2 Munf. 396; Branch v. Bowman, 2 Leigh, 170; Stoughton v. Taylor, 2 Paine, 652.)

As the law stood before 1870, every person born within the British dominions, though he should be removed in infancy to another country where his family resides, owes an allegiance to the British crown which he could never resign or lose except by act of parliament, or by the recognition of the independence, or the cession of the portion of British territory in which he resided. By the Naturalization Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict. c. 14, it was made possible for British subjects to renounce their nationality and allegiance, and the ways in which that nationality is lost are defined. So British subjects voluntarily naturalized in a foreign state are deemed aliens from the time of such naturalization, unless, in the case of persons naturalized before the passing of the act, they have declared their desire to remain British subjects, within two years from the passing of the act. Persons who from having been born within British territory are British subjects, but who at birth became under the law of any foreign state subjects of such state, and also persons who, though born abroad, are British subjects by reason of parentage, may by declarations of alienage get rid of British nationality. (Enc. Britannica, art." Allegiance," vol. 1, p. 589.)

(19) Local allegiance is such as is due from an alien, page 370.

Aliens resident in this country are subject to its laws, written or unwritten, whenever applicable to them. This is a consequence of the territorial applicability of all law, which has been for at least a thousand years the jus gentium of civilized states, though they have never conceded it to barbarous nations. It is expressly enacted also by a statute of 1540, 32 Hen. VIII., c. 16, 9, which may be considered common law with us. It is true of all laws imposing duty, but may be limited in

the case of rights. (Kelyng, 38; Andree v. Fletcher, 2 Term Rep. 135.) It is said in a recent case that such an alien may even be guilty of treason or misprision of treason. (U. S. v. Carlisle, 16 Wall. 147.) A resident alien is bound by the state insolvent laws. (Von Glahn

v. Varrenne, 1 Dill. 515.)

(20) Local allegiance

ceases the instant such

stranger transfers himself from this kingdom to another, page 370.

To constitute a domicile, two things must concur : First, residence; second, the intention to remain there. (Mitchell v. U. S. 21 Wall. 350.) Domicile, therefore, means more than residence. A man may be a resident of a particular locality without having his domicile there. He can have but one domicile at one and the same time, at least for the same purpose, although he may have several residences. (Per Staples, J., in Long v. Ryan, 30 Gratt. 718.)

Two things must concur to effectuate a change of domicile: First, an actual change or removal of residence; second, an intention to make such change or removal permanent. If both of these requisites concur on point of time, the place to which removal is made becomes instantly the place of domicile, notwithstanding the party may entertain a floating intention to return at some future period. (Story on Conflict of Laws, 46.) The leading English case is Summerville v. Summerville, 5 Ves. 760, so often reaffirmed as to be the unquestioned law. (Per Brown, J., in Doyle v. Clerk, 8 The Reporter, 164.)

(21) The children of aliens, born here in England, are: generally speaking, natural-born subjects, and entitled to all the privileges of such, page 373.

With the exception of those born of alien enemies who happen to hold a part of the country as enemies, it is the allegiance, not the soil, that determines. (7

Coke Rep. 18 a.) Whether a child born in the house of a foreign embassador would be an alien or citizen seems doubtful.

The dictum of the commentator as to French law is no longer true. A child born in France of foreign parents may claim French citizenship under certain conditions. (Code Nap. I. 1, 9.) In both countries the citizenship derived by actual birth is probably now held to be conclusive if properly claimed. (See Wooddesson, Lect. 1, 231.)

Two distinct and sometimes contradictory principles lie at the foundation of the law of allegiance: (1) That children follow the parents' condition. (2) That allegiance depends on place of birth. The former is termed by Westlake (Private International Law, ? 7) the Roman principle; but it seems rather to be that of the doctrine of personal law, common among all early European peoples, perhaps among the Romans in an early stage of their development as well as the rest. The latter is no doubt feudal in its origin, and dates from the time when territorial law had become the accepted rule. Westlake states (? 16) the present English rule thus: “Legitimate children, wherever born, are regularly members of that state of which their fathers are members at the time of their birth, but may choose, if they prefer it, the nationality of their place of birth."

