lain doth hereby agree to use and manage said premises in a good, husbandlike manner, and will pay to the said Charles McLellan, his executors, administrators, and assigns, as rent, the annual sum of one-half the income of said farm, and said Chamberlain is to pay one-half the taxes on said farm and stock. All grain raised on said place to be fed out there, and what feed they may buy is to be paid for out of the undivided profits of said farm; said McLellan to furnish one-half of seed grain, and all the grass seed."

W. W. Miles, for plaintiff. E. A. Cook, for defendant.

THOMPSON, J. The decision of this case depends upon the construction to be given to the written contract between the plaintiff and Chamberlain. By this contract the plaintiff leased the farm and personal property to Chamberlain for three years, subject only to plaintiff's right to sell the premises during that time. Under this lease, Chamberlain went into the exclusive possession and occupancy of the farm and personal property, and was in the possession thereot at the time the defendant took the oats. This was not a letting upon shares, but was a leas ing of the property for an annual rent to be equal in amount to one-half the annual income of the farm, however derived. The plaintiff reserved no right during the term in the farm or its products, nor any lien there on, and under the lease he could not demand that the rent should be paid in the specific products of the farm. If the lessee sold the products of the farm, and received the money therefor, he would only do what he had a right to do, under the lease. One-half the income he thus received he would owe the lessor, as rent, at the end of the year. The contract was a lease of the land, and the whole title of the crops grown during the term was in Chamberlain. This is a much stronger case for thus holding than Hurd v. Darling, 16 Vt. 377, where the lessee was to deliver to the lessor one-half of all the crops, except those fed to the stock, by way of rent, and in which this court held that prior to delivery the lessor had no title to the crops, or any part of them, grown during the term. It is true that in Aiken v. Smith, 21 Vt. 172, the court criticised Hurd v. Darling somewhat; but as the court remarked in Frost v. Kellogg, 23 Vt. 308, it was not necessary for the decision of that case. In Gray v. Stevens, 28 Vt. 1, the court say that the contract in Hurd v. Darling was susceptible of the construction put upon it. The difference in the cases, growing out of the letting of farms, arises altogether from the difference in the contracts in the cases, and the construction put upon them by the courts, and not from the adoption of different principles by the court in cases practically alike. The provision in plaintiff's lease to Chamberlain, that the grain raised on the place should be fed out on it, vests no title to the grain in

the plaintiff, nor does it afford him any ground for recovery in this action. In Gray v. Stevens, supra, the county court charged the jury that a mere agreement by the lessee to feed out the hay and fodder on the place would give the lessor no ground for recovery for the hay, as against the lessee, or a purchaser from him, and this court said the case was correctly tried below. The plaintiff, having no title to, nor possession of, the oats, cannot maintain this action. This view of the case renders it unnecessary to pass upon the other questions raised by the exceptions. Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.

(65 Vt. 513)

CROOK v. TOWN OF BRADFORD. (Supreme Court of Vermont. Orange. July 14, 1893.) HIGHWAYS

CHANGES BY SELECTMEN - PETITION
TO COUNTY COURT.

Under R. L. § 2940, providing that a landowner dissatisfied with the alteration of a highway by selectmen may petition the county court, at the next term, "if there is time for notice," if not, at the succeeding term, for commissioners to rehear the cause, the petition need not be brought to the first term if, in addition to the time for notice, there is not reasonable time for considering the case and preparing papers.

Exceptions from Orange county court; Munson, Judge.

Petition by Mira H. Crook to the county court for an appeal from the action of the trustees of the village of Bradford in altering a highway, and awarding damages in the premises. The defendant moved to dismiss for that the petition should have been brought to a previous term. The petition was dismissed, and the petitioner excepted. Reversed.

John B. Peckett, Jr., and Hunton & Stickney, for plaintiff. John H. Watson and Geo. A. Dickey, for defendant.

TAFT, J. A petition for the alteration of a highway was made to the trustees of the village of Bradford. An alteration was made by them, and they filed their report May 14, 1892. Mira H. Crook, a landowner, has brought her petition for the appointment of commissioners to rehear the cause. It was incumbent upon her to prefer her petition to the then next term of the county court, "if there was time for notice," and have it, with a citation annexed, served at least 12 days before the session of the court. The first term, after the report was filed, convened on the 7th of June following. After the filing of the report there were 12 days before the time of service for the then next term expired. The petition was brought to the term in December next succeeding the June term in 1892. The court held that there was time for notice, and dismissed the petition. This the petitioner insists was error.

