' remain without the neshama. Sometimes a man 'is only worthy of the nephesh, and so continues 'without the ruach and the neshama; and then the 'ruach and neshama remain in a place concealed, ' and only known to the holy and blessed God.'*

Another writer gives a very different account, both of the number of these undefinable subsistencies and of the times of their respective accessions to the body. First, indeed, he says: 'There are in man three forms of a soul: the first is 'the intelligible soul; the second is the speaking or 'reasoning soul; the third is the animal soul which is always craving.' In another place he says: The soul has five distinct forms or parts, and names. There are the nephesh, the ruach, the neshama, the chaja, the jechida. These are re'ceived by man at the following seasons. In the working days, between the feast and the increase

* Sepher Gilgulim, f. 40. c. 1. ibid. p. 247, 248.

+ It is probable that this theory of a threefold soul was of heathen origin. The above description very much resembles the pneumatology of Plato. Η ψυχὴ διαιρείται εις τρία· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῆς, ἐςὶ λογισικὸν τὸ δὲ, ἐπιθυμητικὸν τὸ δὲ θυμικόν. “The soul is divided into three parts: the first the seat of reason; the second, of appetite; and the third, ' of passion.' Laert. Diog. Lib. 3. Vit. Platon. p. 90. E. Vide etiam p. 85. D. Edit Pearon. Lond. 1664. Pythagoras also asserted the soul to be threefold Τὴν δὲ ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴν διαιρεῖσθαι τριχῆ. The soul • of man is divided into three parts εἴς τε νοῦν, καὶ φρένας, καὶ θυμὸν 'the seat of sensation, of reason, and of passion.' Laert. Diog. Lib. 8. Vit. Pythag. p. 221. B. The Stoics appear not to have been satisfied with triple souls. Φασὶ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι ὀκταμεςῆ· μέρη γὰρ αὐτῆς τὰ τε πέντε αισθητήρια, καὶ τὸ φωνητικὸν μόριον, καὶ τὸ διανοητικὸν ὅπές ἐςιν αὐτη ἡ διάνοια, καὶ τὸ γεννητικὸν. They say that the soul consists of eight parts; and that those parts are, the five senses, the vocal 'faculty, the cogitative which is cogitation itself, and the generative.' Laert. Diog. Lib. 7. Vit. Zenon. p. 190. C.

' of the moon comes to him the nephesh; on the 'feast day, comes to him the ruach; on the day of ' atonement, the neshama; and on the sabbath, the supernumerary soul, which is the mystery of chaja: and in the life to come he is made worthy to receive the jechida.'-The design of this supernumerary soul, with which the Jews are said to be inspired on the sabbath, is taught by the same author: The mystery of voluptuousness on the • sabbath, is, to exhilarate the supernumerary soul, ' in order that she may utter a mighty prayer in 'honour of the divine majesty among the lower, ⚫ that is, among men who dwell on the earth; when 'they say grace at meals; which is a duty not enjoined among the upper, or those that dwell ' in heaven.'* The benefit communicated by this sabbatical guest is thus celebrated by one of the gravest expounders of the Talmud: The supernumerary soul carries out the mind of man to eating ' and drinking, and makes him eat and drink with appetite and pleasure.'+-Menasseh Ben Israel however says: If the reader supposes that an 'additional soul is given to an Israelite on the sabbath, he is mistaken. For they who first deli'vered this matter had no such conception.-An 'additional soul signifies increase of knowledge ' and advancement in the study of the divine law.' But that the language just quoted from other writers was designed to convey the idea of spiritual improvement, cannot be admitted upon the bare

* Jalkut Chadash, f. 154. c. 1. f. 165. c. 3. f. 144. c. 1. ibid. p. 247. 274, 275.

+ Rabbi Solomon Jarchi, in Taanith, f. 27. c. 1. ibid. p. 275.

assertion of Menasseh; who must be regarded as opposing in this respect the general doctrine of his brethren. The nephesh, ruach, and neshama, he likewise maintains, signify nothing but the faculties, capacities, or virtues of the soul.'*

(

Some of the rabbinical writings represent the souls of Gentiles as having a very different origin from the souls of Jews: the latter as emanations from God; the former as the spawn of demons. Two passages may serve as specimens of others. The skin and flesh is the coat of a man. The 'spirit within is the man. But the idolaters are 'not called men; because their souls have their origin from the unclean spirit. But the souls of the Israelites are derived from the holy spirit.'— The souls of the nations, or Gentiles, have their origin from the exterior powers, the powers of Klippoth, or demons.-But the souls of the people ' of Israel have their origin in holy emanations 'from the blessed God.'+-Some of the traditions, however, appear not to be consistent with this notion; and as to many of them, it is difficult to understand, whether they are intended to be restricted to the souls of Jews, or to include those of all mankind.

