The space of a year is a determinate and well-known period, Division and consisting commonly of 365 days; for though in bissextile or of time in Litt., 135, b; 2 Roll., 521, 1. 40; Com. Dig., Ann. (A.).) But both half years and quarters are usually divided according to certain feasts or holydays, rather than a precise division of days, as Lady Day, Midsummer Day, Michaelmas Day, and Christmas; or Old Lady Day (6th of April), or Old Michaelmas Day (the 11th of October). In these cases, such division of the year by the parties is regarded by the law, and therefore, though half a year's notice to quit is necessary to determine a tenancy from year to year, yet a notice served on the 29th of September to quit on the 25th of March, being half a year's notice according to the above division, is good, though there be less than one hundred and eighty-two, viz., one hundred and seventy-eight days. (4 Esp., 5, 198; 6 Esp., 53; 4 Moo. & P., 391.) A day is natural, which consists of twenty-four hours; or artificial, which contains the time from the rising of the sun to the setting. (Co. Litt., 135, a.) A day is usually intended of a natural day, as, in an indictment for burglary, we say, in the night of the same day. (Co. Litt., 135, a; 2 Inst., 318.) Sometimes days are calculated exclusively, as where an act required ten clear days' notice of the intention to appeal, it was held that the ten days are to be taken exclusively both of the day of serving the notice and the day of holding the sessions. (3 B. & Al., 581.) A legal act, done at any part of the day, will in general relate to the first period of that day. (11 East, 498.) An hour consists of sixty minutes. (Com. Dig., Ann. (C.).) By a misprint in 2 Inst., 318, it is stated to be forty minutes. There is a distinction in law as to the certainty of stating a month or day, and an hour. When a fact took place, "circa horam" is sufficient; but not so as to a day, which must be stated with precision, though it may be varied from in proof. (2 Inst., 318.)-[CHITTY.]* In the computation of time, "the law doth reject all fractions and divisions of a day, for the uncertainty, which is always the mother of confusion and contention." (5 Rep., 2; Co. Litt., 135; 15 Ves., 257; 11 East, 496; 5 Mad., 61.) In computing the years of the reign of Edw. I., who was proclaimed king on the 20th of November, 1272, however, this maxim was disregarded. Thus, the surrender of the Scottish crown by Baliol in the early part of the 20th of November, 1292, was said to have taken place at the end of the 20 Edw. I.; while proceedings, later in the same day, were said to have happened "anno regni ipsius domini nostri Edwardi vicesimo finiente et vicesimo primo incipiente." (Sir H. Nicolas, Chronology of History, p. 312.) When it is necessary to ascer tain which of two events first happened, the courts will regard fractions of a day (3 Burr., 1434; 2 B. & Al., 586; 1 Ves. Sen., 83; 8 Dowl., P. C., 337; 2 Mont. & Ayr., 13); and in questions of seizin, &c., even a moment may be divided into two parts, but not into three. (6 Rep., 33.) It was formerly held that, where an act was agreed to be done within a certain number of days "from the date" of the instrument, the day of the date was to be included in the computation; but not when the words were "from the day of the date;" but since the case of Pugh v. the Duke of Leeds, Cowp., 714, these formal distinctions have been done away. (2 Camp., 294; 1 Per. & D., 647.) And when the computation is to be made from an act done, it was formerly said that the day in which the act is done is included in the reckoning (3 T. R., 623; 3 East, 407); but, however, this doctrine has been overruled. The presentment of a bill of exchange is an act done; yet it is now settled that the day of presentment is to be excluded. (9 B. & Cr., 603.) The execution of a deed is an act done; yet the twenty days from the execution of an annuity deed were counted, under the old annuity act, exclusively of the day of execution. (5 T. R., 283.) "It is not neces * In New York, the Gregorian or Roman style is adopted in the computation of time: the first day of January is reckoned the first day of the year; and it is enacted, that whenever the term "year" shall occur in any statute, deed, contract, or instrument, the year shall be taken to consist of 365 days; a half year, of 182 days; and a quarter of a year, of 91 days: the added day of a leap-year, and the day immediately preceding, to be reckoned together as one day; and that the term "month" shall be construed to mean a calendar, and not à lunar month.