wrong; and the question is, What shall be the confequence of fuch errors with respect to reparation. The latter cafe is clear: the person who occafionally fuffers loss by a right action, has not a claim for reparation, because he has no just cause of complaint. On the other hand, if the action be wrong, the innocence of the author, for which he is indebted to an error in judgement, will not relieve him from reparation. When he is made fenfible of his error, he feels himself bound in confcience to repair the harm he has done by a wrong action: and others, fenfible of his error from the beginning, have the fame feeling: nor will his obstinacy in refifting conviction, nor his dullness in not apprehending his error, mend the matter it is well that thefe defects relieve him from punishment, without wronging others by denying a claim for reparation. A man's errors ought to affect himself only, and not thofe who have not erred. Hence in general, reparation always follows wrong; and is not affected by any erroneous opinion of a wrong action being right, more than of a right action being wrong.

But

But this doctrine fuffers an exception with respect to one who, having undertaken a trust, is bound in duty to act. A judge is in that state: it is his duty to pronounce sentence in every cafe that comes before him; and if he judge according to his knowledge, he is not liable for confequences. A judge cannot be fubjected to reparation, unless the judgement he gave was intentionally wrong. An of

ficer of the revenue is in the fame predicament. Led by a doubtful clause in a statute, he makes a feizure of goods as forfeited to the crown, which afterward, in the proper court, are found not to be feizable: he ought not to be fubjected to reparation, if he have acted to the best of his judgement. This rule however muft be taken with a limitation: a public officer who is grofsly ignorant, will not be excufed; for he ought to know better.

Reparation is due, tho' the immediate act be involuntary, provided it be connected with a preceding voluntary act. Example: "If A ride an unruly horse in "Lincolns-inn fields, to tame him, and "the horse breaking from A, run over B " and grievously hurt him; B fhall have

an

an action against A: for tho' the mis"chief was done against the will of A,

yet fince it was his fault to bring a wild "horse into a frequented place where "mifchief might enfue, he must answer "for the confequences." Gaius feems to carry this rule ftill farther, holding in general, that if a horse, by the weakness or unfkilfulness of the rider, break away and do mischief, the rider is liable (a). But Gaius probably had in his eye a frequented place, where the mischief might have been foreseen. Thus in general, a man is made liable for the mischief occafioned by his voluntary deed, tho' the immediate act that occafioned the mischief be involuntary.

SECT.

VII.

Final Caufes of the foregoing Laws of Nature.

Several final caufes have been already

mentioned, which could not conveni

(a) 1. 8, §. 1. ad leg. Aquil.

ently

ently be referved for the prefent fection, being neceffary for explaining the fubjects to which they relate; the final caufe for instance of erecting a standard of morals upon the common fenfe of mankind. I proceed now to what have not been mentioned, or but flightly mentioned.

The final cause that presents itself first to view, refpects man confidered as an accountable being. The fenfe of being accountable, is one of our most vigilant guards against the filent attacks of vice. When a temptation moves me it immediately occurs, What will the world fay? I imagine my friends expoftulating, my enemies reviling-it would be in vain to diffemble-my fpirits fink-the temptation vanishes. 2dly, Praife and blame, especially from those we regard, are strong incentives to virtue: but if we were not accountable for our conduct, praife and blame would feldom be well directed; for how shall a man's intentions be known, without calling him to account? And praise or blame, frequently ill-directed, would lofe their influence. 3dly, This branch of our nature, is the corner-ftone

.

of

of the criminal law. Did not a man think himself accountable to all the world, and to his judge in a peculiar manner, it would be natural for him to think, that the jufteft fentence pronounced against him, is oppreffion, not juftice. 4thly, It Potes fociety. If we were not accountable beings, thofe connected by blood, or by country, would be no lefs fhy and referved, than if they were utter ftrangers to each other.

The final caufe that next occurs, being fimple and obvious, is mentioned only that it may not seem to have been overlooked. All right actions are agreeable, all wrong actions, difagreeable. This is a wife appointment of Providence. We meet with fo many temptations against duty, that it is not always eafy to perfevere in the right path: would we perfevere, were duty difagreeable? And were acts of pure benevolence difagreeable, they would be rare, however worthy of praise.

Another final caufe refpects duty, in contradistinction to pure benevolence. All the moral laws are founded on intuitive perception; and are fo fimple and plain, as to be perfectly apprehended by the most

ignorant.