unanimity, in the advice they will have to offer. If they fail in this, either from want of a clear view of events, or from discord among themselves, the prospect will open to us with a very clouded aspect.

The intention of this treatise is to prevent evils, by anticipating their danger; to contest with the insidious outcry against the encroachments of the crown, to show its real motive; to diminish the prejudices against monarchy, and to show its total difference from despotism. In this essay, speculatively, monarchy is held to be the best of all governments; in the same manner it is in many respects preferred to the theoretical British constitution; a system excellent in speculation, but a speculation never strictly reduced to practice, and in fact incapable itself of being realised.

This part of the work should by the reader be considered as purely speculative: those who have been eye-witnesses of revolutions, will be the last to promote them at home. In the same point of view may be regarded the plan of parliamentary reform hereafter delineated, not only because, if it were adopted, new inconveniences might arise, but also, because power exists no where in this government, to reduce it to practice: the influence of great families being too strong to permit the execution of it. The resistance of these, however, to any reform, may put them some day in a predicament, which will force them to accede to one, in which no moderation, will be found.

A deliberative representative assembly, carries with it such innu» merable inconveniences, and has in its nature so many inherent vices, that, construct it as you please, you will still get farther from perfection. We ought, therefore, to content ourselves with endeavouring to make it as little likely to do mischief as possible. The only way to obtain this is so to class the electors, and so qualify the candidates, as to render it most probable that virtuous, wise, and moderate men should be chosen, and that the ambitious and turbulent should be excluded. Great are the difficulties which would here arise, and these we shall endeavour to point out, li of ba je deto

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No regard to the feelings of various parties will be permitted to influence a single line of this work. The author's wish is to invite all those who are attached to their country, without the medium of party to unite together to support the crown against oligarchy on the one haud, and democracy on the other, y mkanda juk Saujãos

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A Brief Survey of Parliamentary Proceedings from the Revolution in 1688, to 1812.

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WHATEVER be the form of a government, none can be absolutely immutable or perfect. A multitude of circumstances introduce alanges more or less sensible, more or less rapid. Great Britain' particularly presents a striking proof of this vicissitude, and experience has shown, that the British are not less susceptible of absolute servitudeo than of unbridled licence.vs. COS .. t

After a series of efforts between the parties to establish a political system either of monarchy or republican liberty, men became weary of the contest, and of the evils resulting from it. A compromise of principles was agreed upon at the restoration of Charles II, and on this were regulated the concessions, which each of them reciprocally made: one party consented to a limitation of liberty, the other to that of the supreme power. The primitive charactersofthe parties was never, theless not totally effaced. In one party there remained a decided inclination for a republican government, in the other a preference for a less restrained regal power. Neither one party nor the other dared openly to avow their desire of gratifying their inclination ; they both confined themselves to declare ins sfavor of the arrangement which resulted from the establishment of the limits of liberty on the one hand, and those of the sovereign power on the other. They tacitly reserved to themselves the faculty of interpreting the different senses which the consequences of this arrangement might occasionally presenta to The two parties subsided into a state of equilibrium, each however endeavouring to prevail over the other, under the pretence of only seeking to preserve a just balancesThese formed two distinct parties, one known by the appellation of Whigs, the other that of Tories:

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The princes of the House of Brunswick confining themselves to the

operation of the vis inertiæ, (if the expression be allowed) and giving no encouragement to the zeal of the partizans of an extended prerogative; this zeal was by degrees cooled, until the denomination of Tory became obsolete. They gave themselves up to their ministers in whatever regarded the point of royal prerogative. Very soon, the ambitious, the restless, and those eager for power, for dignity, and emolument, perceived that the only avenue was by the occupation of the ministerial offices, in which consisted the exercise of that power of the government, which by the constitution devolved on the King.

Before we proceed farther, it were well to recollect, that the origin of the party which has by the above means triumphed over the other, and which we have designated by the title of Whig, was no other than that, which overturned the throne of Charles the First. We shall be able to trace a similar spirit in their successors, although circumstances have moderated their pretensions, and have obliged them to keep within the bounds established by both parties at the Restoration. When the House of Hanover came over to this country, the violent contentions between the monarchists and r republicans were still fresh in the minds of men. The princes of that dynasty naturally considered the House of Commons as the hydra, which once already had abolished the regal power, and which had also excluded the lords from a share in the government.

The Commons, conscious of their own power, were not likely to be moderate in their pretensions; it was therefore determined, in order to avert their resentment, to conciliate them by a participation of that power against which they were considered as the guardians and defenders of the rights of the people. Before this they were no more than the tribunes of the people; they became by this operation in some measure their masters. As in this arrangement it was impossible for all to have a share, it became an object of contention, who were to be the chosen few hence arose a second distinction of men, that is to say, the government and opposition parties. The crowny apprehensive of a renewal of troubles, determined to allow these parties to balance one another; unless it was sometimes to divide them, and then adhere to the strongestjosuda evi kun >Thus the House of Hanover accepted the crown, as one takésd a contract. They literally fulfilled the functions of royalty, and, as strangers, avoided all enterprises which could embroil them with the Parliament. Inasmuch as they conducted themselves with moderation, so they never evinced any great zeal impolitics o they have thus avoided disputes and troubles with the states, but have abandoned them to their factions and Idissensions, without ever exerting that influence which alone resides in the regal authority, either to quash or reconcile themi The spirit of neutrality which they brought with them, and in which theyshave invariably persevered, has obscured the brilliancy of the throne, while it has tended to weaken the energy of the states they mays almost be said, rather to have governed in the name of their ministers,o than that ministers have governeds in theirs. Princes, who have adopted a similar dine of policy, cannot be supposed to have any