—(1 R 8., 605, § 1-4.) computation general. Month. [141] leap years it consists properly of 366, yet, by the statute 21 Hen. III., the increasing day in the leap-year, together with the preceding day, shall be accounted for one day only. That of a month is more ambiguous; there being, in common use, two ways of calculating months; either as lunar, consisting of twenty-eight days, the supposed revolution of the moon, thirteen of which make a year; or, as calendar months of unequal lengths, according to the Julian division in our common almanacs, commencing at the calends of each month, whereof in a year there are only twelve. A month in law is a lunar month, or twenty-eight days, unless otherwise expressed; not only because it is always one uniform period, but because it falls naturally into a quarterly division by weeks. Therefore a lease for "twelve sary to lay down any general rule upon Where property was directed to be month, except in quare impedit; in all temporal cases the word month standing unexplained means a lunar month, in ecclesiastical cases a calendar month. (1 W. Bl., 450; 1 Bingh., 310.) "I confess I wish it had been decided that months should be understood to mean calendar, and not lunar months; but the contrary has been determined so long and so frequently, that it ought not again to be brought in question. In the instance, indeed, of a quare impedit, the computation of time is by calendar months, but that depends on the words of an act of Parliament (13 Edw. I., st. 1, c. 5), tempus semestre. (See Cro. Jac., 167.) But for all other purposes, and in all acts of Parliament where months are spoken of without the word 'calendar,' and nothing is added from which a clear inference can be drawn that the legislature intended calendar months, it is understood to mean lunar months." Per Lord Kenyon (6 T. R., 226.) This rule is applied in the construction of deeds and contracts, in which the word month standing unexplained is held to mean four weeks. (See, however, 1 You. & C., 419.) But the court may gather evidence of a different intention from the context, as where, on a sale, it was agreed that certain acts were to be done at the expiration of two, three, and four months from the date of the contract, which was the 24th of January, and the sale was to be completed on the 24th of June following, which day being exactly five calendar months from the date of contract, was held to show that the parties contemplated calendar months in the prior limitations of two, three, and four months. (1 Mau. & S., 111; see 3 Br. & B., 186; 1 Q. B. Rep., 247; 1 You. & C., 401.) And by the custom of merchants, the word "month" in a bill of exchange, or (3) A month in law is always a lunar a policy of insurance, is always under months" is only for forty-eight weeks; but if it be for "a twelvemonth" in the singular number, it is good for the whole year.d For herein the law recedes from its usual calculation, because the ambiguity between the two methods of computation ceases: it being generally understood that by the space of time called hus, in the singular number, a twelvemonth, is meant the whole year, consisting of one solar revolution. In the space of a day all the twenty-four hours are usually reckoned, the law generally rejecting all fractions of a day, in order to avoid disputes.e Therefore, if I am bound to pay money on any certain day, I discharge the obligation if I pay it before twelve o'clock at night; after which the following day commences. But to return to estates for years. terms for These estates were originally granted to mere farmers or Origin of husbandmen, who every year rendered some equivalent in years. money, provisions, or other rent, to the lessors or landlords; but, in order to encourage them to manure and cultivate the ground, they had a permanent interest granted them, not determinable at the will of the lord. And yet their poss ssion was esteemed of so little consequence, that they were rather considered as the bailiffs or servants of the lord, who were to receive and account for the profits at a settled price, than as [142 | having any property of their own. And, therefore, they were not allowed to have a freehold estate; but their interest (such as it was) vested after their deaths in their executors, who were to make up the accounts of their testator with the lord, and his other creditors, and were entitled to the stock upon the farm. The lessee's estate might, also, by the ancient law, be at any time defeated by a common recovery suffered by the tenant of the freehold ;f which annihilated all leases for years then subsisting, unless afterward renewed by the recoveror, whose title was supposed superior to his by whom those leases were granted. Terms wer usually While estates for years were thus precarious, it is no woner that they were usually very short, like our modern leases short. e Co. Litt., 135. 