year, has considerably altered the state of public affairs, and opened the way to considerations of the highest importance to the interests of the country. The three grand points, upon which the attention of the public is at. present fixed, are those of Russia, Spain, and America; and it is with these that the principal difficulties to a pacific negociation arise. In their superior importance all other interests seem now to be absorbed; yet it must be recollected that these difficulties are all of very recent occurrence, and have entirely arisen since the failure of the negociation for peace in 1806. The blood that might have been spared in every quarter of the globe, and the distress that might have been prevented in every country, and in this amongst the rest, if a reconciliation had then happily taken place, are considerations too obvious to be dwelt upon; but which ought at least to induce us, whilst we lament the past, to look to the future, and to endeavour, as far as in our power, to prevent that continual ac. cumulation and extension of inisery and of slaughter, which are the natural consequences of rooted enmity and long-, continued warfare. The character of the war can no lon. ger either be concealed or denied. On our part, it is an attempt to destroy the present government of France, by the overthrow of Bonaparte and his dynasty, and either to place the Bourbons upon their ancient throne, or to regulate the government in such a way as may be consistent with our own views of interest and of safety; an attempt which we designate under the name of the Liberation of Europe from the yoke of France. On the part of France, it is au attempt to cut off and destroy the resources of Great Britain, so as to deprive her of the means of carrying on the war; a project so extensive in its nature, and so difficult in its execution, as could only have been suggested by a total despair of being able to make any effectual impres sion upon this country by direct hostilipes.Which of these will be first accomplished, is the great question that two powerful nations have undertaken to try; this is the experimentum çrucis, or rather the experiment so well typified by Mr. Rose! There is, however, a third result, which seems not to have been sufficiently contemplated, and which is not only possible, but much more probable than either of the others, viz. that we shall neither be able to impose a govern ment upon France, nor France be able to destroy the resources of this country; but that, after an indefinite length of hostilities, and an additional profusion of blood and treasure, we shall be com pelled, like wearied and exhausted combatants, to give up to the weakness of nature what we refuse to its claims, and, because we can no longer be at war, consent to be at peace. If such be the true state of affairs, would it not be wise to anticipate the season of reconciliation, and to listen to terins of peace before we are reduced to the necessity of accepting them? Even, if we were to succeed in our wishes, by the destruction of the power of Bonaparte, how are we to be assured that our influence in the affairs of France will be in the slightest degree increased? Or, if any person, in a state of sanity, could admit the idea of this country regulating the concerus, and distributing the goveruments, of Europe according to its pleasure, how is he to be assured that the derangement of a continental system, which has now been twenty years in forming, would not be attended with as much difficulty and bloodshed in its overthrow as it was in its establishment? On the other hand, it sufficiently appears, that, although Bonaparte may diminish the resources and cripple the exertions of this country, he can neither destroy the one, nor prevent the other. Thus, the two nations are to be compelled, by the false views and inordinate jealousies of their rulers to drag on a hateful contest, of which it is difficult to say whether it is more injurious to the interests of the people, or more disgraceful to their common religion and their common sense ! Taking it then for granted that, in ' every view of the case, nothing is likely to be obtained, but that much may yet be lost, by the continuance of the war, let us again recur to the circumstances which oppose themselves to a reconcilia tion: and first with respect to Russia. RUSSIA! what a train of awful reflections does that name suggest to every considerate mind! The shock of hostile armies, more powerful by the skill of the leaders and the means of destruction, by the numbers of the combatants, and the spirit by which they are animated, than any that are recorded in history; the conflagration of an immense capital; the desolation and dispersion of its inbabitants in a severe season and inhos pitable clime; the destruction of the ancient ancient palace of the czars; and all this effected at such a distance from the ene my, and so powerfully defended, as seemed only a short time ago to place it beyond the possibility of danger! On the other hand, the overthrow and ruin of the finest army that has been collected in modern times, overwhelmed and destroyed by the joint effects of an exasperated adversary and an irresistible natural calamity; the horse and his rider perishing by thousands and tens of thou sands in the trackless wilds; stiffened into sudden death by the Gorgon power of frost, or finding a living grave under sepulchres of snow! and the audacity and aggressions of the invader repaid upon his own head, and upon the heads of his followers! And what is the real and immediate ground of such a contest? what the direct cause of such dreadful catastrophes? Neither more nor less than to compel the Emperor of Russia to close his ports against British merchandize! For this have mighty armies been called into action, and populous cities been laid waste; and thus those commercial arrangements that might have been accomplished by a just spirit of temperate conciliation, to the infinite ad vantage of all parties, yet remain unac complished, probably to