pendence, which at his first acceffion feems, it must be owned, to be wanting. And then, with regard to power, we may find perhaps that the hands of government are at least fufficiently strengthened; and that an English monarch is now in no danger of being overborne by either the nobility or the people. The inftruments of power are not perhaps so open and avowed as they formerly were, and therefore are the lefs liable to jealous and invidious reflections; but they are not the weaker upon that account. In short, our national debt and taxes (befides the inconveniences before mentioned) have alfo in their natural confequences thrown fuch a weight of power into the executive fcale of government, as we cannot think was intended by our patriot ancestors; who gloriously struggled for the abolition of the then formidable parts of the prerogative, and by an unaccountable want of forefight eftablished this fyftem in their ftead. The entire collection and management of so vast a revenue, being placed in the hands of the crown, have given rife to fuch a multitude of new officers created by and removeable at the royal pleasure, that they have extended the influence of government to every corner of the nation. Witnefs the commiffioners and the multitude of dependents on the cuftoms, in every port of the kingdom; the commiffioners of excife, and their numerous fubalterns, in every inland district ; the post-masters, and their fervants, planted in every town, and upon every public road; the commiffioners of the ftamps, and their diftributors, which are full as fcattered and full as numerous; the officers of the falt duty, which though a species of excife, and conducted in the fame manner, are yet made a distinct corps from the ordinary managers of that revenue; the furveyors of houses and windows; the receivers of the land-tax; the managers of lotteries; and the commiffioners of hackney coaches; all which [336] are either mediately or immediately appointed by the crown and removable at pleasure without any reafon affigned: thefe, it requires but little penetration to fee, muft give that power, on which they depend for fubfiftence, an influence most amazingly extenfive. To this may be added the frequent opportunities of conferring particular obligations, by prefer

ence

ence in loans, fubfcriptions, tickets, remittances, and other money-transactions, which will greatly increase this influence; and that over those perfons whofe attachment, on account of their wealth, is frequently the most defirable. All this is the natural, though perhaps the unforeseen confequence of erecting our funds of credit, and to support them establishing our prefent perpetual taxes: the whole of which is entirely new fince the restoration in 1660; and by far the greatest part fince the revolution in 1688. And the same may be said with regard to the officers in our numerous army, and the places which the army has created. All which put together give the executive power so perfuafive an energy with respect to the persons themselves, and fo prevailing an interest with their friends and families, as will amply make amends for the lofs of external prerogative.

BUT, though this profufion of offices fhould have no effect on individuals, there is still another newly-acquired branch of power; and that is, not the influence only, but the force of a disciplined army: paid indeed ultimately by the people, but immediately by the crown: raised by the crown, officered by the crown, commanded by the crown. They are kept on foot it is true only from year to year, and that by the power of parliament: but during that year they muft, by the nature of our constitution, if raised at all, be at the abfolute disposal of the crown. And there need but few words to demonftrate how great a trust is thereby repofed in the prince by his people. A trust, that is more than equivalent to a thousand little troublesome prerogatives.

ADD to all this, that befides the civil lift, the immenfe revenue of almoft feven millions fterling, which is annually paid to the creditors of the public, or carried to the finking fund, is first depofited in the royal exchequer, and thence [ 337 ] iffued out to the refpective offices of payment. This revenue the people can never refuse to raise, because it is made perpetual by act of parliament: which alfo, when well confidered, will appear to be a truft of great delicacy and high importance:

UPON

Book I. UPON the whole therefore I think it is clear, that, whatever may have become of the nominal, the real power of the crown has not been too far weakened by any transactions in the last century. Much is indeed given up; but much is also acquired. The ftern commands of prerogative have yielded to the milder voice of influence; the flavish and exploded doctrine of non-refiftance has given way to a military establishment by law; and to the disuse of parliaments has fucceeded a parliamentary trust of an immense perpetual revenue. When, indeed, by the free operation of the finking fund, our national debts fhall be leffened; when the posture of foreign affairs, and the univerfal introduction of a wellplanned and national militia, will fuffer our formidable army to be thinned and regulated; and when (in confequence of all) our taxes fhall be gradually reduced; this adventitious power of the crown will flowly and imperceptibly diminish, as it flowly and imperceptibly rofe. But, tili that fhall happen, it will be our especial duty, as good fubjects and good Englishmen, to reverence the crown, and yet guard against corrupt and servile influence from thofe who are intrufted with its authority; to be loyal, yet free; obedient, and yet independent; and, above every thing, to hope that we may long, very long, continue to be governed by a fovereign, who, in all those public acts that have perfonally proceeded from himself, hath manifested the highest veneration for the free conftitution of Britain; hath already in more than one inftance remarkably ftrengthened it's outworks; and will therefore never harbour a thought, or adopt a persuasion, in any the remoteft degree detrimental to public liberty.

CHAPTER THE NINTH.

OF SUBORDINATE MAGISTRATES.

IN

N a former chapter of these commentaries we diftinguished magistrates into two kinds; fupreme, or those in whom the fovereign power of the ftate refides; and fubordinate, or those who act in an inferior fecondary sphere. We have hitherto confidered the former kind only; namely, the fupreme legislative power or parliament, and the supreme executive power, which is the king: and are now to proceed to inquire into the rights and duties of the principal fubordinate magistrates.

AND herein we are not to investigate the powers and duties of his majesty's great officers of state, the lord treasurer, lord chamberlain, the principal secretaries, or the like; because I do not know that they are in that capacity in any confiderable degree the objects of our laws, or have any very important share of magistracy conferred upon them: except that the fecretaries of state are allowed the power of commitment, in order to bring offenders to trial". Neither fhall I here treat of the office and authority of the lord chancellor, or the other judges of the fuperior courts of justice; because they will find a more proper place in the third part of thefe commentaries. Nor fhall I enter into any minute disquisitions, 143. 5 Mod. 84. Salk. 347. Carth,

ach. 2. page 146.

Leon. 70. 2 Leon. 175. Comb. 291.

with regard to the rights and dignities of mayors and alder

men, or other magiftrates of particular corporations; because [339] thefe are mere private and strictly municipal rights, depending entirely upon the domeftic conftitution of their refpective franchises. But the magiftrates and officers, whofe rights and duties it will be proper in this chapter to confider, are fuch as are generally in use, and have a jurisdiction and authority difperfedly throughout the kingdom: which are, principally fheriffs; coroners; justices of the peace; conftables; furveyors of highways; and overfeers of the poor. in treating of all which I fhall inquire into, first, their antiquity and original; next, the manner in which they are appointed and may be removed; and lastly, their rights and duties. And firft of fheriffs,

I. THE sheriff is an officer of very great antiquity in this kingdom, his name being derived from two Saxon words, rcine genera the reeve, bailiff, or officer of the fhire. He is called in Latin vice-comes, as being the deputy of the earl or comes; to whom the cuftody of the fhire is faid to have been committed at the firft divifion of this kingdom into counties. But the earls in procefs of time, by reafon of their high employments and attendance on the king's perfon, not being able to tranfact the business of the county, were delivered of that burden: referving to themselves the honour, but the labour was laid on the fheriff. So that now the fheriff does all the king's bufinefs in the county; and though he be still called vice-comes, yet he is entirely independent of, and not subject to the earl; the king by his let ters patent committing cuftodiam comitatus to the fheriff, and him alone.

SHERIFFS were formerly chofen by the inhabitants of the feveral counties. In confirmation of which it was ordained by ftatute 28 Edw. I. c. 8. that the people should have elec◄