If the county court found, as matter of

In

fact, that there was time for notice, such finding cannot be disturbed, and the judgment must be affirmed. But no testimony was introduced, and the ruling must have been, as matter of law, that there was time for notice. This ruling, we think, was erroneous. The statute should be construed so as to give a party reasonable time to determine whether he wishes to proceed further in the matter, and, if he does, the like time for the preparation of his petition and citation and the service of them. Section 2940, R. L., provides that the dissatisfied person may apply to the county court, etc., "if there is time for notice." This means a reasonable time to prepare his necessary papers and have them served. case a report is filed more than 12 days before the term, but so short a time prior thereto that a dissatisfied person has not sufficient reasonable time to institute proceedings, no one could reasonably claim that it was intended by the statute to cut off his right to petition for relief. The petitioner in this case may have had ample time to make her application. If so, her petition was rightly dismissed; but this was a question of fact, and should have been passed upon by the county court. If, under all the circumstances connected with the transaction, she did not have reasonable time to consider the matter, prepare her petition and citation, and have service thereof made on or before the 26th day of May, after the report was filed, the petition was rightly brought to the succeeding December term. Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings.

(62 Conn. 492)

CITY OF MIDDLETOWN v. NEW YORK, N. H. & H. R. CO.

(Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. March 6, 1893.) HIGHWAYS-BRIDGE VER Railroad-Duty of MAINTAINING.

Acts

Ge . 1888, § 3480, (Acts 1849,) provides that bridges or other structures placed over or upon existing highways by a railroad company in constructing its road shall thereafter be maintained by such company. 1889, (entitled "An act relating to grade crossings,") c. 220, § 7, provides that railroad companies shall keep in repair all structures erected over their tracks at any highway crossing, but the municipality in which the structure is situated shall keep in repair the surface of the highway, including planking or other surface material of the highway upon such structure. Held, that section 3480 was not repealed by implication by the latter act, and a railroad company was not relieved of the duty of replanking a highway bridge erected over its road prior to 1889.

Case reserved from superior court, Middlesex county.

Action by the city of Middletown against the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company to recover the expense incurred by plaintiff in replanking a certain bridge over defendant's tracks within the

corporate limits of such city. Case reserved on an agreed statement of facts for the advice of the supreme court. Judgment for plaintiff advised.

C. E. Bacon, for plaintiff. H. C. Robin son, for defendant.

HALL, J. This is an amicable suit, brought upon an agreed state of facts, with all questions as to the form of action waived, for the purpose of obtaining a construction of section 7, c. 220, Pub. Acts 1889. The claim in suit is for expenses incurred by the plaintiff, amounting to the sum of $265.74, in replanking a bridge over the Air Line Railroad at Main street in the city of Middletown. The roof of the bridge forms the surface of the highway. Previous to the act of 1889 the railroad company had always assumed the duty of maintaining and repairing the bridge, but after the passage of that act refused to make further repairs, or longer maintain the planking upon the bridge, claiming to have been relieved therefrom by the provisions of the act. The bridge in question was rendered necessary by the construction of the New Haven, Middletown & Willimantic Railroad in 1869, and was located across an existing highway by the railroad commissioners, who, in approving the layout of the railroad, ordered and adjudged that Main street and certain other streets "were to cross over said railroad on overcrossing bridges." At the time of the construction of the bridge there was a general statute, which reads as follows: "Every railroad company which may locate and construct a railroad across any turnpike, highway or public street, shall construct it so as to cross over or under the said turnpike, highway or street; and for this purpose it may, under the direction of the railroad commissioners, raise or lower said turnpike, highway or street at the said crossing, or change the location thereof, and shall make, keep up and maintain such bridges, abutments, tunnels, arches, excavations, embankments and approaches, as the convenience and safety of the public travel upon said turnpike, highway or street may require; but the railroad commissioners may, upon due notice to said company, and to the selectmen of the town or mayor of the city in which said crossing is situated, authorize and direct such company to construct its railroad at such crossing upon a level with the turnpike, highway or street." This statute was passed in 1849, appears in all the revisions since that time, was reenacted with slight amendment in 1883, and now constitutes section 3480 of the General Statutes, revision of 1888.

