The powers of Continental Europe were surprised and indignant; Monroe was a dictator of the worst character, while the United States was an upstart nation, that maintained unwarrantable pretensions, and sought to establish wholly inadmissible principles in contempt of the civilized nations of the world. The declaration of this presumptuous people should be resisted by all powers possessing interests in the Western Hemisphere. But just back of the outstretched wings of the noisy American eagle, France and Russia believed they detected the British lion. If England had, after all, joined the allies in their schemes, it is much to be doubted whether the President's message of 1823 would have seriously embarrassed them in the ultimate perfection of their Spanish American plans; but the realization that Great Britain, with her powerful navy, endorsed, in the main, the sentiments of President Monroe, cast a gloom over the propagandists of divine right, and the great South American project was abandoned.

Although the Colombian Congress resolved that the doctrine of the North American President was "an act eminently just and worthy of the classic land of liberty," the message does not seem to have been welcomed with loud acclaim in South America. Events following soon after convinced the people of Spanish America - suspicious by nature, and at heart distrustful of the Anglo-Saxon - that the United States did not intend to uphold the doctrine, and that if it were meant as a promise of protection to them, it was false.

Soon after the reading of the President's annual message, Henry Clay, Speaker of the House of Representatives, caused to be introduced the following resolution:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the people of these states would not see, without serious inquietude, any forcible intervention by the allied Powers of Europe, in behalf of Spain, to reduce to their former subjection those parts of the continent of America which have proclaimed and established for themselves, respectively, independent governments, and which have been solemnly recognized by the United States.

This attempt to place the seal of Congressional approval upon the Monroe Doctrine, and give it thereby a more authoritative character, failed in less than two months after its enunciation by the executive. Several reasons have been assigned for this failure; one is, that Congress considered the alleged threats of the allies as empty vaporings, unworthy of notice; another is, that members of Congress, believing the danger to be past, were unwilling, in the absence of clear evidence of hostile intentions from abroad, to lay down a principle so wide and sweeping in its character, and one that might possibly be regarded by friendly nations as offensive. Still another reason is advanced why Mr. Clay's resolution was consigned to the table. Mr. Clay was well known to be a candidate for the presidency. His strength was great throughout the South and the West, and his influence as Speaker in the House was a powerful one. John Quincy Adams also was looking in the same direction as Mr. Clay; General Jackson was a possible candidate, and the same may be said of Calhoun. The "Monroe Doctrine" carried within it the elements of unbounded popularity; its champion in Congress might become a political hero. The opponents of Clay therefore combined against him, and he found himself in the awkward attitude of fathering a measure which was doomed in advance. He yielded to necessity, and consented to the shelving of his resolution.

Mr. Poinsett of South Carolina also moved a similar resolution, which met the same fate, but political jealousy can hardly be charged for the failure of Mr. Poinsett's motion.

In his last annual message to Congress, the following year (December 7, 1824), President Monroe again took occasion to reaffirm the policy announced in his previous message.

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Separated as we are from Europe by the great Atlantic Ocean, we can have no concern in the wars of the European Governments nor in the causes which produce them. The balance of power between them, into whichever scale it may turn in its various vibrations, cannot affect us. It is the interest of the United States to preserve the most friendly relations with every power and on conditions fair, equal, and applicable to all. But

in regard to our neighbors our situation is different. It is impossible for the European governments to interfere in their concerns, especially in those alluded to, which are vital, without affecting us; indeed, the motive which might induce such interference in the present state of the war between the parties, if a war it may be called, would appear to be equally applicable to us. It is gratifying to know that some of the powers with whom we enjoy a very friendly intercourse, and to whom these views have been communicated, have appeared to acquiesce in them. . . .