be the abundant source of yet greater calamities. Whether the French emperor may or may not be able to recruit his armies, so as to recommence vigorous and successful hostilities in the spring, may be made matter of doubt; but there can be no doubt that, if he can arrange matters with this country, by which he can be freed from the dangers he apprehends from its hostility, he will be glad to be released from the necessity which he conceives himself to be under, of renewing his attack upon Russia; an attack which, after what he has suffered from the climate, cannot hold out to him any prospects of a very propitious result; but which, like the former, will certainly be attended by infinite bloodshed and distress. The retreat of the apposing armies into winter-quarters, alfords however, as far as Russia com poses a part of the general question, a favourable opportunity for discussion. And, if England and France should be fortunate enough to adjust all other differences, the contest respecting Russia afords not a single obstacle, but must naturally terminate with the causes that gave rise to it, and open to us a free in tercourse with the northern states. The present situation of this country, with respect to the contest in the SPANISH PENINSULA, in some degree resem bles that of our enemies with respect to Russia; and, at the moment when Bo naparte was compelled to retreat into. Poland, and relinquish the prize which he had obtained, Lord Wellington was under the necessity of withdrawing from the scene of his victories, and retracing his steps to the confines of Portugal. More fortunate, however, than the French ruler, the British commander had to contend against an enemy which had no ally in the climate. Hence the contest in Spain admits also of a tem porary pause, which affords the contending parties an opportunity for deliberas tion. At what time, or whether at any time, Lord Wellington will be able again to undertake offensive operations, and to penetrate into the interior of Spain, is a subject on which persons will reason differently, according to the temperament by which they are animated, or the in formation they may possess; but, after the dispositions manifested by the great body of the Spanish nation, all men in their senses must agree, that, if this coun try can admit the idea of a pacification with France, as far as regards its real interests, and can accomplish any tolerable terms with respect to Spain, it would be highly culpable to neglect any favourable opportunity of effecting it; and this as well for the interests of that nation as of our own. Another branch from that tree of hitter fruit, the contest with France, is the war with AMERICA. Of the contagious effects of war, and the difficulty of avoiding being implicated in it, this is a most remarkable instance. That the ancient governments of Europe should have been drawn into the vortex, is not surprising; but that a young and unwarlike country, separated by the Atlantic from the seat of War, whose essential policy and earnest desire it was to preserve its neutra lity, should at length have been betrayed by impatience, or compelled by necessity, to resort to hostilities, is a subject of astonishment no less than of regret! As the war with that country is however, in fact, grafted on the war with France, so, whenever that shall terminate, the chief causes of hostility between Great Britain and America must terminate also. The obnoxious tenor of the Orders in Council, and of the French Decrces, prohibiting neutral states from extended lines of coast, by what are justly called paper paper blockades, must naturally cease with the cessation of hostilities, and the terms upon which any two nations are to continue their commercial intercourse, must be regulated by themselves, without the intervention of a third. One point only could then remain for discussion between Great Britain and America-the validity of the right, exercised by the former, of inpressing British seamen found serving in the navy of the latter; and, if this be the only cause of dissention, it would surely be disgraceful in the highest degree, that two countries, connected by such ties, should be compelled to submit to the calamities of war, from an inability in their rulers to devise the means of adjusting ay difference so capable of ac' commodation. Such being the principal objects that present themselves on a negotiation for peace, we will now, for a moment, consider them in an aggregate point of view, in order, if possible, to arrive at some useful conclusion; and here it is in the first place evident, that, if a reconciliation can be effected between Great Britain and France, with respect to the primary causes of the war directly subsisting be. tween the two countries, (and that those causes, if any such ever existed, are long since done away, must be universally acknowledged,) the collateral or secondary causes of hostility will terminate of course, except so far as other countries may be involved in the discussion. That the Emperor of Russia will be happy to be relieved from the formidable attack with which he is yet threatened, and to become a party in a general pacification, can admit of no reasonable doubt. America will also join, if she be wise, in the restoration of her commerce, and the accommodation of her maritime disputes. It appears then that the chief difficulty is occasioned by the present situation of the Spanish Peninsula; by the determination of Bonaparte to establish his brother on the throne of Spain; by the resolution of this country to pre. vent it, and the alliance formed for that purpose with the constituted authorities of the resisting part of the Spanish nation. In every attempt to adjust this difference, it is obvious to remark the very different situation in which Spain and Portugal stand with respect to Great Britain. The latter of these is an ancient ally, to the protection of whom we are bound by the strongest ties of duty and interest. The former is a power with which we have had a more remote