Anderson v. Anderson et al. executed a mortgage to the appellant. Suit was brought on the note and mortgage, a judgment for $7,178 was recovered against Jeremiah, and a decree foreclosing the mortgage was rendered. On this judgment and decree the mortgaged land was sold for $3,000, and subsequently other property was sold for $1,500. The avails of the sales under the judgment were not sufficient to pay the judgment, but left the sum of $3,020 unpaid. In November, 1887, Sarah Anderson recovered judgment against Jeremiah Anderson for $1,516. On the 20th day of January, 1888, she redeemed the land described in the mortgage executed to the appellant. The appellant's position is that he is entitled to have the land sold to himself and redeemed by Sarah Anderson again sold to satisfy the $3,020 remaining unpaid upon his judgment against Jeremiah Anderson. Counsel argue that the lien of the mortgage was not merged, and that the lien still exists, notwithstanding the sale, and refer us to the case of Teal v. Hinchman, 69 Ind. 379. It is true that the lien of a mortgage is not always merged in a judgment, and that equity will preserve the lien when necessary to prevent injustice. Evansville, etc., Co. v. State, ex rel., 73 Ind. 219; Pence v. Armstrong, 95 Ind. 191 (207). But the doctrine stated does not rule such a case as this. The principle which controls the present case may be thus stated: The sale on a judgment or decree exhausts it as to the property sold, and the judgment creditor can not, after redemption by a junior encumbrancer, resell the land to enforce payment of an unsatisfied part of his judgment. Horn v. Indianapolis Nat'l Bank, 125 Ind. 381; Green v. Stobo, 118 Ind. 332; Hervey v. Krost, 116 Ind. 268; Simpson v. Castle, 52 Cal. 644; People, ex rel., v. Easton, 2 Wend. 298; Russell v. Allen, 10 Paige, 249; Clayton v. Ellis, 50 Iowa, 590. The object of the law is to compel creditors to bid a fair and adequate price for the debtor's property, and to prevent Anderson v. Anderson et al. them from bidding a small sum, and, in the event of a redemption, again subject the property to sale. The policy of the law-and it is a sound and just one-is to prohibit the creditor from selling the property more than once for his own benefit, and to secure a just and fair price for the property in the first instance. Another purpose is to discourage the practice of creating costs by making repeated sales on the same judgment. The case of Greene v. Doane, 57 Ind. 186, has been disapproved in many decisions and by the text-writers generally. Our own decisions have emphatically asserted that even if that case was well decided under the statute then in force (which is questioned in some of the cases), it does not express the law as it now exists. It is a mistake to suppose that the law intends that the redemption by a junior encumbrancer shall be for the benefit of the creditor, upon whose judgment the land was sold; for, on the contrary, the right of redemption is created for the benefit of the debtor and junior encumbrancers. When a junior encumbrancer redeems he does so, in contemplation of law, for his own benefit, and not for that of the creditor upon whose judgment the sale was made. Porter v. Pittsburgh, etc., Co., 122 U. S. 267. It is insisted by the appellant's counsel that the case is governed by the statute enacted prior to 1881, and that the decision in Greene v. Doane, supra, controls. But this position is untenable. Even if it were conceded that the doctrine of Greene v. Doane, supra, is sound, it would not follow that it governs here. It has been directly decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, and impliedly by this court, that statutes creating a right to redeem may be altered. The right to redeem is solely the creature of statute; it relates to the remedy, and is not, as it is held, so essentially and intrinsically a contract right as to be entirely beyond legislative control. Connecticut, etc., Ins. Co. v. Cushman, 108 U. S. 51; Davis v. Rupe, 114 Ind. 588; Hartlepp et al. v. Whiteley et al. Hervey v. Krost, supra; Parker v. Dacres, 130 U. S. 43; Judgment affirmed. No. 15,083. HARTLEPP ET AL. v. WHITELEY ET AL. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.-Action to Set Aside.-No Other Property.-Defective Finding. In a suit by a creditor to set aside a conveyance of property on the ground that it was made to defraud creditors, where the special finding fails to show that the grantor had no property other than the land out of which the debt sued for might have been made, either at the time of the conveyance, or from that time up to the time suit was brought, the defendant is entitled to judgment. SPECIAL FINDING.-Amendment of After Verdict.