Revocation of Order Revoking a Selection for Appointment. After the revocation by the Secretary of the Treasury of his order selecting Mrs. Brown for the position to which Miss. Rhodes was appointed, it seems clear that Mrs. Brown stood in the same position as the other eligibles whose names were certified with hers; like them she had been certified, but not appointed. The case of Mrs. Brown is a hard one, and strongly appeals to the sympathy of the appointing power, and I must acknowledge that I regret I can not say that, in my opinion, the Secretary of the Treasury could repair the unin tentional wrong done this lady by revoking his past action to her prejudice, and appointing her to a position in the classified departmental service. But, in my judgment, there are weighty reasons why such a course would be inadmissible under the civil-service legislation and rules. First, it might result in the appointment of a person whose term of eligibility, under clause 10 of Departmental Rule VI, had expired, as in fact is the case with Mrs. Brown; secondly, it might result in giving the State to which the appointee belonged more than its lawful quota of appointments, and such, we are informed, would be the result of Mrs. Brown's appointment at this time; and, thirdly, it might result in the appointment of a person over the heads of others of higher standing on the same register, whose names had been added since the appointee's name was certified and who would have been certified to the appointing power, if the Commissioners of the Civil Service had been applied to for the usual certificate. These reasons are sufficient, in my judgment, to show that Mrs. Brown is not strictly eligible for appointment to the classified departmental service without a new certification of her name made on the application of the appointing power. This lady has suffered through what seems to have been the fault of the Government. It would seem that a remedy might be furnished by the President, who made the rules, waiving them to avoid injustice in the particular case. Very respectfully yours, The PRESIDENT. W. H. H. MILLER. Rock Creek Park-Duty of Commission. ROCK CREEK PARK-DUTY OF COMMISSION. Where an act provides for the acquisition of land for a public park not to exceed 2,000 acres, at a total cost not to exceed $1,200,000, and the park commission appointed by the act has assessed the value of the land proposed to be taken at $830,000, but fears that it will be unable to agree with all property-owners to accept its estimate of value, and that if forced to institute condemnation proceedings the judicial assessment upon the lots not purchased by agreement may be so large as to make the cost exceed the limit of the appropriation, it is still the duty of the commission to perform its duty under the statute; and should the judicial award and expenses of obtaining the land exceed the limit of the appropriation, it will be in its power, exercising its discretion, to pay for the land most to be desired, in view of the impossibility of acquiring all included in its map. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, April 10, 1891. SIR: In obedience to your direction I beg to submit the following views upon the letter of Gen. Casey, chairman of the commission, for the purpose of establishing a public park on Rock Creek, in the District of Columbia, under an act of Congress passed September 17, 1890 (Pamphlet Laws, p. 492), in which he presents for your consideration a dilemma that the commission anticipate as possible in the execution of the act. Stated in brief, the difficulty is this: The first section of the act directs the establishment of the park, with the following proviso: "Provided, That the whole tract so to be selected and condemned under the provisions of this act shall not exceed two thousand acres, nor the total cost thereof exceed the amount of money herein appropriated." The amount appropriated in the act for the payment of all expenses, including the cost of the land, was $1,200,000. The subsequent sections of the act provide that the commission shall select the land for the park, and shall make an accurate map of the same, with the names of the owners; shall fix a just compensation for the various lots, to be approved by the President; and that upon the filing of the map in the public records of the District, the land so selected shall be taken as condemned for public purposes and the title thereto vested in the United States, if the owners of the land accept the compensation fixed. In the event that in thirty Rock Creek Park-Duty of Commission. days after the filing of the map an agreement is not reached with the owners for any of the lots in the map, it then becomes the duty of the Commissioners to institute proceedings in the supreme court of the District of Columbia for an assessment of the land selected and not purchased by agreement. The land has been selected, the map prepared and filed, and the compensation aggregates $830,000 as fixed by the Commissioners, being $350,000 below the limit fixed for the cost in the act. The Commissioners fear that only part of the owners of the land will agree to accept the compensation fixed by them, with your approval; and that in order to acquire title to the remainder they will be obliged to go into court, as in the act provided, and that the judicial