connection, and in whose concerns we could have no legitimate motive for interfering, except for the purpose of preventing the further aggrandizement of our already too-powerful enemy. There are, it is true, persons who talk of contending for the liberties of Spain, but these are, in general, persons who have never been known to contend for the liberties of any country, and who well know that, by effecting the restoration of Ferdinand VII. they will not subject themselves to the reproach of inconsistency. If any thing is to be done for the liberties of Spain, it will not be by carrying the contest to extremities, and subjecting that country to the absolute will of a conqueror, but by a pacific negociation between the contending parties, in which alone the real interest of the people of Spain can be considered and secured. We shall conclude these observations with a brief statement of the various Offers that have been made by, or at the instance of, France, to this country, since the recommencement of the war in 1803, for entering into Negotiations for Peace. We wish we could counterbalance them by showing what pacific overtures had originated with this country; but this our ministers have not put it in our power to do. We trust, however, that they now begin to see the true interests of the nation, and we will not carry our distrust of them so far as to believe, that, when they are once convinced of the indispensible necessity of Peace, they will not sincerely endeavour to obtain it. After the many propositions that have been made by Napoleon without success, it is not very probable that he will repeat them, particularly as he cannot but consider this as a season of disappointment and depression. But the same reasons that render it unlikely that he will propose a pacific negotiation, strongly call upon this country to seize so favourable an opportunity of securing a peace on honourable and advantageous terms; and we are convinced that an incalcula. ble majority of the nation will unite with us in the sincerest regret, if this oppor tunity should be lost. I. On assuming the imperial title, Bonaparte addressed a letter to the King of Great Britain, dated 2d Jan. 1805. In this he stated that, His first wish was for peace, and that he considered it as no disgrace to make the first step. He observed that the war was without in object, and that it was a melancholy busi ness to cause two natims to fight merely for effecting a reconciliation between the belligerent powers. Mr. Canning, then Secretary of State, replied, that his Majesty would willingly accede to such negociations, whenever the consent of the other parties interested in them should be oùtained; and, that His Majesty would LOSE NO TIME in communicating with such powers, and, if their views should be facourable to his Imperial Majesty's propo sal, in concerting with them the mode in which such negotiations should be opened. It does not appear that the British ministry ever adopted any measures for consulting their allies on this subject; and Consequently the proposal was of no avail. for the sake of fighting.-In answer, Lord Mulgrave, then Secretary of State, informed Bonaparte, That there was no object which his Majesty had more at heart than to avail himself of the first opportunity to procure again for his subjects the advantages of a peace founded on bases which might not be incompatible with the permanent security and essential interest of his dominions; but, that his Majesty felt it impossible to answer more particularly to the overture that had been made to him, till he had time to communicate with the powers on the Continent, WITH WHOM HE WAS ENGAGED IN CONFIDENTIAL CONNECTIONS AND RELATIONS; and particularly the Emperor of Russia, who had given the strongest proofs of the wisdom and elevation of the sentiments by which he was animated, and the lively interest which he took in the safety and independence of the Continent. Of course no further correspondence took place. II. On the 8th March, 1806, M. Tal leyrand transmitted to Mr. Fox, an ex. tract from a speech of Napoleon to the Legislative Body, to the following effect:-"I desire peace with England. On my part I shall never delay it a moment: Ishall always be ready to conclude it, taking for its basis the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens." This led the way to the negociation carried on by Mr. Fox to the time of his death, and after wards by Lord Grey, and which was broken off by our refusing to negotiate otherwise than in conjunction with Russia; Lord Lauderdale having declared, that England was resolved not to make peace, without obtaining for Russia all the objects on which she insisted, which were ROOTE INTERESTING, IF POSSIBLE, to Eng. land, than those points which might be considered as peculiarly connected with her own interests. This result was the more to be regretted, as it had been proposed on the part of the French Emperor not only to restore Ilanover to His Majesty with out any compensation, but also to give up Malta and the Cape of Good Hope; his minister, Talleyrand, having observed, that Hanover was for the honour of the Crown, Malta for the honour of the Navy, and the Cape of Good Hope for the honour of the British Commerce. III. On the 18th April, 1807, the Austrian Ambassador in London, Prince Siahremberg, transinitted to his Majes ty's ministers, a proposal from the Einperor of Austria, of his friendly intention 1 IV. On the 1st August, 1807, M.' Alopeus, the Russian Ambassador at London, notified to the British ministry, that the Emperor of Russia had, by the treaty of Tilsit, offered himself as a mediator of peace between England and France, provided his mediation was accepted within the space of one month.-In reply, Mr. Canning required, as a preliminary, the communication of the treaty of Tilsit, and the statement of those equitable and honourable principles,upon which hisImperial Majesty expresses his belief that France is desirous of concluding a peace with Great Britain.