views of their own of a general and extensive nature; and as a succession of factions must have in many respects opposite views, in vain we seek in Britain for the soul which animates the body, and which constitutes its unity. This order of things from long usage is become so inveterate, that notwithstanding it is the cause of every political reverse we have suffered, and is likely, if permanent, to cause many more, it is considered by the generality of mankind as the peculiar beauty and perfection of the government.

The Whigs have ever endeavoured to advance themselves in the opinion of the multitude, by holding up to them the image of despotism, instead of representing the regal power as the centre of public will, and the basis of confidence. They have even affected to consider the crown as a public enemy, ever watching to enslave the people, and to trample on the fundamental laws of the kingdom. How often have they told us, that the peace establishment of the army were prætorian bands, who would, at the nod of the King, be ready to reduce us to slavery? All these insults and attacks, which royalty has borne from these patriots, have been more owing to its own fault, than to any other cause. A sovereign who reigns half a century without appearing, but through the ministerial veil; who has allowed all the ambitious and factious candidates for power to contend with each other, without ever declaring an opinion of his own, or having any direct communication with his people, secluded like the grand Lama of Thibet from the beginning to the end of his reign, must inevitably become first the tool of one party and then of another; his name must sanction the most contradictory resolutions, and he must submit ever to become an instrument in the hands of a predominant party.

It has often been alleged that such is the excellence of the British constitution, that it signifies little whether the sovereign be a great or a poor character: this pretended axiom is no more than the effect of habit and prejudice we have been so long habituated to the neutrality of our kings in great national measures, that we cannot imagine any other order of things possible, and there is no spot on the globe where prejudice takes deeper root than in this country. Many people think that a great and enterprising prince, at the head of these kingdoms, could never hit on a more glorious pursuit than that of sending some individual to prison without the proper forms of law : that a weak and vicious prince should wish to destroy the privileges of his subjects, may easily be conceived, but that as great character should occupy himself in so absurd a manner appears highly improbable. The theatre of ambition on a great scale presents objects far more attractive than uthe glorious exploit of putting a libeller into Newgate, an operation which may be done by the verdict of his own Countrymen. The advancement of the power and influence of his empire in the scale of nations, the encouragement of science, and the general prosperity of his subjects, are objects which such a prince will naturally pursue. The infringement of the very code of laws, from which his own safety and power arise, would be both useless and absurd; and princes employed about great objects have no time to think of such pursuits.

The most powerful empire which a human being can exert over his fellow creatures, is that of opinion; and if a nobleman or even a commoner can find means to gain such an influence, what is to prevent the sovereign from taking the same advantages? Whatever sentiment a sovereign utters, is preserved and repeated: such sentiments may be so many appeals to public opinion, and here he must have the advantage over every one. Unconstitutional interferences are unne cessary on his part to gain the public confidence; a sovereign will always reign, if he be the best statesman in the country; and he will have sufficient strength to support such a system of exterior policy as he deems advantageous. As ministers are considered to be advisers of the sovereign, so they are answerable for his conduct; but as he chooses them or is supposed to do so, they must either defend his measures, or leave their places. A sovereign who has the address and wisdom to rival even the demagogues in the public opinion, will never be at a loss to find ministers, because his conduct will be wise, and require very little sophistry to defend it: and, acting on the principles here described, he would put an end to the factions which have made Great Britain, in her connexion with other states, the weakest government in Europe!

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The neutrality of the crown in the struggles of various factions may be considered both as their cause and their effect, and we know of no other part of the constitution competent to remedy the evil. The kingly power, even in its present state, operates so far as to keep them from breaking out into civil warg remove it, and these factions would guillotine one another until one were extirpated: The conquerors, then would divide, and true republican virtues would develope themselves in all their native deformity, until a military chief would put an end to the tragical farce, as Cromwell and Bonaparte have already done.→→ But to return to the subject. obala

The object of the kings of the present dynasty being to leave the operations of the government to pursue their own course, they felt that the choice of their ministers could only falbon individuals, whoi enjoy credit sufficient to carry those measures in parliament which were essential to its operations. ups ne tas 7 ,*u、I

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They, who aspired to the cabinet, from this instant felto the necessity of acquiring a great credit with the parliamenty and with the nations with a view not only of obtaining their places,obut also to preserve them when obtained: This has produced a regular system of pros ceeding among all parties sat consists principally in the distribution of the favors in the gift of the crown to such individuals, whose talents are judged fit to be employed, or to those whom it would be thought proper to paralyse. si va soob sa year dɔdw 201419q6 utk -alagwał An opposite line of conduct on the part of those, who have not had equal success, consists in celogging as much as possible the wheels of the government, either by snares insidiously laid too entangle the ministers, or by an open opposition, to such of their measures, as can best afford room to doubt on their propriety towards the public in terest and sparticularly to fasten on those, which can be the least