he comes to age, he may either agree or disagree to it, as he thinks prudent or proper, without alleging any reason; and so may his heirs after him, if he dies without having completed his agreement. It is, farther, generally true, that an infant, under twenty-one, can make no deed 2but what is afterwards voidable: yet in some cases 2 he may bind himself apprentice by deed indented or indentures, for seven years; and he may by deed or will appoint a guardian to his children, if he has any. Lastly, it is generally true, that an infant can make no other contract that will bind him yet he may bind himself to pay for his necessary meat, drink, apparel, physic, and such other necessaries; and likewise for his good teaching and instruction, whereby he may profit himself afterwards.e* And thus much, at present, for the privileges and disabilities of infants. NOTES OF THE AMERICAN EDITOR TO CHAPTER XVII. (42) Of guardian and ward, page 460. The common-law distinctions as to different kinds of guardian have almost entirely disappeared, though in the guardian ad litem we have still a reminiscence of the prochein amy who was guardian in socage; and the parent is still guardian by nature of his child's person, but not of his estate. The guardian is now testamentary or statutory; the latter being appointed by the proper court under the state laws regulating the subject. After the age of fourteen the infant has usually by these statutes the right to select his guardian, subject to the court's approval. Either is now known as a general guardian, unless his power is expressly limited by the act appointing him. b Co. Litt. 2. c Stat. 5 Eliz. C. 4. 243 Eliz. C. 2 Cro. Car. 179.2 d Stat. 12 Car. II. c. 24. e Co. Litt. 172. 2 First edition reads, "that is of any force or effect: yet." *Cited, 2 Conn. 651. The court of the father's last domicile is the proper court to appoint. (Wells v. Andrews, 60 Miss. 373.) The guardian cannot change it by removing the ward. (Matheinake v. Grothaus, 72 Mo. 204.) The appointment has no extraterritorial force, e. g., out of state. (Taney's Appeal, 97 Pa. St. 74, peculiar facts, guardian appointed where father was killed-aunt's choice of domicile.) Ancillary guardian may be appointed in another jurisdiction. Guardianship of "unknown heirs of A" is a mere nullity. (State v McLaughlin, 77 Ind. 335.) He may expend the income, but not the principal without leave of court. Semble, under strong and sudden urgency, as for maintenance, medical expenses, and burial, he may do so. (Hobbs v. Harlan, 10 Lea, 268; 43 Am. Rep. 209.) The court can afterward sanction this as to personalty, but not as to realty. (Renker v. Street, 33 Gratt. 663.) He may under circumstances anticipate future resources. (Gott v. Culp, 45 Mich. 265.) The ward cannot in any case extend his authority. His consent even in a criminal case is a nullity. (State v. Willoughby, 76 Mo. 215.) The apparent exception of consent given by female ward after marriage not real. (Bickerstaff v. Marlin, 60 Miss. 509; 45 Am. Rep. 418.) A guardian's contract even for necessaries for the ward will not bind the estate (Reading v. Wilson, 38 N. J. Eq. 446); but he may be held personally on a contract so made. (McKenney v. Jones, 55 Wis. 39.) He cannot advance money from his own means, and hold the ward personally liable after coming of age. (Preble v. Longfellow, 48 Me. 279; 77 Am. Dec. 227.) The guardian is a trustee, and held to all the duties of a trustee, except those belonging to the legal title, which he has not (in land at least, though he may have in personalty). It is a breach of trust if he takes title in his own name, and the title is void. (Robinson v. Pebworth, 71 Ala. 240; Coffey v. Greenfield, 62 Cal. 602.) Upon his responsibility for the ward's money deposited in his own name, see Parsley v. Martin, 77 Va. 376; 46 Am. Rep. 733. Like other trustees, he cannot purchase (Jeffries v. Dowdle, 61 Miss. 504.) It is his duty to collect debts by suit (Bemis v. Bemis, 110 U. S. 42); and he may compound them. (Ordinary v. Dean, 44 N. J. L. 64.) The guardian should settle his accounts in court at the termination of the minority. It will then be res adjudicata. (State v. Slanter, 80 Ind. 597.) He may settle with the infant personally after the latter is of age, but in case of doubt will have the burden of proving the fairness of the settlement, especially if made soon or hastily. A delay of four years in questioning such a settlement is fatal, at least as to claims on his sureties. (Aaron v. Mendel, 78 Ky. 427; 39 Am. Rep. 248.) (43) Infants have various privileges and various disabilities but their very disabilities are privileges; in order to secure them from hurting themselves, page 464. An infant's disabilities extend only to the disposal of property. In holding it he has the same rights with any other person, and a gift, devise, or conveyance to him vests a complete title, with which the parent has no right as parent to interfere, and as guardian can only deal with it as any other guardian would, subject to account, and under the direction of a court of probate or chancery. Acceptance by the infant is presumed. (Jackson v. Bodle, 20 Johns. 