The truth is that the patriots of Spain have no warmer friends than the administration of the United States; but it is our duty to say nothing and to do nothing for or against either. If they succeed we shall be well satisfied to see Cuba and Mexico remain in their present dependence, but very unwilling to see them in that of either France or England, politically or commercially. We consider their interests and ours as the same, and that the object of both must be to exclude all European influence from this hemisphere.

In this statement from high authority the historian Schouler finds the germ of the Monroe Doctrine. When the Spanish dependencies began to declare their independence, and the grasp of the Old World upon the new one began to loosen, Jefferson's bold statement found active support in all directions. Henry Clay, the leader of his party in Congress, exerted himself to the limit of his oratorical powers in the "emancipation of South America." The continual assaults upon the administration of Monroe by this opposition leader may have caused the President to recognize the independence of the revolted colonies sooner than he otherwise would have done, although it is clear from the words of nearly all his annual messages, that Monroe had his heart in the success of freedom's cause in the Western Hemisphere quite as fully as had Clay, but he moved more cautiously and with far more deliberation than the eloquent and impetuous member from Kentucky. In the autumn of 1817, the first year of Monroe's presidency, he sent a commission to South America for the purpose of investigating the political conditions and of determining if there were any bona fide revolutionary governments worthy of recognition. The commission was composed of men well-known for their radical views of republicanism, yet in this respect they differed in regard to the proper course to be pursued by the United States in the matter of recognizing the sovereignty of the seceding Spanish colonies.

In the midst of cabinet discussions regarding this question, news suddenly came from abroad (during the early part of 1818) that a movement had been inaugurated in

Europe to intervene in the affairs of South America. Further confirmation of these first reports came from several foreign ministers resident in Washington. John Quincy Adams, the Secretary of State, instantly became alive to the situation, and somewhat curtly announced that "if the European alliance undertook to settle matters which concerned us so closely, and without consulting us, they should not be surprised if we acted without consulting them." Monroe shared in these apprehensions of the Secretary of State and feared that the rumors of a European combination to aid Spain in maintaining her old-time supremacy in the Americas might prove true. Mr. Adams at once sounded the British Minister in regard to England's attitude toward the South American question; indeed, the President desired Great Britain to join with the United States then and there in recognizing the independence of the South American colonies.

Across the Atlantic, the American Minister in London, Richard Rush, was instructed to watch closely the intentions of the reported European alliance, one of the alleged objects of which was to interfere in behalf of Spain in America. Rush approached the English Premier, Castlereagh, whose sympathies were thought to be with the European alliance, though the commercial interests of his country called for a greater freedom of trade with the West Indies and Central America than Spain had been willing to grant. Castlereagh, however, believed this end could be effected by European mediation, and that by securing to Spain her complete supremacy over her colonies, she might be coerced into adopting more liberal trade regulations as a just compensation for services rendered. Rush could not succeed in winning over the conservative Castlereagh to his original proposition, that of checking all future juggling with the question by a prompt acknowledgment of the independence of South America.

Great relief was felt in Washington upon the declaration. of the allied powers of Europe, whose interference in South America was so much feared by Monroe and his cabinet,

that they did not contemplate using force to subjugate the revolting Spanish colonies. In his annual message of November 16, 1818, President Monroe said :

From the view taken of this subject, founded on all the information that we have been able to obtain, there is good cause to be satisfied with the course heretofore pursued by the United States in regard to this contest, and to conclude that it is proper to adhere to it, especially in the present state of affairs.

Only two months later, however, the President called together his cabinet to discuss the subject of recognizing the independence of Buenos Ayres, a measure he proposed and defended vainly against the adverse counsels of his advisory board. About this time Adams refers in his diary (May 29, 1819) to an episode that again places on record his views relating to the policy of the United States toward foreign interference in the affairs of the American states. The Russian Minister, Mr. Poletica, had been instructed from Petersburg to use all his influence with the administration to keep the United States from rupturing the bonds of amity that existed between them and Spain. The snapping of tender ties of course related to the recognition of the South American states, and Mr. Poletica went so far as to intimate that unless the United States followed a policy in harmony with the aims of the European alliance she would find herself, however unwilling, obliged in the end to "follow the impulse of Europe combined."