Vattel, sections 213, 215, also makes the father's condition the natural one of the child, though he recognizes the power of positive laws to change the rule. But the English common-law rule seems to have reversed this order, and to have made the place of birth the controlling consideration-to be overruled only by positive statutes, such as that of 25 Edw. III. st. 2, and those following, which gave citizenship to the children of English fathers born abroad. "To this day, not only are all persons born within the United Kingdom ipso

facto entitled to all the civil privileges conferred by the British character, but our law holds that they cannot divest themselves of that character by any act of theirs." (Westlake, 12; Macdonald's Case, 18 State Trials, 857; Udny v. Udny, 1 H. L. Cas. 441.) And this was the doctrine of the American courts down to a very recent period. They held to indefeasible allegiance, even while the legislature provided, and the courts themselves administered oaths of naturalization. (2 Kent, 42, 49; Wharton's Am. State Trials, 655. See Holmes' note to 2 Kent, 49.) By the common law, allegiance is not a matter of individual choice. It at taches at the time, and on account of birth, and under circumstances in which the family owe allegiance, and is entitled to protection. A person may be domiciled. in one place or country, and owe allegiance to and be a citizen of another. "The fact that plaintiff's grandfather made his permanent domicile in Canada does not of itself prove him to be an alien. Even if he was regarded as a British subject, this would not necessarily make him an alien. The laws of the United States determine what persons shall be regarded as citizens, irrespective of such persons' pleasure or the laws or pleasure of any other government." (Seevers, J., in State v. Adams, 45 Iowa, 101; 24 Am. Dec. 760. A. removed to Canada in 1790. His son was born there in 1795; his grandson in 1834. The two latter came to Iowa that year, and have resided there ever since. Held, that the grandson was a citizen by virtue of the Act of 1802. [U. S. Rev. Stats. 2172.] "Children of persons who now are, or have been citizens of the United States, shall, though born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, be considered as citizens thereof." Seevers, J., cites also as authorities, Calais v. Marshfield, 30 Me. 411; Peck v. Young, 26 Wend. 612; Ingles v. Sailors' Snug Harbor, 3 Peters, 99.) But this would not apply to a colored man, born of slaves

who emigrated to Canada. (Hedgman v. Board of Reg. of Detroit, 26 Mich. 51.) By the common law, a child born within the allegiance of the United States is born a subject thereof, without reference to the political status or condition of its parents. (McKay v. Campbell, 2 Sawy. Or. 118, 1871; Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 583.) Aliter as to an Indian child. (Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 583.) In Lynch v. Clarke, the point decided was that Julia Lynch, born in New York in 1819, of alien parents temporarily there, who returned to Ireland when she was a few months old, was a citizen of the United States. This question is very fully argued on pages 588-637. The abandonment of the doctrine of indefeasible allegiance by England and the United States (see preceding note 18, to page 366) destroys the force of this reasoning, and seems to leave no presumption in favor of either the citizenship by birthplace, or that by inheritance. The American-born child of an English native subject domiciled in America is a subject of both countries. (Cranworth, L. C., in Dawson v. Jay, 3 De Gex, M. & G. 764, 772, 1853.) A man may at the same time enjoy the rights of citizenship under two governments. (Rutledge, C. J., in Talbot v. Janson, 3 Dall. 138, 169.)

A question of difficulty upon which there is now very little authority is that of the effect of choice in cases of elective citizenship. In a variety of forms, most civilized nations recognize the citizenship of all children actually born upon their soil, except those of alien enemies, without reference to the nationality of their parents. Most of them also recognize as native citizens the children of their own citizens, though born in a foreign country. This is a common-law doctrine wich us, and perhaps in England, also, though the first clear recognition of it there was by the statute 25 Ed. III., c. 2, and 33 Hen. VIII., c. 25. Such children have the option of claiming either the country of their actual