Reason for inventing words expressing abstract ideas. relation, that is, a certain difference or resemblance observed between objects present to our sight, or to our memory. Now the judgment formed of ideas, that by this application become material, will be, as I have repeatedly said, nothing more than the pronouncing of sensations felt. I shall be asked perhaps, from what motives men have invented and introduced these algebraical expressions, if I may be allowed the term, which till they are applied to sensible objects, have no real signification, and represent no determinate idea? I answer, that men thought they should by this method be able to communicate their ideas more easily, readily, and even more clearly. It is for this reason that they have in all languages created so many adjectives and substantives that are at once so vague * and so useful. *The language of a polished people invariably comprehends a multitude of pronouns, conjunctions, in short, of words that being void of meaning themselves, borrow their different significations from the expressions with which they are connected, or the phrases in which they are used. The invention of most of these words is owing to the fear that men had of too much increasing the signs of their languages, and a desire of communicating their ideas more easily. If they had in fact been obliged to create as many words as there are things to which they might be applied; for example, the adjectives white, strong, great, as a great cable, a great ox, a great tree, &c. it is evident that the multiplicity of words necessary to express their ideas would have been too weighty for their memory. It appeared necessary therefore to invent such words, as representing no real idea themselves, 1:|:|: ལྔ བས Vague ideas excited by certain words. Let us take for example, among these insignificant expressions, that of the word line, considered in geometry as having length without breadth or thickness; in this sense it recals no idea to the mind. No such line exists in nature, nor can any idea be formed of it. What does the master design therefore by using it? Merely to induce his pupil to give all his attention to the length of a body, without considering its other dimensions. When, for the facility of algebraical calculation, we substitute the letters A and B for fixed quantities, do these letters present any ideas? Do they express any real dimension? No. Now what is denoted in algebraical language by A and B, is expressed in common language by the words weakness, strength, smallness, greatness, &c. Those words express only a vague relation of things to each other, and do not convey any real and clear idea till the moment they are applied to a determinate object, and that object be compared with another. It is then that these words being put, if I may so say, in equation or comparison, express very precisely the relation of objects to each other. Till that moment the word greatness, for example, recals to the mind very different ideas, accord having only a local signification, and expressing merely the relations which objects have to each other, should however recal to the mind distinct ideas, the moment these words were connected with the objects whose relation they expressed. Vague ideas excited by certain words. ing as it is applied to a fly or an elephant. It is the same with regard to what is called in man idea or thought. These expressions are in themselves insignificant; yet to how many errors have they given birth: how often has it been maintained in the schools, that as thought does not belong to extension and matter, it is evident, that the soul is spiritual. I confess I could never make any thing of this learned jargon. What in fact is the meaning of the word thought? Either it is void of meaning, or like the word motion it merely expresses a mode of a man's existence. Now nothing can be more clear, than that a mode or manner of being is not a body or has no extension. But to make of this mode a being, and even a spiritual being, nothing, in my mind, is more absurd. be more vague than the word crime? What again can That this collec tive term may convey to my mind a clear and determinate idea, I must apply it to a theft, a murder, or some such action. Men have invented words of this sort merely to communicate their ideas more easily, or at least more readily. Suppose a society was instituted into which none but honest men were to be admitted; in order to avoid the trouble of transcribing a long catalogue of the actions for which any one was to be excluded, they would say in one word, that no man guilty of a crime was to be admitted. But of what precise idea would the word crime be here the representative? Of none. This word could be solely intended to call to the mind of the society those pernicious actions of which 13 All ideas may be reduced to sensations. which its members might become culpable, and to caution them to take heed to their conduct. In short, this word would be properly nothing more than a sound, and a more concise method of exciting the attention of the society. In like manner, if we are forced to determine the punishment due to a crime, we must first form clear and precise ideas of it, and then recal to our memory, successively, the representation of the different crimes a man may commit: then examine which of those offences is most detrimental to society, and lastly, form a judgment which would be, as I have so often said, nothing more than expressing the sensations felt at the presence of several representations of those crimes. Every idea whatever may therefore, in its ultimate analysis, be always reduced to material facts or sensations. Some obscurity is thrown on discussions of this kind by the vague significations of a certain number of words, and the trouble that is sometimes necessary to deduce clear ideas from them. Perhaps it is as difficult to analyze some of these expressions, and to reduce them, if I may so say, to their constituent ideas, as it is in chymistry to decompose certain bodies. However, let us but apply the method and attention necessary in this decomposition, and we shall not fail of success. What is here said will be sufficient to convince the discerning reader, that every idea and every judgment may be reduced to a sensation. It would be therefore unne it Interest the motive for comparing objects. unnecessary, in order to explain the different operations of the mind, to admit a faculty of judging and comparing distinct from the faculty of sensation. But what may be asked, is the principle or motive that makes us compare objects with each other, and gives us the necessary attention to observe their relations? Interest, which is in like manner, as I am going to shew, an effect of corporeal sensibility. CHAP. VI. WHERE THERE IS NO INTEREST THERE IS NO ALL comparison of objects with each other supposes |