Modern Jews have generally received the doctrine of what is called the pre-existence of souls. 'Although,' says Menasseh Ben Israel, 'the learned of the nations of the world are of opinion, that

*Nishmath Chajim, f. 53. c. 2. f. 69. c. 2. f. 70. c. 1, 2. ibid. p. 276. 247.

+ Jalkut Reubeni, Parasha Bereshith, f. 10. c. 1. Shefa Tal, f. 4. c. 2. ibid. p. 254, 255.

the souls are created with the body; yet true 'Israelites believe with a perfect faith, that they 'all,' even all the souls which have been from the 'time of the first man, and which shall be to the ' end of the world, were created in the six days of 'the creation.'-'And most of our sages agree in

this, that the souls were created on the first day. Rabbi Moses Ben Nachman has written, It must 'by no means be said, that they were created after the first day; because on the first day, the holy ' and blessed God created something out of nothing: but from that day forward, during the rest of the days of the creation, he created something ' out of something: and if so, then are the souls comprehended in what was created on the first day.'*-Another writer attributes to the soul the same early existence, but describes its nature in terms altogether inapplicable to a creation out of nothing, and designating a kind of personality of the godhead: They,' the heathens, 'suppose, that the 'soul and spirit of man is a coruscation of the 'spheres.-The law, however, clearly demonstrates, 'that they are in an error; that it is not a corus'cation from the spheres, but that, on the contrary, 'the spirit of God, that is, the spirit of man, a 'coruscation and particle of the Deity, brooded over the face of the waters; that whilst as yet nothing existed except what was in the waters, the soul of man had an existence anterior to the formation of the heavens, they being nothing but

6

* Nishmath Chajim, f. 70. c. 2. f. 71. c. 2. Tanchuma, f. 32. c. 2. ibid. p. 263, 264. Menasseh de Creat. Probl. 16. apud Hoornbeek contra Jud. L. 4. c. 1. p. 330–332.

'fire and water.'* The same writer elsewhere† says: The human soul is a particle of the Deity 'from above, an intermede between us and the ' proprietor of us; and is eternal like the heavenly natures.'I

R. Joseph Ben Chajim, Jad Joseph, f. 6. cit. in Oxlee on Trinity, &c. vol. i. p. 64, 65.

+ Dar. iv. p. 150. cit. in Jewish Repository, vol. ii. p. 413.

The want of any foundation for the notion of a pre-existence of souls, in the writings of Moses and the prophets, justifies something beyond a suspicion that the rabbies borrowed it from the Heathens. Menasseh Ben Israel, indeed, (De Creatione, Problem. xv.) most confidently affirms that the Gentile philosophers derived it from the Hebrews; but he offers no proof or argument in support of the assertion. There is not the least evidence of its having been adopted by any Jews, till within a century before the Christian era.-One of the most distinguished advocates of this opinion, who died above three hundred years before the birth of Christ, was Plato. The grand argument, or rather sophism, on which he rests it, is the assumption, that all our knowledge is mere remembrance. Ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἀλλό τὶ ἤ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ καλὰ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη που ἡμᾶς ἐν πρότερῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ μεμαθηκέναι ἃ νῦν ἀναμιμνησκόμεθα. Τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνα τον, εἰ μὴ ἦν που ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἴδει γενέσθαι. Εἴτις τὶ ἀναμνησθήσεται, δεῖν αὐτὸν τοῦτο πρότερον ποτὲ ἐπίστασθαι. Καὶ εἰ μὲν γε λαβόντες μὴ ἑκάστοτε ἐπιλελήσμεθα, εἰδότες ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἀεὶ διὰ βίου εἰδέναι. Τὸ γὰρ εἰδέναι τοῦτ ̓ ἐστὶ, λαβόντα τοῦ ἐπισε τήμην ἔχειν, καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλεκέναι· * οὐ τοῦτο λήθην λέγομεν, ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολήν.—Εἰ δὲ γε λαβόντες πρὶν γενέσθαι, γιγνόμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν, ὕστερον δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι χρώμενοι περὶ αὐτὰ ἐκείνας ἀναλαμβάνομεν τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἃς ποτε καὶ πρὶν εἴχομεν, ἆρ ̓ οὐχ ὃ καλοῦμεν μανθάνειν, οἰκείαν ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν εἴη; τοῦτο δὲ που αναμιμνήσκεσθαι λέγοντες, ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν;—Πότε λαβοῦσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀφ' οὗ γε ἄνθρωποι γεγόναμεν.-Πρότερον ἄρα.— Ησαν ἄρα αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ πρότερον, πρὶν εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἴδει χωρὶς σωμάτων, καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχον. ‘Our learning is in reality no other 'than reminiscence; and hence it follows, that what we remember now, we must have learned at some former time. But this would be 'impossible, unless our soul had existed somewhere, before it came into this human form.-If a person remember any thing, he must 'have known it before.-If we never forgot what we had acquired,