-The negotiation was afterwards carried on by Lord G. L. Gower, at Petersburgh, with the Russian ministry; in the course of which it was con ceived, that an opportunity was afforded of detaching Russia from the interests of France. The discussion was accordingly continued with other views than those of peace.--In-the official correspondence it appears, that Mr. Canning informed the British Envoy, that the establishment of future good understanding between this country and Russia, and the concert of measures to be taken, with a view to future exertion, were ALONE the proper subjects of discussion between the two governments. This negotiation was, however, suddenly terminated by our attack upon Copenhagen; which so exasperated the Emperor of Russia, that he declared, that no arrangements should take place between Russia and England, until the latter should have given satisfaction to Denmark; at the same time expressing his expectation, that his Britannic Majesty, instead of permitting his ministers, as had lately been the case, to scatter ancw the seeds of war, would lend his assistance to the conclusion of peace with France. V. On the 20th of November, 1807, Prince Stahremberg, the Austrian ambassador, officially and earnestly requested bis Britannic majesty, to declare kis intentions in evincing his disposition to enter into a negotiation for a maritime peare, upon a 'basis suitable to the reciprocal interests of the powers who might take a part in it. To this Mr. Canning replied, that his Majesty was then, as he had all times been, prepared to enter into a negotiation for the conclusion of such a peace as should settle on equal terms the respective interests of the powers engaged in the wor; as should be consistent with his Majesty's fidelity to his allies, and should provide for the tranquillity and sẻcurity of Europe. In consequence of this answer, the Austrian minister, about five weeks afterwards, informed the British ministry, that, in consequence of the pacific disposition of his Britannic Majesty, he was charged to propose to the British ministry to send immediately plemipotentiaries to Paris for the purpose of treating for the establishment of peace be tween all the powers at war with England; adding, that this must furnish a proof of the good faith and of the sincere intention of France to put an end to the calamities of war. He notified, at the same time, that he was authorized to give pussports to the ministers appointed for that purpose. After a long correspondence Mr. Canning informed the Austrian minister, that his Majesty could no! again consent to send his plenipotentiaries to a hostile capital. The further interference of Prince Stab remberg was, at the same time, effectually prohibited by Mr. Canning informing him, that his Majesty had not given him any authority to speak in the name of his Majesty to the government of France. The Austrian ambassador immediately demanded his passports; and Austria was added to the list of our enemics. VI. In October, 1808, the Emperors of France and Russia met in anity at Erfurth, for the purpose of adjusting the peace of Europe, and avoiding the delays and alleged equivocations, which had at tended former negociations; and, as England had recently declared that she continued the war for Russian objects, the participation of Russia in the first overture appeared likely to remove every difficulty. The two emperors accordingly addressed the following perspicuous letter to the King of England: SIRE,The present circumstances of Europe have brought us together at Erfurth. Our first thought is to yield to the wish and the wants of every people, and to seek, in a speedy pacification with your Majesty, the most efficacious remedy for the miseries which oppress all nations. We make known to your majesty our sincere desire in this respect by the present letter. The long and bloody war which has torn the continent is at an end, without the possibility of being renewed. Many changes have taken place in Europe; many states have been overthrown. The cause is to be found in the state of agitation and misery in which the stagnation of maritime commerce has placed the greatest nations. Still greater changes may yet take place, and all of them contrary to the policy of the English nation. Peace, then, is at once the interest of the Continent, as it is the interest of the people of Great Britain. We unite in entreating your Majesty to listen to the voice of humanity, si`lencing that of the passions; to seek to conciliate all interests, with the intention of arriving at the object, and by that means to preserve all the powers which exist, and so insure the happiness of Europe and of this generation, at the head of which Providence has placed us. ALEXANDER NAPOLEON. To this overture, characterized by a frankness which has perhaps no example in ancient or modern history, Mr. Canning, the English secretary, replied to the Russian minister, that, “however desirous his Majesty might be to reply di rectly to his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, be found it impossible to adopt that mark of respect towards the Emperor of Russia, without at the same time acknowledging titles which bis Majesty never had acknowledged; that his Majesty will basten to communicate to his Majesty the King of Sweden, and to the existing government of Spain, the proposals which have been made to him; and that it is absolutely necessary his Majesty should receive an im mediate assurance that France acknow ledges the government of Spain as party to any negociation, and that such is the inten tion of the Emperor of Russia his Majesty cannot doubt.-To this unhappy answer the Russian and French ministers replied in a style which bordered on remou strance, in which the Russian minister exclaimed that, after fifteen years of war Europe bad a right to demand peace; and the French minister contended, that the French government had as much right to demand the admission of the Irish insurgents to be parties to the negociation as the English had to claim the admission of the Spanick |