184.) Guardian's promise does not bind. (Burnham v. Porter, 24 N. EL, 570.) A conveyance from the father to the child is no exception to this rule; only such a conveyance is subject to be avoided by creditors if voluntary, as the like conveyance to a stranger would be, and the relationship of the parties is a suspicious fact that would strengthen other evidence of fraud. Such a conveyance to a stranger would be valid between the parties, and there seems to be no reason why it should not be valid between parent and child, as any other voluntary conveyance would be, against subsequent purchasers under the American rule, though not under the English. (Spencer v. Carr, 45 N. Y. 406.) An absolute gift of personalty by father to child, e. g., of a watch, cannot be reclaimed without the child's consent. (Smith v. Smith, 7 Car. & P. 401.) Upon the distinction between different acts by the infant himself, the fundamental principle may be stated thus: An infant or minor is incapable of obligating himself by any promise he may make, or other expression of his will; but he is subject to all the laws of the state, and responsible for transgressions against them, equally with adults. In consequence, he is liable for torts, but not upon contracts: or more accurately, he is subject to duties in rem, but not to obligations in personam. But even this limited responsibility does not attach to him upon birth, or before he can be deemed a rational being; mischief done by a young infant not capable of foreseeing the results of his acts, must be regarded as accidents. At what age this capacity begins is a question of fact in each case. So, too, in cases where a greater degree of care, skill, prudence, or knowledge is required, or where actual malice must be shown, it will always be a question of fact, and his age at the time will be one of the evidential factors, of which the answer to that question must be constructed. Infancy may always be taken into consideration with other circumstances in determining whether a wrong has been committed. It is here not an ultimate but an evidential fact, and the effect of it will vary according to the nature of the tort. This is very clearly stated by C. J. Marshall in Vasse v. Smith. After holding that infancy is not a complete bar in trover, even when the goods were in his possession by virtue of a contract, he says: "Yet it may be given in evidence, for it may have some influence on the question whether the act com plained of be really a conversion or not," and therefore overrules an exception taken to its admission. The exceptional cases in which the minor is said to bind himself by his contracts, will be found always to contain some external act or course of conduct, upon which the law fixes the consequence wrongly attributed to his obligation. Thus his feoffments actually passed the seisin, but his grants were inoperative; his contract to serve was called binding, to give him a settlement (King v. Dutton, 15 East, 352); but it was really the residence that was the result in fact of the service. The clearest instance, however, is the purchase of necessaries; the law implies liability to pay the reasonable worth of what he has in fact received, but his express promise to pay any particular sum is of no force. In these cases the obligation is to be separated from the act done; the latter can only be annulled upon equitable terms; the former is simply unenforcible against the minor, while no question can arise upon it otherwise. Per contra, the acts done by either party may have legal consequences, which only the minor can avoid-under what conditions? In all executed contracts there is something done, the practical consequences of which are the same when an infant does them as when they are done by a person of full age. It is absurd to speak of such acts as void or voidable. Being actually done, the only question is what legal consequences follow; and we must distin guish land, chattels, money. Where the infant has conveyed land, the grantee has a title good as to all third persons (9 Wall. 628), and is bound by his purchase, although the infant may avoid it by re-entry, without returning the price (Green v. Green, 69 N. Y. 553), or by deed to another person, after he is of age, except where the grantee is in actual possession, and the law avoids deeds of land in adverse possession, when he must re-enter. (Riggs v. Fisk, 64 Md. 400; Mustard v. |