An occasion was about to be presented to the United States Government which would indicate the extent to which the country was willing to go in pledging its material support to the Monroe Doctrine. In the negotiations and debates relative to an invitation from the South American states to send delegates to a general Congress of the Americas, every shade of sentiment touching the Monroe Doctrine is found. So widely divergent were opinions in Congress upon this subject, that the doctrine, after running the gantlet of the Senate and House, emerged sadly disfigured. But in these debates, as with Clay's resolution, a series of political considerations became involved. The reluctance of Congress on this occasion to endorse the policy was, after all, scarcely a test of popular sentiment on the subject.

VI. PANAMA CONGRESS

Simon Bolivar was the Washington of South America. It was his voice that stirred the people to patriotic ardor; it was his martial skill that brought them victory, and won for them the prizes of liberty. His statue adorns the public squares of South American cities; his memory is revered from Panama to Buenos Ayres; he is declared to be the hero, the liberator of South America. At his instance, the states of Colombia in 1822 (then New Granada) began making treaties of alliance, offensive and defensive, with other South American states, whose independence from Spain had been practically won. In that and the following year, the

various independent states of South America formed a federation, bound together by the closest ties of friendship and common interest.

The central object of this confederation was to maintain independence by mutual aid and support, and to shield themselves against all harmful foreign influence. Like their North American neighbor, they had watched with considerable apprehension the threatened movement of the European allies to aid Spain in their resubjugation, and they recognized the necessity of standing firmly together. It was therefore agreed among them that "a general assembly of the American states shall be convened," for the purpose "of cementing... intimate relations," and Panama was suggested as a convenient meeting place. There seems to have been no original intention on the part of these "formerly Spanish" provinces to ask the United States to coöperate with them when they made their treaties of alliance, but the publication of President Monroe's message, of December, 1823, with its encouraging words for all newly created republics in the Western Hemisphere, seemed clearly to entitle the United States to a voice in their proposed Congress, should such a desire manifest itself at Washington. In the spring of 1825, the ministers of Colombia and Mexico, Messrs. Salazar and Obregon, cautiously approached the Secretary of State with a proposition from their respective governments, to the effect that, should the United States desire to participate, her delegates would find welcome at the Congress of the Americas, soon to convene at Panama. This invitation came immediately after the inauguration of President Adams (March, 1825). The President was known to be a hearty supporter of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine; he had been Secretary of State under Monroe, and had enjoyed, as such, the full confidence of the President during the preparation of his famous message. The Secretary of State was Henry Clay, and he had always been the champion in Congress of the South American states; indeed, some of his greatest speeches had been made in their cause. It was then reasonable to suppose that the administration would be favorable

to this plan of a general Congress. Knowing now that Adams, to a very large extent, was the real author of the Monroe Doctrine, one looks with considerable interest to the reply of the President to Messrs. Salazar and Obregon, because it is, from the highest source, an official and authoritative interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. During the cabinet discussions of 1823, when the phrasing of that portion of the President's message relating to foreign affairs was under discussion, and Mr. Adams was urging the acceptance of his own copy, Mr. Wirt, the Attorney General, had asked him if he intended that the country should sustain, by force of arms, the somewhat aggressive policy he advocated. Mr. Adams could only then reply that that very question had given him no little concern, and he could not fully answer it. Now the same question was subtly asked by South America, - Would the United States confer with those who had joined in arms against European aggression, or perhaps, would she go a step further, and ally herself with them?

The President replied to the invitation of the two ministers through Mr. Clay, saying:

That of course the United States could not make themselves a party to the existing war with Spain. The President believed such a Congress as was proposed might be highly useful in settling several important disputed questions of public law, and in arranging other matters of deep interest to the American continent, and strengthening the friendship and amicable intercourse between the American powers; but, before such a Congress assembled, certain conditions should be complied with, namely, the fixing of the subjects to be discussed at the Congress, the powers to be given to the commissioners, and the mode of organizing the Congress. . . .

A cautious reply. In the following November (1825), these same diplomatic agents of Colombia and Mexico reported to Mr. Clay, renewing their invitation upon this occasion, by formal notes from their home governments. They stated that while it was impossible to enumerate,