thor of our sinful tendencies. But this is a conclusion which De Wette rejects, as decidedly as every other sound-minded man. Plainly the word, vitiosity, must mean more than the bare possibility of sinning; for the possibility of sinning is consistent with a complete indifference of the free will; but vitiosity presupposes a decided propensity to evil, and a germ of sin from which actual transgressions subsequently unfold themselves. Therefore, although we are to ascribe the possibility of sinning to Jesus, we by no means allow that there existed, in connection with this possibility, any sinful disposition; any, even the least propensity towards evil, or any real evil.2

It is another question, whether, besides the possibility of sinning, necessary to every free nature, there were not also in Jesus that peculiar bias to evil, which has been superinduced upon the nature of man, without his own choice; that vitiosity which is called original sin.3 If we consider a predominant bias to evil as dwelling universally in human nature, it will be peculiarly difficult to avoid the supposition, that Jesus was swayed by it, and thereby his moral purity was defaced. In many systems which retain the strict doctrine of original sin, this difficulty, as we well know, is removed by the theory, that the peculiar divine interposition, at the miraculous conception of Jesus, prevented the implantation within him, of the human original depravity; and the divine nature being united with the human at the first moment of its earthly existence, precludes the introduction of the least degree of moral evil into that human nature.1 But we do not allow ourselves to examine, at present, this mode of solving the difficulty, and we must decline making any use of the solution for the two following reasons. First, it has been our design, throughout the whole of this essay, not to interrupt the regular historical course of our investigation by the admixture of dogmatical principles. Secondly, it cannot be proved, that the fact of Christ's extraordinary conception, as it is definitely taught by both Matthew and Luke, is ever in the New Testament brought into connec

1 Einen positiven Hang zum Bösen, und einen Keim der Sunde, aus welchem sich dann die wirklichen Sünden entwickeln.

2 See Note G, at the close.

3 For the meaning of original sin, and the distinction between it and vitiosity, see note H, at the close.

[See Knapp's Theol. IX. § 78. Storr and Flatt IV. § 75.-TR.]

tion with the freedom of his nature from original sin. If the New Testament does not give this solution, it cannot be considered as authoritative, even though it have many an argument in its favor.

A reply now, somewhat like the following, might be made to this objection. Whatever shape may be given to the dogma of original sin, the doctrine of moral freedom must never be endangered by it. This doctrine we must hold fast, both in the sense in which it is taught in the Gospel, and also in the shape in which it is declared by our moral consciousness. For even if we have a propensity to evil, we are yet conscious every moment of an inextinguishable power, by which we can resist allurements to sin, and act virtuously. Without this immediate consciousness, there would be no exercise of the moral sense, and no imputation of moral qualities; for all moral judgments are founded on the conviction that we are both able and bound to avoid the evil, and perform the good. Now in this certainty of freedom, the supposition of which excludes all absolute necessity of sinning, we have the pledge, that it is possible to be a partaker of human nature, and yet to be without sin. For if the power of free-will is one, which can overcome the inclination to evil, and do what is right, in every individual case, then it also includes the possibility of doing right in all cases. It is therefore conceivable, that in some human being this possibility should be exemplified in actual fact.'-But this kind of exemption from sin presupposes an entirely uncorrupted and unweakened power of choice; and the existence of such a power is denied by the supposition of a universal corruption of human nature.1

The objection, therefore, which we are now considering, may perhaps be answered more satisfactorily in the following manner: 'It cannot be regarded as a truth of abstract reason that man must sin; nor even that he is infected by nature with a propensity, or bias to sin. Looking away from Revelation, we can be convinced of this bias cleaving to ourselves only by experience."2 By this experience, indeed, we are compelled to believe that the moral consciousness of every one may convince him of the weakness which exists in his own will. Still, on the other hand, if a rational being appears, who

1 See Note I, at the close of this Treatise.

2 Even Kant appeals to experience, when he would prove the existence of a bias to evil in human nature. Relig. innerh. der Gränzen der bl. Vernunft, 1. Cap. 3.

does not experience this moral failing, and who with vast mental power, and with cool discretion, bears testimony to his own perfection of virtue, then, unless this testimony be destitute of other criteria of truth, we have no reason to reject it. We have no reason, as sin must not be considered necessary to man, to refuse such testimony, even if, at first view, it be not entirely obvious how a being, who belongs to a corrupted race, can yet be free from the common corruption.

