The understanding dependent on the organization.

minds or understandings can be clearly deduced, we ought to give the preference to the latter opinion.

Now when a known cause can explain a fact, why should we have recourse to one that is unknown, to an occult quality, whose existence, always uncertain, explains nothing that we cannot account for with out it?

To prove that all men equally well organised, have an equal disposition for understanding*; we must ascertain the principle by which it is produced: what is it?

* Mr. Locke was doubtless partly convinced of this truth, when he said, speaking of the unequal capacity of understandings, he thought he saw less difference between them, than is commonly imagined. “I think, says he, in the second page of his Education, we

may assert, that in an hundred men, there are not more than ninety, "who are what they are, good or bad, useful or pernicious to society, "but from the instruction they have received. It is on education "that depends the great difference observable among them. The "least and most imperceptible impressions received in our in"fancy, have consequences very important, and of a long dura"tion. It is with these first impressions, as with a river, whose "water we can easily turn, by different canals, in quite opposite "courses, so that from the insensible direction the stream receives "at its source, it takes different directions, and at last arrives at "places far distant from each other: and with the same facility, I "think, we may turn the minds of children to what direction we "please." In this passage Locke does not indeed expressly affirm, that all men equally well organised, have equal aptitude to mental capacity but here he says, what he had been, as it were, a witness of, and what daily experience had taught him. This philosopher

All

Of the principle which produces the understanding.

All the sensations of man are material. Perhaps I have not sufficiently explained this truth in my Treatise on the Mind. What then should I here propose? To demonstrate rigorously, what, perhaps, I have there only asserted, and prove that all the operations of the mind are reducible to sensation. It is this principle,

had not reduced all the faculties of the mind to the capacity of sensation, which is the only principle that can resolve this question.

σε

Quintilian, who had been for so long a time charged with the instruction of youth, had still more practical knowledge than Locke, and is more bold in his assertions. He says, Inst. Orat. lib. i." It " is an error to think that there are few men born with the faculty "of discerning the ideas offered them, and that the greatest part "lose their time, and pains in endeavouring to conquer the innate "idleness of their minds. The greatest number, on the contrary, appear equally well organised, to think and retain with prompti"tude and facility. It is a talent as natural to man, as flying is to birds, running to horses, and ferocity to savage beasts. The life "of the soul is in its activity and industry, whence it has received "the attribute of a celestial origin. Minds that are stupid and "incapable of science, are in the order of nature to be regarded "as monsters and other extraordinary phenomena; minds of "this sort are rare. Hence I conclude, that there are great re"" sources to be found in children, which are suffered to vanish "with their years It is evident therefore that it is not of nature, but of our negligence we ought to complain."

The opinions of Quintilian and Locke, both founded on experience, and the proofs I have urged to demonstrate this truth, ought, I think, to suspend on this subject the too precipitate judgment of the reader.

tha

Of the principle which produces the understanding.

that can alone explain to us how we owe our ideas to our senses; and at the same time that is not, however, as is proved by experience, to the extreme perfection of those senses, that we owe the greater or less extent of our understanding.

If this principle will reconcile two facts, in appearance so contradictory, I shall conclude, that the superiority of the understanding is not the produce of temperament, nor of the greater or less perfection of the senses, nor of an occult quality, but that of the well known cause, education, and in short, that instead of vague assertions so frequently repeated, we may substitute very determinate ideas.

Previous to the particular examination of this question, I think, in order to make it more clear, and to avoid all contest with the theologians, I should first distinguish between the mind, and what they call the soul.

CHAP. II.

OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MIND AND THE SOUL.

THERE

HERE are no two words perfectly synonimous. This truth being unknown to some, and forgotten by others, has caused the words Mind and Soul to be fre

VOL. I.

H

quently

Notions of the Parsis respecting the soul.

quently confounded. But what is the difference between them? and what is the soul? Are we to regard it after the ancients, and the first fathers of the church, as a matter extremely refined, and as the electric fire by which we are animated? Were I here to recount all the opinions of different nations, and different sects of philosophers, concerning it, they would altogether form nothing but vague, obscure, and trifling ideas. The only people that expressed themselves with sublimity on this subject, were the Parsis.* When they pronounce a funeral oration over the tomb of some great man, they cried "O earth! O, common mother "of human beings, take back what to thee appertains "of the body of this hero: let the aqueous particles "that flowed in his veins exhale into the air, and falling in rain on the mountains, replenish the streams, fertilise the plains, and roll back to the abyss "of the ocean whence they proceeded! Let the fire "concentered in this body rejoin the heavenly orb, the "source of light and heat! Let the air confined in his "members, burst its prison, and be dispersed by the "winds in the mundane space! And lastly thou, O "breath of life, if perchance thou art of a nature se

parate from all others, return to the unknown being "that produced thee! or, if thou art only a mixture of "material elements, mayst thou, after being dispersed

* A people of Cambaya, in the empire of the Mogul.

Inability of philosophy to describe the nature of the soul.

"in the universe, again assemble thy scattered par"ticles, to form another citizen as virtuous as this "hath been!"

Such were the noble images, and sublime expressions employed by the enthusiasm of the Parsis, to express the ideas they had of the soul. Philosophy, less bold in its conjectures, dares not describe its nature, and resolve the question. Philosophy cannot advance without the staff of experience: it does indeed advance but constantly from observation to observation, and where observation is wanting it stops. All that philosophy knows, is, that man feels, that he has within him a principle of life, and that without the wings of theology, he cannot mount to the knowledge of this principle.

Whatever depends on observation appertains to metaphysical philosophy; all beyond belongs to theology* or scholastic metaphysics.

* Some have doubted whether the science of God or theology, be in fact a science. All science, they say, supposes a series of observations. Now what observation can be made on a Being that is invisible and incomprehensible? Theology is therefore no science. In fact, what do we understand by the word of God? The unknown cause of order and motion. Now, what can we say of an unknown cause? If we attach other ideas to the word of God, we shall fall, as Mr. Robinet has shown, into a thousand contradictions. Does the theologian contemplate the curves described by the heavenly bodies, and thence conclude, that there is a power who moves them? Cæli enarrant gloriam Dei! H 2 But