National Security Policy, 1969-1972U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012 - 1092 sivua This volume documents U.S. national security policy in the context of the Vietnam War and the changing Cold War strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. When President Richard Nixon assumed office in January 1969, he was confronted with the fact that the United States no longer held commanding military superiority over its superpower rival. Since the end of his stint as Vice President in 1961, the Soviets had achieved a rough strategic parity that left the United States with "significant vulnerabilities" vis-à-vis the USSR. This work documents the Nixon administration's efforts to grapple with this new strategic situation and provides coverage of the following: The administration's review of U.S. nuclear and general purpose forces and strategic doctri≠ its attempts to ascertain the level of technological sophistication achieved by the Soviet missile program; and its decision to deploy Safeguard, a modified anti-ballistic missile system. The page contained in this volume also examines chemical and biological weapons policy; U.S. nuclear policy in Asia; the evolution of the administration's strategic priorities in light of an ever-shrinking defense budget; and the transition from military conscription to an all-volunteer armed force. Additionally, it provides previously unreleased material regarding the October 1969 Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test, in which Nixon secretly placed on alert portions of the United States military, including its nuclear forces. Throughout this comprehensive and historical volume, a consistent theme is the relationship between military strength and diplomatic strength; in particular, the importance of military might--real or perceived--to the United States' ability to maintain credibility in the eyes of allies and adversaries alike. |
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Tulokset 1 - 5 kokonaismäärästä 99
Sivu 16
... Deterrence . However , the overall implications depend largely on whether an ABM defense of Minuteman or an anti ... deterrent , a delay would not endanger our security . ( 2 ) Few believe that an anti - Chinese system justifies the ...
... Deterrence . However , the overall implications depend largely on whether an ABM defense of Minuteman or an anti ... deterrent , a delay would not endanger our security . ( 2 ) Few believe that an anti - Chinese system justifies the ...
Sivu 17
... deterrent overcome earlier political and psychological disadvantage . SS - 9 bigger , more accurate than SS - 11 . a . Defense : 64 ABM launchers . b . R & D many projects at or near decision stage . On Talinn- majority believe it is ...
... deterrent overcome earlier political and psychological disadvantage . SS - 9 bigger , more accurate than SS - 11 . a . Defense : 64 ABM launchers . b . R & D many projects at or near decision stage . On Talinn- majority believe it is ...
Sivu 23
... deterrence be- comes demonstrably less . 4. Stable Deterrence Deliberate deterrent force . 5. Minor Deterrence . Fashionable at MIT and Harvard . Present Posture - a little short of having a significant edge . Choice is not purely ...
... deterrence be- comes demonstrably less . 4. Stable Deterrence Deliberate deterrent force . 5. Minor Deterrence . Fashionable at MIT and Harvard . Present Posture - a little short of having a significant edge . Choice is not purely ...
Sivu 24
... deterrent . 2. We can use ABM to protect missile & bomber forces . Fact ABM isn't perfect isn't so troublesome ; you complicate Soviet problem , aren't losing people . You could increase deterrence by building up offensive forces . But ...
... deterrent . 2. We can use ABM to protect missile & bomber forces . Fact ABM isn't perfect isn't so troublesome ; you complicate Soviet problem , aren't losing people . You could increase deterrence by building up offensive forces . But ...
Sivu 37
... deterrent and our second strike such as the Minuteman sites and other non hardened sites . This would also avoid the risk of falling behind in development of the art . Secondly it would improve our bargaining position and thirdly it ...
... deterrent and our second strike such as the Minuteman sites and other non hardened sites . This would also avoid the risk of falling behind in development of the art . Secondly it would improve our bargaining position and thirdly it ...
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air defense aircraft allies alternative area defense attack billion biological warfare bombers capability chemical China Chinese cost David Packard decision defense budget Department of Defense deploy deployment deterrent discussion Document draft Europe Footnote Helms Ibid ICBM improve increase Institutional Files H-Files Intelligence issues Joint Chiefs Kissinger Korea limited line not declassified memorandum military Minuteman MIRV Moorer National Archives National Security NATO Nixon Presidential Materials North Vietnam NSC Files NSC Institutional Files NSC meeting NSDM NSSM nuclear war nuclear weapons options Packard paper posture President problem protection purpose forces radar reduce Safeguard Safeguard program SALT Secretary of Defense silos SLBM Southeast Asia Soviet Union strategic forces strategic nuclear submarines tactical nuclear talks targets testing threat tion Top Secret toxins Tucker U.S. strategic United USSR Vietnam warheads Warsaw Pact Washington Wheeler White House