It will be observed that this statute clearly contemplates that bridges or other structures placed over or upon existing highways by a railroad company in constructing its railroad shall thereafter be maintained by the railroad corporation. It is a general

statute, applicable to the original construction of railroads. As early as 1849, when, for the first time, the support of these structures seems to have been a subject of consideration by the legislature, owing

doubtless to the rapid construction of railroad lines, the lawmaking power apparently determined that, as the railroad corporations for their own private gain rendered such structures necessary at highway crossings, justice required that they alone should bear the burden of their maintenance. They therefore adopted that policy, and the general statute reflects the legislative will upon the subject. The legislature evidently intended to relieve all towns wherein such structures are imposed by the necessities of railroad construction from all liability for their maintenance or repair. We have heretofore approved the justice of this policy. City of New Haven v. New York & N. H. R. Co., 39 Conn. 132. Yet notwithstanding this long-settled policy in dealing with this question, the defendant claims that the legislature of 1889 not only inaugurated, but intended to establish, an exactly opposite policy, the effect of which is to relieve the railroads from the expense of hereafter supporting these structures of their own creation, and casting the burden of their support upon the several towns within whose limits they may happen to be located. As to the power of the legislature to do this we have no question. English v. Northampton Co., 32 Conn. 240. It is not a question of power, but of intent. Section 7 of the act of 1889 relating to grade crossings, upon the language of which the defendant bases its claim to exemption from further statutory liability to maintain the surface of the bridge in question, and of course of all bridges of the same character, wherever situated, is as follows: "It shall be the duty of the railroad companies to maintain and keep in repair all structures erected over their tracks at any highway crossing, but it shall be the duty of the municipality in which the structure is situated to keep in repair the surface of the highway, including planking or other surface material of the highway upon such structure." Undoubtedly the language of this section, if it stood alone and disconnected from the act of which it forms a part, is sufficiently broad and comprehensive in its terms to sustain the construction claimed for it by the defendant. As an independent statute we should feel bound on general principles to adopt that construction, and to infer an intent on the part of the legislature to change the old policy and establish a new one in regard to the maintenance of structures oi the class in question. There is a plausible force in the defendant's argument that, inasmuch as the planking of a highway which forms the roof of a railroad bridge and constitutes the whole surface of the highway is under the constant observation of the

municipality, which has notice of its defects, and by its use wears it out, therefore the municipality should be charged with the sole care and maintenance of the planking, as it is for all other parts of the surface of the highway. But whatever of merit there may be in these claims of the defendant, we are bound to infer that they were all duly weighed and considered by the legislature when it decided in 1849 to impose upon the corporations for whose sole benefit and profit these structures were required the sole burden of their support. The unbroken continuance of this statutory regulation for half a century indicates no change of the legislative judgment upon this subject. The sole question, therefore, for our decision is whether the legislature of 1889, in passing the section of the statute in question, intended to repeal section 3480 of the General Statutes, which compels railroads to maintain bridges like the one under consideration. careful examination of the whole question at issue we have reached the conclusion that the legislature did not intend to repeal, and that section 7 of the act of 1889 does not repeal, any part of section 3480 of the General Statutes, and will briefly state the reasons that lead us to this conclusion.

From a

1. The title of the act containing the section involved is "An Act relating to Grade Crossings.' While the title is not controlling, yet it is significant, and may aid in showing what was in the mind of the legislature. U. S. v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610. To arrive at the true meaning of a statute it is necessary to take a broad, general view of the whole açt, so as to get an exact conception of its aim, scope, and object. Endl. Interp. St. § 27. The true meaning of a statute is discovered not merely from its words, but also by comparison with other parts of the act, by reference to previous legislation upon the same subject, and by ascertaining the cause and occasion of the passage of the act, and the purpose intended to be accomplished thereby. By reference to previous legislation it will be found that as early as 1883 the legislature, moved doubtless by the frequent recurrence of frightful accidents at grade crossings, passed several enactments to provide methods of increasing public safety at such highway crossings. In 1884, and later, additional legislation ensued, and finally, in 1889, the legislature undertook still further and more radical legislation, looking to the gradual abolition of all grade crossings. The whole purpose and scope of the act of 1889 seems to be to facilitate the extinction of grade crossings. It is apparently directed wholly to this deadly menace to public safety. That part of section 1 which defines the proper allegations for a petition to the railroad commissioners under the provisions of the act shows its scope and purpose. It is as follows: "The selectmen of any town, the mayor and common council of any city, the warden and