I related to him [Mr. Poletica] all that has been done by us concerning the South American question; told him we were convinced that Buenos Ayres at least would maintain her independence of Spain; that sooner or later they must be recognized as an independent power; that we had thought that the time would before now have arrived when they might justly claim this as a right, but from the time when we learnt that the allies had determined, that whatever might be the event of their mediation, not to use force against the South Americans, the President had concluded that we might also forbear to take an immediate, decisive part in their favor.

At the opening of Congress in December, 1819, nothing

further had been done toward the recognition of the South American states. The President said in his annual message (December 7, 1819):

This contest has from its commencement been very interesting to other powers, and to none more so than to the United States A virtuous people may and will confine themselves within the limit of a strict neutrality; but it is not in their power to behold a conflict so vitally important to their neighbors without the sensibility and sympathy which naturally belong to such a case.

At the reading of the next annual message, November 4, (1820), the situation was little changed. No further threats from the European alliance having come across the sea, the United States had not been moved to act. The President said:

No facts are known to this Government to warrant the belief that any of the powers of Europe will take part in the contest, whence it may be inferred, considering all circumstances which must have weight in producing the result, that an adjustment will finally take place on the basis proposed by the colonies. To promote that result by friendly counsels with other powers, including Spain herself, has been the uniform policy of this Govern

ment.

Henry Clay never ceased his attacks upon the administration for what he considered its almost criminal negligence in abandoning the great cause of liberty. By extending our recognition of their sovereignty it would not only give encouragement to the states struggling to free themselves from the clutches of tyranny, but it would give as well "additional tone, and hope, and countenance to the friends of liberty throughout the world." Clay saw deeper reasons why the United States should lend a hand to her Southern neighbors. In a great speech at Lexington in 1821, he said:

It was evident after the overthrow of Bonaparte that the alliance, by which that event was unexpectedly brought about, would push the principle of legitimacy, a softer and covered name for despotism, to the uttermost extent. Accordingly, the present

generation has seen, with painful feeling, Congress after Congress assembling in Europe to decide without ceremony, the destiny and affairs of foreign independent states. And if we, the greatest offender of all against the principle of legitimacy, had not been brought under their jurisdiction, and subjected to their parental care, we owed the exemption to our distance from Europe and to the known bravery of our countrymen. But who can say, that has observed the giddiness and intoxication of power, how long this exemption will continue? It had seemed to him desirable that a sort of counterpoise to the holy alliance should be found in the two Americas in favor of national independence and liberty, to operate by the force of example and by moral influence; that here a rallying-point and an asylum should exist for freemen and for freedom.

Adams agreed with Clay in the broad principles, but differed with him only in the course the United States should practically adopt before occasion called more loudly for action. He told Mr. Clay that he never doubted the final issue of the struggle in South America, and that he believed it to be better policy to take no active part. "The principle of neutrality," he continued, "to all foreign wars was, in my opinion, fundamental to the continuance of our liberties and our Union." Wishing well to the cause of freedom in South America, he had yet to see better evidences that the South Americans meant to establish "free or liberal institutions of government."

As events turned out, Clay's vision seems to have proved the clearer, but Adams' conservative action was probably the wiser. However, no more alarming threats from abroad came, and our recognition of the South American states was not effected until May, 1822.

The previous year Spain had ratified the treaty ceding the Floridas, and with that vexed question off the programme, the State Department found itself greatly relieved. With these pressing details out of the way, the administration was free to turn its attention to a more remote but much more important matter. The solicitude of the President and Secretary Adams was at once directed to the consideration of permanent opposition to European intervention in the