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principle that when a state adopts a foreign law it is presumed to adopt with it the interpretation given in the state of its origin. Perhaps the most important question, arising as to legitimatio per subsequens matrimonium, is whether that effect is to be given in cases where the parents could not have lawfully intermarried before the child's birth, as in cases of adulterine bastardy, etc., or whether no such limitations are to be applied, none being found in the statutes themselves. The Roman law restricted such legitimation to cases of comparatively venial though irregular concubinage.

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Another question which must inevitably arise, and upon which the foreign law throws no light, is whether children may be made legitimate by what is now commonly termed a common-law" marriage, without any public ceremony. Our courts have lately gone very far in presuming such a marriage from cohabitation and repute, without the possibility of fixing any certain date for its commencement. It would be hard to deny to some children of such cohabitation the legitimacy thus assured to others; yet such may be the effect, if it is not held retroactive. At the same time there can be no doubt that the rule in its original sense was confined to actually solemnized marriages. So also was the French rule from which we derive the other statutory change, that "the issue of marriages deemed null in law or dissolved by a court shall nevertheless be legitimate;" but in this case it is difficult to give any definite meaning to the rule, or prevent it from legitimizing all bastards indiscriminately, unless we confine the word "marriages" to actually solemnized unions. If the restriction put upon the jurisdiction in divorce by such cases as Collins v. Collins, 80 N. Y. 1, that the courts have no power to grant divorce where there has not been a regular and duly celebrated marriage, should prevail, it would give rise to two singular anomalies, that these informal "common-law" marriages, hardly distin

guishable from concubinage, would be the only marriages indissoluble by law, and the only ones of which the innocent offspring could invoke no legal protection of their status, if their unnatural parents saw fit to bastardize them. Even the remote possibility of such results is a disgrace to our laws, and calls loudly for a wise and uniform revision of them.

The Roman law made a distinction that seems never to have been recognized in our own, dating the life and status of a child born in legitimate wedlock from the time of conception, that of others from the time of birth (Ulpian, Fragm. v. 10; Gaius, i. 89; Gaius Vis. i. 4, 29; and see the note of Schulting, 41); but in spite of this they allow a child to be free-born whose mother was free at any moment while bearing him. (Paulus, R. S. ii. 24; L. 5, 2, Dig. de stat. hom.)

(39) The duty of parents to provide for the mainte nance of their children is a principle of natural law, and thus the children will have the perfect right of receiving maintenance from their parents, page 447.

There is a fallacy in the term "perfect right," used here, very unusual with Blackstone. By a perfect right of receiving maintenance, we can only understand that it is morally right for the child to receive whatever the parent, in the fulfillment of his duty, may provide. But a perfect right in legal language imports much more: it imports the right to demand the maintenance, or, at least, to have a remedy for the parent's neglect to provide it, and this neither common nor statute law has ever given. The only legal duty imposed on the parent is to so provide for his children that they shall not become a burden to the community; and, for a breach of this duty, it is the state only that can punish him. Upon the amount and manner of the maintenance to be given, and upon the education and protection to be furnished, the parent must act in his

own discretion, over which the child has no control. Harsh as this doctrine may seem when thus stated, it is only a just expression of the principle that the law deals only with enforcible rights and duties, and not with ethical ones. Experience has not shown that English and American fathers have been less careful or less generous in maintaining and educating their children, than those living under a system of government which enforced these parental duties, and many other ethical ones, by the oversight of the state.

When it is claimed that a father has promised to pay for things not necessary, furnished to his child, that is, when the father as such is to be holden for the contract made by his child, the plaintiff must show that the contract binds him as it would any stranger; that it is made for a good consideration (Freeman v. Robinson, 38 N. J. L. 383), and that it is in writing, so as to satisfy the statute of frauds. (Dexter v. Blanchard, 11 Allen, 365.)

By common law (a) neither the father is legally bound to support the child (Mortimore v. Wright, 6 Mees. & W. 482; Shellon v. Springer, 20 Eng. L. & Eq. 281; Hunt v. Thompson, 3 Scam. 180), nor (b) the child to support the father (Rex v. Munden, 1 Strange, 190; Edwards v. Davis, 16 Johns. 821); and it is now held (c) that the moral duty is not sufficient to sustain an express promise. (Cook v. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57.) Upon the implied promise to repay a stranger who has furnished necessaries to a child or parent, the cases conflict. (Pro, Van Valkinburg v. Watson, 13 Johns. 480. Con, Hunt v. Thompson, supra, followed in 78 Ill. 230, 445; 84 Ill. 40; 88 Ill. 75; 89 Ill. 456.) Where a child is sent into the world to look out for himself, even without emancipation, he cannot claim his earnings (Stiles v. Granville, 6 Cush. 458), nor can the father's creditors. (McCloshey v. Cyphert, 27 Pa. St. 220; Cloud v. Hamilton, 11 Humph. 104; 53 Am. Dec. 778.)