There is another objection. It is said," So far as the virtue of Jesus was human, it must have had a mixture of the sensuous, from which no human resolution is entirely free; and in being thus subjected to a law of sense, there is such an imperfection, as is incompatible with the idea of absolute completeness of virtue." There is some truth in this idea. We cannot deny that the sensuous principle, which imparts excitement to the resolutions and acts, was intimately connected with the virtue of Jesus. We cannot deny it, so long as we suppose, that he had necessarily the same connection of soul with body, which other men have. It is not to be conceded, however, that in this sensuous element of the voluntary and of the external action, there is anything in itself evil and sinful. As soon as the last and highest impulse to the volition and the outward act goes forth from the appropriate leading power, from spirit (pneuma), the volition and the act are morally good; even if in the progress of these there be conjoined, as is inevitable, an excitement of the animal sensibilities. The excitement of sense is evil, only when in opposition to higher spiritual principles. But we do not find this opposition in Jesus, neither in suffering, nor in acting; and wherever, as the result of his human nature, any enticement arises from his animal sensibilities, the enticement is overpowered by the spiritual nature. If then an operation of the sensuous principle is exhibited in the conduct of Jesus, it is still in harmonious subordination to the ruling spiritual power. Now the excitements of this principle are actually essential to human nature; if we should suppose them to be at all sinful, we must ascribe the guilt to the author of them. That these sensuous impulses, however, operated unsuitably, even in a single instance, as the means of determining the will of Jesus, can in no way be shown. Still less is it evident to me, how any one, without considering

'De Wette Christ. Mor. I. p. 188.

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every created being as an apostate from God, and without adopting the representations of the oriental Gnostics and of Origen, how any one, I say, can speak of Jesus as guilty in having a finite nature;" and can make the remark, that “ as a human being, he must have been finite, and therefore a subject of the contractedness and guilt, which belong to the finite state, as such." Every being, as is obvious, is perfect only according to his constitutional structure. The perfection of a finite nature is therefore by no means absolutely identical with the perfection of an infinite; the highest and purest human virtue is yet not the holiness of God, for this holiness is conjoined with the comprehensive whole of his nature and attributes. But the finite being is not guilty on account of this difference. Whatever corresponds with the origin and design of his constitution is right; all that belongs to pure humanity2 is, as such, perfect. If we impute finiteness, as a sin, to a finite nature, then again the sin lies at the door of him who has actually made that nature as it is, made it not infinite. But yet the perfectly virtuous will of man, though it be finite, may correspond with the holy will of God, which is infinite; and the human, in the sphere of operation assigned it, may harmonize with the divine. This is all which we assert, when we ascribe to Jesus, in his mere human nature, innocence and holiness. Only when the finite will goes out of its appropriate sphere, does it become guilty for its finiteness, and just so far guilty, as it puts itself forward for something different from what it actually is, (and comes short of what it pretends to be.) This charge however is not brought against Jesus; at least not in the preceding objection.

Finally, it is still objected,3" The feeling of humility in the breast of Jesus resulted from the consciousness of being imperfect and circumscribed; and of having some vitiosity and guilt. This humility is an essential feature of the moral perfection of man; by it man purifies himself from the guilt cleaving to him; and therefore Jesus, when he humbles himself as a finite nature, before the heavenly Father, is in this respect also an example for us." But if a self-consistency must be ascribed to the character of the Messiah, we cannot admit this assertion. The same Jesus who declared himself free

1 De Wette, Christ. Mor. I. pp. 189, 192.

2 [Whatever belongs to the constitution of man as he came from the hand of God.-TR.]

3 Ibid. I. p. 192.

from every fault, who was confident of his oneness with God, who was immovably persuaded that in all his life he represented the character of his Father, could not have been humble on account of any, even the slightest feeling of moral deficiency and guilt. It was only from a generous condescension, that he was humble. It was only for the sake of being an example to the race, for the sake of attracting and elevating men to himself, by the power of a selfdenying love. The general truth is, humility does not distinctively consist in the consciousness of our moral imperfections and faults; this is the feeling of guilt. Humility is the modest estimation of the good which belongs to ourselves, the mild judgment respecting others of inferior worth, and the conviction that none of the good which we possess is of our own acquisition, but is the gift of a higher power and love. And this humility we find in Jesus. He allowed no splendid exhibition of his high and peculiar excellences. He was always mild and condescending; so that he might bless the weakest with the beams of his light, and the power of a better life. And above all, in every thing which he said and did, he pointed to the fountain of truth and goodness; to the Father, who permitted the Son to have in himself, and to exhibit to man a heavenly life that was pure, perfect and self-sufficient.1

1 It is indeed true, that the heaven of heavens is destitute of the degree of purity which belongs to God, and may therefore be called comparatively impure; and the angels are destitute of the degree of wisdom, which be longs to Him, and may therefore be charged with comparative folly; and all finite beings are necessarily, in the strictest sense of the term, imperfect, and are bound to feel and acknowledge their inferiority to Him, who only is absolute perfection. Hence the angels veil their faces before God, and fall prostrate. Hence Christ, as a man, was “meek and lowly," and cried "not as I will but as thou wilt." These created intelligences are perfect relatively to their capacities, but as they are not perfect in the absolute sense, they feel bound to appreciate their inferiority, as it really is. This heart-felt appreciation may be termed humility; a generic word, which, though it ordinarily includes the specific idea of penitence for sin, does not always, nor necessarily. See De Wette, Christian Morals, Vol. I. P. 192.—TR.]