them, fully and precisely, to the particular end, which he would have them subserve, so that no interruption should accrue to the plan of his providence, but every link of the great chain be kept entire ; in vain has his power been exercised in the great work of creation. He must be able to govern and use things as he would, or it would have been better to have left them in the mysterious womb of their own original non-entity. No one, who would not represent the Deity as the meanest and most preposterous of beings, will imagine, that he will neglect to use things in the most proper and advantageous manner, provided he has power to do so. And if his power be lacking, in any degree, truly an evil will lie upon him and his kingdom, too great for a remedy; which would be an insuperable objection to that confidence in him, without which creatures cannot be happy. It would undermine all the comfort to be derived from such scriptures as the fol lowing, by proving them untrue. "Wherefore he is able to save them to the uttermost that come unto God by him, seeing he ever liveth to make intercession for them." must indeed be in an evil case, who has a great interest to seek, and a great diversity of means to be used in the pursuit, with which he finds himself so shackled, that he cannot proceed with them answerably to his mind, It will not be denied, that the means, which God has introduced into his all-comprehensive plan of government, having his

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glory for their final end, are very many, and very various.

We may throw them into two large classes, viz. the intelligent, and the unintelligent. Under these two kinds, or general descriptions, all the creatures of God may be ranked. The creation of the ope has an equal respect to the glory of God, as its last end, with that of the other. Both the kinds, and all the individuals belonging to them, were made to be instrumental in this momentous concern. If a vulgar term might be allowed, they are the tools, with which the work of providence is carried on. And since every one has his proper department and office in the grand enterprize, it is of primary importance, that the great workman should be able to use them aright. He must needs have this power in relation

1. To unintelligent creatures. Though they are of a lower species, they are not, therefore, any the less necessary. In the animal frame, the smallest vein is as necessary, as the largest artery, to render the body perfect. Irrational animals, and inanimate substances, have all a part to perform, under-divine direction, in the general affair of providence. And if a defect exist, in any part, it must have an unfavourable result, in regard to the whole. It is not pretended, however, that we, or creatures of any grade whatever, are capable of distinguishing between sound and defective instruments, in that work, which is, properly and exclusively, in the hands of God. Still we may conclude,

yea, we cannot rationally do otherwise, that if there be imperfection, or unfitness, in any of the parts of the great frame of the universe, as they relate to the whole; the same good end cannot be expected, as if such imperfection did not exist. If, in a watch, upon which a man depends to measure the time for him, there be but one defective wheel, and that the least in the whole machine, he may be as effectually disappointed of his object, as if the main spring were broken. To be a perfect agent, therefore, in the work of government, God must have power to make all creatures, that are destitute of reason,and them that are without life, subservient to the particular ends, for which they exist, that he may not fail of the great end, for which he sits upon the throne of the universe, and rules the world by the rod of his power.

2. He must have power also to govern the intelligent part of creation, and make every individual of this class an effectual instrument of carrying forward the work, to which he has set his almighty hand. The principle we would advocate, when applied to this: branch of the subject, may possibly stir up objectors, particularly among those, who think intelligent or moral liberty inconsistent with any influence upon the mind except what there is in moral suasion or arguments addressed to the understanding. If moral beings, as angels and men, were made merely to be instruments in the work of provi dence, as other things were; it is necessary

that Deity should have an established control over them, to the same extent that he has over the waters of the deep, to which he says, "Hitherto shalt thou come and no further, and here let thy proud waves be stayed." A man, who, upon any occasion of importance, should undertake to work an engine, that was too complicated and un. wieldy to be managed, would be condemn, ed for his rashness and presumption.

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if he himself had been the inventor of it, and had constructed it for that particular occasion, it would be seen, at once, that he had proved himself unequal to his undertaking. If man was made to be an instrument for God to work with, in getting honour to himself, and yet because he is a free agent, he cannot be moved, either this way or that, even by the power that produced him into being; does not the idea come upon us, irresistibly, that the Deity, in bringing such a creature into existence, has only brought an incumbrance upon his own hands? Does not the very idea of his being an instrument imply, that he, is not the subject of a single faculty, but what is subject to be continually regulated and directed by the will of him, for whose use he is designed? And we have the same evidence, that man is but an instrument in the hand of his maker to bring about wise and wholesome purposes, as that other things are. And yet a modern writer of some note has seriously questioned, whether there may not be certain events so connected with, and dependent upon, the free

actions of men, as to render it even impossible for God to prevent them. The freedom of moral exercises, in creatures, he seems to suppose, raises them completely above all determining influence from the Deity; so, that the government of God, over intelligent subjects, degenerates to a level with that government, which one man exercises over others. Instead, therefore, of considering their agency as a necessary part of provi dence, as much so as any event that transpires; he seems to view it as something aside from what God is bringing to pass, in, fulfilment of his eternal counsels, which may help or hinder, as the case shall happen to be circumstanced. He, therefore, speaks of God's having power "to restrain them from the execution of those purposes which would thwart the designs of his providence." How?, Not by disposing them to things, which are. within the compass of his determinations. and counsels, as if they were in his hands as clay in the hands of the potter; but "either by disabling them from bringing their de signs to pass, or by withdrawing the subject or the object of them, or by such dispensations as he sees will turn the bent of their

hearts another way." Such a specimen of divine government, as is here described, will bear a comparison with the measures of an earthly potentate, as the following: Within the limits of a certain kingdom, but not belonging to it, a certain lawless, petty, sove * Whitby's Discourses, p. 362.