Against another employer, the father cannot recover the value of minor's services to him. (Williams v. Williams, 132 Mass. 304.) The father is liable for support of infant children, not of adults (Hawkins v. Hyde, 55 Vt. 55); but if they live with him not as boarders, he cannot collect board even from their estates. (Beardsley v. Hotchkins, 96 N. Y. 201.) He is not entitled to an allowance for support from the infant's estate except under special circumstances (Beardsley v. Hotchkins, 96 N. Y. 201; Re Walling, 35 N. J. Eq. 105); nor liable for services (Cooper v. Cooper, 12 Ill. App. 478); but the mother is, during the husband's life. (Gladding v. Follett, 95 N. Y. 652.) But when an express contract is shown, child may recover quantum meruit. (Byrnes v. Clarke, 58 Wis. 13.) Step-children once received into the family, the father cannot recover from their estates. (Norton v. Aibar, 11 Lea, 563.)

The father's consent for the son to receive his own earnings is put on the same footing with a gift delivered. It is valid against the father (2 Mass. 113, 115; 12 Mass. 275, 378; 3 Pick. 201), even if not against creditors (6 Conn. 547); but it is held not liable for father's debts (49 N. H. 543), and the consent may be implied. (7 Cowen, 92; 49 N. H. 544.) That it does not withdraw from the creditors any fund to which they are justly entitled, see Lord v. Poor, 23 Me. 569; Wolcott v. Rickey, 22 Iowa, 171 (homestead bought by son's earnings). But such a consent is not necessarily permanent; if by parol and without consideration it is revocable. (Abbott v. Converse, 4 Allen, 530; Ream v. Watkins, 27 Mo. 516; Everett v. Sherfey, 1 Iowa, 356.) The child's own desertion does not emancipate him without the father's consent. (Bangor v. Readfield, 32 Me. 60.) As to driving from home the cases differ. For emancipation, Nightingale v. Withington, 15 Mass. 272; against, Sumner v. Sebec, 3 Me. 223; Clinton v. York, 26 Me. 167. But some cases call this emancipation. (Lyon v.

Bolling, 9 Ala. 463; 44 Am. Dec. 444. See, also, Same v. Same, 14 Ala. 453; 48 Am. Dec. 122.)

The father may emancipate the minor, and thus surrender his own rights; but cannot thereby make him competent to obligate himself. (Note to Burlingame v. Burlingame, 7 Cowen, 92.) The father's creditors cannot touch the earnings of the son so emancipated, or property acquired by him; and such emancipation may be inferred from circumstances (Dierker v. Hess, 54 Mo. 246); but in some states, the emancipation may be followed by an order of the district court, giving all the powers of full age. Upon emancipation by permanent departure from home with consent of the father, see Lowell v. Newport, 66 Me. 78; West Gardiner v. Manchester, 72 Me. 509. That the departure of a minor from home, to obtain employment, does not constitute emancipation, even in regard to settlement laws, is shown by Parsonsfield v. Kennebunkport, 4 Me. 47; Searsmont v. Thorndike, 1 N. E. Rep. (Me.) 261. No public notice is necessary. (Wood v. Corcoran, 1 Allen, 405.)

A minor's liability for necessaries implies that he has not been otherwise furnished by his father; but he must show it as defense. (Parsons v. Keys, 43 Tex. 557.) But the mere fact that the father is poor and unable to pay (for medical services furnished the child) will not make the minor liable. (Hoyt ». Carey, 114 Mass. 397.) The father is entitled to the services of the child till majority; and may recover against any one who seduces him or her away, or by a tort deprives him of services, with allowance for expenses incurred, labor of nursing, etc. (Frick v. St. L. K. C. etc. R. Co. 75 Mo. 542; Connell v. Putnam, 58 N. H. 534), although the child has his own action. (Evansech v. G. C. & S. F. B. Co. 57 Tex. 123.) Upon the distinction between the two cases, see Durkee v. C. P. R. R. Co. 56 Cal. 388; 38 Am. Rep. 59.

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