assessment upon the lots not purchased by agreement may be so large as to bring the entire cost of the land above the limit of the appropriation fixed in the act, and so violate the proviso of the first section. I do not see that the difficulty thus anticipated, which may or may not be a real one when the assessment in court is had, should prevent the commission from executing their plain duty under the statute. So far as they are concerned, and as far as their responsibility extends, the limit of cost for the park by them selected is very considerably under the amount appropriated in the act. The third section contemplates that they shall fix a price to be approved by you on each lot, and that if this shall be accepted by the lot owners the purchase shall be made. There is no suggestion in the language of the act that the purchase by agreement enjoined upon the commission is to be conditional. The terms used exclude any other idea than that of absolute purchase. The proviso in the first section as to the acres to be purchased is of course absolute. As to the payment of money it is also absolute, because no more than that appropriated in the act can be paid. But it would be going too far to say that the proviso is such a condition precedent as to nullify all the work of the commission, if it should turn out that by the uncertain assessment in the judicial proceedings the cost of the land selected should exceed $1,200,000. If it does, it will require further Congressional action. I am of the opinion that if the assessed value of the land in the court proceedings exceeds the limit, the commission may exercise its Superintendent of Immigration and his Assistants-Salaries. discretion to pay for that land which in their opinion is most to be desired, in view of the impossibility of acquiring all that they have included in their map. Whether the failure to acquire all included in the map by reason of the limit of the appropriation would invalidate the local assessments upon adjoining lot owners, provided for in the subsequent sections of the act, is not a question mooted, and could not, I think, affect the plain duty of the Commissioners in the premises. Very respectfully, WM. H. TAFT, Acting Attorney-General. The PRESIDENT. SUPERINTENDENT OF IMMIGRATION AND HIS ASSISTANTS— SALARIES. The salaries of the Superintendent of Immigration and of his clerical assistants authorized by section 7 of the act of March 3, 1891, chapter 551, may be paid by the Secretary of the Treasury out of the immigration fund created under section 1 of the act of August 3, 1882, chapter 376. The salaries of the inspectors of immigration appointed under the sec- DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: Your communications dated respectively March 28 and April 8, calling for my opinion upon specified questions arising under the immigration and contract-labor laws, have been received and considered. The first question presented is, whether the salaries of the Superintendent of Immigration, his chief clerk, and the two clerks of class 1, authorized by section 7 of the act of March 3, 1891 (an act in amendment of the various acts, etc.), may Superintendent of Immigration and his Assistants-Salaries. be paid out of the "immigration fund" created under section 1 of the act of August 3, 1882 (22 Stat., 214), entitled "An act to regulate immigration." The second question is, as to what moneys or fund such inspectors as may be appointed under the second paragraph of section 8 of said act of 1891 shall be paid. The third question is, whether the power to contract with State commissions, boards, or officers given by section 2 of said act of August 3, 1882, is repealed by the provisions of said act of 1891. The act of August 3, 1882, provides as follows: "There shall be levied, collected, and paid a duty of fifty cents for each and every passenger not a citizen of the United States who shall come by steam or sail vessel from a foreign port to any port within the United States." It is then enacted that "The money thus collected shall be paid into the United States Treasury, and shall constitute a fund to be called the immigrant fund, and shall be used, under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, to defray the expense of regulating immigration under this act, and for the care of immigrants arriving in the United States, for the relief of such as are in distress, and for the general purposes and expenses of carrying this act into effect." The duty imposed is made a lien, and a debt, and payment thereof may be enforced. Section 1 concludes with the following proviso: "Provided, That no greater sum shall be expended for the purposes herein before mentioned, at any port, than shall have been collected at such port." By section 2 the Secretary of the Treasury is charged with the duty of executing the provisions of the act and with supervision over the business of immigration to the United States: "And for that purpose he shall have power to enter into contracts with such State commission, board, or officers as may be designated for that purpose by the governor of any State to take charge of the local affairs of immigration in the ports within said State, and to provide for the support and relief of such immigrants therein landing as may fall into distress or need public aid, under the rules and regula |