MCSHERRY, J. The appellees, who are nonresidents of Maryland, instituted an action of assumpsit against the appellants in the superior court of Baltimore city. The defendants pleaded their discharge under the insolvent laws of Maryland. The plaintiffs replied that they (the plaintiffs) were not citizens of this state when the contract sued on was entered into, and had not become such since, and that they did not make themselves parties to the defendants' insolvent proceedings, or participate therein. To the replications setting up this avoidance, the defendants demurred. The court overruled the demurrer, and upon motion entered judgment for the plaintiffs. From that judgment this appeal has been taken. The single question, therefore, brought up for decision, is whether the discharge of a debtor under a state insolvent law by the courts of the debtor's domicile extinguishes a debt due to a nonresident creditor. That it does not, has been repeatedly decided by this court, and by the supreme court of the United States. A state insolvent law is not extraterritorial in its operation, and consequently a discharge under it cannot release a debtor from his contracts with citizens of other states, unless they voluntarily participate in the insolvency proceedings. The discharge of the debtor and his subsequently acquired property from liability for his antecedent debts is subject to the qualification that nonresident creditors who do not voluntarily place themselves within the jurisdiction of the insolvent court shall not be affected or bound. It is no answer to say, as was contended in the argument, that this will result in giving to the foreign creditor an advantage which the domestic creditor is denied, for the extent of a court's jurisdiction, or the inability of a state, by its legislative enactments, to control the rights of persons resident be yond its borders, does not depend upon considerations of that character. The limits to the jurisdiction and authority being ascertained and defined, the consequences following their legitimate exercise or assertion can neither restrict nor enlarge the one nor the other. As, then, lawful contracts with nonresident creditors are neither impaired nor extinguished by the discharge, the discharge presents no bar to a recovery upon them. The replications, therefore, good, and the demurrer to them was properly overruled. Without further elaboration of this subject, we refer to Pinckney v. Lanahan, 62 Md. 450; Brown v. Smart, 69 Md. 328, 14 Atl. Rep. 468, and 17 Atl. Rep. 1101, affirmed upon writ of error by the supreme court of the United States in 145 U. S. 454, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 958. The judgment appealed from, being free from error, will be affirmed. Judgment affirmed, with costs in this court and the court below.

were

(67 N. H. 591)

JACOBS v. TOWN OF CROYDON. (Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Sullivan, March 11, 1892.)

DEFECTIVE HIGHWAY-ACTION FOR INJURIES-27AMINATION OF WITNESS.

Where, in an action for injuries caused by a defective highway, plaintiff testifies on cross-examination that he had previously been injured by a defective highway in another town, and sued therefor, and as to the character of such injuries, it is not error to refuse to permit him to be asked also whether he recovered of such town.

Exceptions from Sullivan county.

Case by George H. Jacobs against the town of Croydon for personal injuries caused by a defective highway. There was a verdict for plaintiff, and defendant excepted. Exceptions overruled.

The plaintiff testified on cross-examination that he had previously been injured by a defective highway in another town, and had brought an action for the injury. After examining him at length in regard to the extent and character of the injury, the defendants asked him whether he recovered of the town. The question was excluded.

S. L. Bowers and H. W. Parker, for plaintiff. G. R. Brown, for defendants. CHASE, J. The evidence called for was irrelevant. Exception overruled.

CARPENTER, J., did not sit; the others

concurred.

(85 Me. 252)

STATE v. RICHARDS. (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Jan. 2, 1893.)

CRIMINAL LAW-INSTRUCTIONS-OPINION OF COURT

-WAIVING OBJECTIONS.

1. A charge to the jury does not contravene the statute that prohibits the presiding justice from expressing "an opinion upon issues of fact arising in the case," because of general observations made before commenting on the testimony, or because it contains affirmations of familiar principles for the application of evidence, or considerations of an elementary and axiomatic character, or statements which, considered in their appropriate connection, do not manifest an expression of opinion,

2. When counsel regard the charge as containing such expressions of opinion by the presiding justice, he should request the court to rectify the mistake before the jury retires.

3. His failure to do so will be regarded as a waiver of any objection arising from that

source.

(Official.)

Exceptions from supreme Judicial court, Kennebec county.

John H. Richards was convicted on 8 criminal charge, and brings exceptions. Exceptions overruled.

C. E. Littlefield, Atty. Gen., and L. T. Carleton, Co. Atty., for the State. 8. S Brown, for defendant.