6 Rep., 61. stood to be a calendar month (3 Br. & B., 187); and generally, in mercantile contracts, it seems that the word will have that construction. (1 Q. B. Rep., 250.)* (4) See 4 T. R., 170; where there was a difference of opinion in the court upon the question whether a bill of exchange could be protested for non-payment on the same day that it was due, or the acceptor had the whole of the day to discharge it in. It is now settled that refusal to pay on demand, made within VOL. II.-L f Co. Litt., 46. business hours, is a prima facie dishonor *See ante, p. 140, n. *. 161 upon rack rent; and, indeed, we are tolds that by the ancient law no leases for more than forty years were allowable, because any longer possession (especially when given without any livery declaring the nature and duration of the estate) might tend to defeat the inheritance. Yet this law, if ever it existed, was soon antiquated; for we may observe in Madox's collection of ancient instruments some leases for years of a pretty early date, which considerably exceed that period ;1 and long terms, for three hundred years or a thousand, were certainly in use in the time of Edward III.,i and probably of Edward I. But certainly, when by the statute 51 Hen. VIII., c. 15, the termor (that is, he who is entitled to the term of years) was protected against these fictitious recoveries, and his interest rendered secure and permanent, long terms began to be more frequent than before; and were afterward extensively introduced, being found extremely convenient for family settlements and mortgages; continuing subject, however, to the same [143] rules of succession, and with the same inferiority to freeholds, as when they were little better than tenancies at the will of the landlord. Must be certain in duration. Every estate which must expire at a period certain and pre- Mirror, c. 2, § 27. Co. Litt., 45, 46. (5) See 8 Car. & P., 302. (6) If an impossible time is mentioned for the commencement of the term, the date of the delivery of the lease is But i 32 Ass., pl. 6. Bro. Abr., t. Mor m 6 Rep., 35. n Co. Litt., 46. taken; but if an uncertain time, as the if he should so long continue parson, is good ;P for there is a certain period fixed beyond which it can not last; though it may determine sooner, on the death of J. S., or his ceasing to be parson there." mence in fa turo. hold can We have before remarked, and endeavored to assign the May comreason of, the inferiority in which the law places an estate for years, when compared with an estate for life, or an inheritance; observing, that an estate for life, even if it be pur auter vie, is a freehold; but that an estate for a thousand years is only a chattel, and reckoned part of the personal estate.q* Hence it follows that a lease for years may be made to commence in futuro, though a lease for life can not. As, if I grant lands to Titius to hold from Michaelmas next for twenty years, this is good; but to hold from Michaelmas next for the term of his [144] natural life, is void. For no estate of freehold can commence But no esin futuro; because it can not be created at common law with- tate of freeout livery of seizin, or corporeal possession of the land; and corporeal possession can not be given of an estate now, which is not to commence now, but hereafter.r And, because no livery of seizin is necessary to a lease for years, such lessee is not said to be seized, or to have true legal seizin of the lands. Nor, indeed, does the bare lease vest any estate in the lessee; but only gives him a right of entry on the tenement, which right is called his interest in the term, or interesse termini; but when he Interesse has actually so entered, and thereby accepted the grant, the termini. estate is then, and not before, vested in him, and he is possessed, not properly of the land, but of the term of years; the possession or seizin of the land remaining still in him who hath the freehold. Thus, the word term does not merely signify the Difference between term and time. (7) As to what is an estate for a term he enters; as a release made to him is certain, see 10 Mee. & W., 670. (8) That is to say, no estate of freehold can be limited at common law to commence in futuro, unless at the same time an estate of freehold in possession is created to support it, as will be explained when remainders come to be treated of; but it will be seen, under the head of uses, that this common law rule may be evaded by means of a convey ance operating under the Statute of Uses. (9) See 5 B. & Cr., 111; 1 Mee. & W., 747; 1 Br. & B., 248. "To many purposes he is not tenant for years until not good to increase his estate before * In New York, estates for years are classed as chattels real, and are bound by the docketing of judgments and decrees.-(1 R. S., 722, §. 5; 2 Id., 182, § 96; 359, § 3; 7 Wendell, 468; 1 Paige, 558.) |
