allies honor and policy independence indifference interest interfere interfered interposition intervention JOHN BACH MCMASTER King laration Laybach letters of Rush Liverpool Advertiser Lord Salisbury Louis XVIII Madrid message to Congress Mexico monarchy Monroe doctrine MONTPELIER Naples Neapolitan never North peace and safety pean pledge political system Polk possession purpose of oppressing republic of portions resist restored Russia Secretary South America sovereign Spanish America square miles territory tion unfriendly disposition United Venezuela yellow fever
Suositut otteet
Sivu 22 - With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America.
Sivu 21 - The question presented by the letters you have sent me, is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of Independence. That made us a nation, this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us.
Sivu 21 - Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe ; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cisatlantic affairs.
Sivu 24 - It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference.
Sivu 33 - In the existing circumstances of the world, the present is deemed a proper occasion to reiterate and reaffirm the principle avowed by Mr. Monroe, and to state my cordial concurrence in its wisdom and sound policy.
Sivu 23 - Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries...
Sivu 36 - European Governments would have been deprived of all pretext to interfere in the territorial and domestic concerns of Mexico. We should thus have been relieved from the obligation of resisting, even by force should this become necessary, any attempt by these Governments to deprive our neighboring Republic of portions of hor territory — a duty from which we could not shrink without abandoning the traditional and established policy of the American people.
Sivu 23 - Powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every Power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these continents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied Powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering...
Sivu 20 - Europe, which Europe must acknowledge? Were the great political and commercial interests which hung upon the destinies of the new continent, to be canvassed and adjusted in this hemisphere, without the cooperation or even knowledge of the United States?
Sivu 41 - Country, and possibly not altogether in vain, to invite the British Government to extend the "avowed disapprobation" of the project against the Spanish Colonies to the enterprise of France against Spain herself, and even to join in some declaratory act in behalf of the Greeks?