A Treatise on Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning Into Moral Subjects and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Nide 1

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Longmans, Green, 1874
 

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Fatal to the notion that mathematical truths though general
80
In which he equivocates between body as unknown opposite
82
These as knowable must be our ideas and therefore not a real
88
Why they do not trouble him more
94
Ambiguity as to real essence causes like ambiguity as to science
100
Two lines of thought in Locke between which a follower would
106
Two ways out of such difficulties
112
Can it be applied to him figuratively? in virtue of the indefi
118
Sense in which the self is truly real
124
There must have been something from eternity to cause what
126
Humes scepticisin fatal to his own premises
132
The esse of body is the percipi
138
By making colourrelations of coloured points Berkeley repre
144
But he fancies that each idea bas a positive nature apart from
150
His account implies that ideas are conceptions not feelings
180
Not relations of resemblance only but those of quantity also
186
True rationale of Lockes doctrine
192
To make sense of them we must take perception to mean per
198
A compound impression excluded by Humes doctrine
204
The points must be themselves impressions and therefore
205
In his account of the idea as abstract Hume really introduces
210
Yet unites and number are correlative and the supposed
216
In order to seem to do so he must get rid of Infinite Divisi
222
Colours or coloured points ? What is the difference?
228
With Hume idea of vacuum impossible but logically not more
236
Relation of cause and effect the same as this transition
242
Nor determined by any objective relation
248
Identity of objects an unavoidable crux for Hume
254
Are these several fictions really different from each other ? 260
260
Their true correlativity
266

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Sivu 170 - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself 'at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.
Sivu 109 - The understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any ideas which it doth not receive from one of these two. External objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us; and the mind furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations.
Sivu 44 - It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things.
Sivu 548 - Where am I, or what ? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return ? Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? What beings surround me, and on whom have I any influence, or who have any influence on me ? I am confounded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, environed with the deepest darkness, and utterly deprived of the use of every member and faculty.
Sivu 34 - When therefore we quit particulars, the generals that rest are only creatures of our own making, their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into by the understanding of signifying or representing many particulars. For the signification they have is nothing but a relation that by the mind of man is added to them.
Sivu 138 - The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the Imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series — the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author.
Sivu 33 - ... ideas are general when they are set up as the representatives of many particular things : but universality belongs not to things themselves, which are all of them particular in their existence, even those words and ideas which in their signification are general.
Sivu 64 - Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas; and ideas become general by separating from them the circumstances of time and place and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence. By this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing more individuals than one: each of which, having in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is (as we call it) of that sort.
Sivu 259 - As to the first question, we may observe that what we call a mind is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity.
Sivu 534 - I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist.

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