counted fynonymous. And if I fay, brass has capacity to be melted by fire, and that brass has power to be melted by fire: Those philofophers do not difpute their equivalence, who admit the notion of paffive power. Again, a strong wind, and a powerful wind, are confounded together. Liberty to ftretch forth my arm or to forbear it; and power to stretch forth my arm or to refrain it, pass for the same conception. And to delegate power to the King, and to delegate dominion to him, pafs for expreffions of the fame notion. We fhall find ere long, at leaft I venture to affert, that there is more than the fhadow of difference between these contrafted expreffions.-When I have noticed the adroit ufe of the word power in three or four, and fometimes five or fix different fenses in the fame chapter or oration, it has reminded me of the stage actor who becomes Hector or Achilles, Cæfar or Cato, Bevil or George Barnwell, as fuits the manager's purpose. But what is most amazing, is, that all agree, power is a fimple thing: That "it is a thing fo "much of its own kind, and fo fimple in its na"ture, as not to admit of a logical definition." Let us endeavour to call back this poor proftitute, and espouse her to a single determinate meaning.

1. Power is the primary grand effential to producing of change. There must also be Operation otherwise

otherwise there will be no change, but operation is effentially dependent on power. Power is always first in order of nature, therefore we rightly affirm that power is the primary grand essential to the production of change.

2. The notion of producing change leads to power, yet without ftrict attention to the word producing, this is too general; for if we reflect, numerous changes are as fully connected with the absence of power, as others with its presence. Power then is related to value, excellence, or ad. vancc from non-entity. The bringing this world from chaos, we afcribe to power; but should it again decay, return to chaos, we should attribute that change to the absence of power in respect of sustaining it.

I grant that people feem generally to hold a notion that every change must depend on ability to produce it. Hence, even in cafes of evident decay, perishing and declenfions, by a trope, they ascribe the event to some ability and operation. A tree dies through old age—a man dies by a confumption-another of old age.-We fay time. killed the tree-old killed the man, age and that the confumption killed this man, and the fever that man. But in either of these cases where shall a philofopher find the object in which he can admit ability, and what the object which operates? The death in either cafe is the effen

tial

tial confequent of decay of properties in the objects, and confequently decay of power in respect of abiding or enduring.

Power is effentially related to value or excellence, to excellence on the whole, excellence infinity and eternity confidered. The separate existence of either power or excellence is impoffible. Were there nothing valuable or excellent in existence there would be no power. Were there no power in exiftence there would be no excellence. The highest kinds of excellence we have conception of, I think are knowledge and enjoyment: Hence power is effentially related to truth and goodness, immutable and immortal truth and goodnefs. The highest degree of every fpecies of excellence we call perfection: Power then is effentially related to truth, goodness and perfection.

The rule then is, All changes for the better, or to the advance of real excellence, are the refult of power: but all changes for the worse, or declenfions from former excellence, are the refult of the abfence of power. When a scholar advances in learning, we rightly afcribe the improvement to the concurrence of power: but when a lad, unduly indulged by his parents with abfence from fchool, falls back from the advances he had made, I afcribe it to absence of power in respect of tuition. And thus, when a people

a people conquers another people, if the conquef is founded in unrighteousness, and is on the whole an evil to the human fpecies, I think the change is rightly attributed to the abfence of power in respect of defence.

3. Power has always the same respect to a pofitive cause, as its abfence has to what is called a negative cause. View a man walking iu the funhine, I attribute his motion to power: but the motion of his fhadow to its absence.

4. Nor does our contemplation of external and internal changes alone guide us to power, for, abiding and enduring in relation to change are equally the refult of power. We cannot but admit power in exiftence to fuftain any valuable object, which abides, endures or furmounts oppofition. Thus a ftone abides, a tree endures, and a diamond retains its polifh. Thus alfo a thought of any valuable species, abides, endures and occupies the mind effentially dependent on power.

But here we must remark, as before, respecting changes, That power is ftill related to value, advance, and excellence: for abiding, enduring and perfeverance, in degradation and lofs, depends not on power, but its abfence. Natural good and moral good, abide, endure, and perfevere by power; but natural evil and moral evil, abide, endure, and prevail in the world by the absence of

power,

power, in refpect of refifting. We conceive permanency to depend on power, but accident, not on power, but its abfence. Fortitude and obstinacy are mediate fources of perfeverance. We rightly conceive fortitude to depend on power for its exiftence; but obftinacy, not on power, but its abfence. I grant it true, that without power there could be no changes, nor abiding, in opposition to change; because without power, there could be no pofitive being that could be the fubject of change, or which could abide. What I contend for is, that power is not immediately or directly requifite to the existence of every change, or inftance of actual abiding, in respect of opposition.

5. Power, is not exifting, abiding, enduring, producing, or fuftaining: yet it is that without, which no being can in the nature of things exift, abide or endure, produce or fuftain: For existence, immutability, production and mutability, effentially involve power to exift, power to abide and endure, power to produce and power to suftain. There is no power where there is no actual change, or actual abiding in opposition to change. The actual exiftence of power can be alone truly infered from actual change, or actual enduring, in oppofition to change. Where there is no actual abiding or enduring, and on the other hand, no actual change, there is no power in that refpect. As power and change, or power and abid