-After the rendition of judgment the court can not amend and supply defects in a special finding on motion of one of the parties. From the Tippecanoe Circuit Court. I. E. Schoonover, for appellants. J. McCabe and E. F. McCabe, for appellees. OLDS, J.—The complaint by the appellees in this action was to set aside the conveyance of real estate described therein alleged to have been fraudulently made to appellants by one Kasper Hartlepp, who was a co-defendant in the court below. The cause was tried by the court without a jury, and the court, at the request of appellants, made a special finding of facts, and stated conclusions of law thereon. The appellant excepted to the conclusions of law, as stated by the court. The appellants also moved the court for a judgment in their favor on the special finding of facts, which was overruled, exceptions reserved by appellant, and judgment rendered for the appellees. Hartlepp et al. v. Whiteley et al. There was an entire omission to find any facts showing that Kasper Hartlepp, the appellants' grantor, had no property other than the land out of which the debt sued for might have been made, either at the time of the conveyance, or from that time up to the time suit was brought. For aught that appears from the finding, the grantor may have. had an abundance of other property out of which the debt might have been made at the time of the conveyance, and from thenceforward up to and at the time suit was brought. The finding of facts was fatally defective, and the court erred in its conclusions of law, also in overruling appellants' motion for judgment on the finding. The finding being silent upon these material facts, it stands as if such facts were not proven, and upon failure to prove such facts appellants were entitled to a judgment. Brumbaugh v. Richcreek, 127 Ind. 240, and authorities there cited. The court sought to remedy the defect in the finding some days after the rendition of the judgment. The appellees, the plaintiffs below, appeared in court and moved the court to amend the special finding "by finding whether or not said defendant Kasper Hartlepp had any property subject to execution other than the lands described in the complaint, from the time of said conveyances to the time of beginning this action." The court sustained the motion and made a finding that Hartlepp had no property other than the land subject to execution at the time of the conveyance, nor at any time thereafter up to the commencement of this action, and stated that such finding was made from the evidence, and ordered that it be entered of the day of the trial, and that it should have the same effect as if made at the day of the trial along with the other findings. This latter action of the court was clearly of no effect. The court can not amend and supply defects in a special finding on motion of one of the parties to a suit after the rendition of the judgment, even if it could do so before judgment. In the case VOL. 129.-37 Hartlepp et al. v. Whiteley et al. of Clark v. State, ex rel., 125 Ind. 1, this court held that the court had no power to alter or change its special finding after it had been returned and entered of record, and the same doctrine has been held in previous decisions of this court. Wray v. Hill, 85 Ind. 546; Levy v. Chittenden, 120 Ind. 37. In the opinion of the court justice will be best subserved by the granting of a new trial. Judgment reversed at costs of appellees, with instructions to the court below to set aside the judgment and grant a new trial. Filed Oct. 7, 1891. SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION. OLDS, J.-In the original opinion we only made a statement showing the controverted question presented for decision, and it should have been more explicit. The appellees, Whiteley, Fassler and Kelley, and James McCabe, joined in the action as plaintiffs, alleging and showing that Whiteley, Fassler and Kelley had a judgment against Kasper Hartlepp which was unsatisfied, and that McCabe held a note executed by said Kasper Hartlepp to him for $145, due September 1st, 1885, with eight per cent. interest and attorney's fees, and alleging facts showing a fraudulent conveyance and transfer by Kasper Hartlepp of his real estate, and asking judgment in favor of McCabe on his note, and to have the fraudulent conveyance set aside and the land subjected to the payments of the Whiteley, Fassler and Kelley judgment, and the judgment of McCabe. The facts found show McCabe entitled to his judgment, and judgment was rendered in his favor. The personal judgment in favor of McCabe was authorized by the findings of fact, and should not be set aside, but the judgment setting aside the conveyance by Kasper Hartlepp to James Hartlepp should be set aside. The mandate of the original opinion is, therefore, hereby modified, and the personal judgment in favor of James Mc |