least, emancipation in Cuba would greatly imperil the policy of the United States touching the question of human slavery.

Mr. Soulé's diplomacy did not bring about a satisfactory settlement of the Black Warrior affair. The President was far from being satisfied with the results of Mr. Soulé's hotheaded methods, and the Democrats called all the more loudly upon its President for action for a swift retaliation upon Spain, and for the immediate annexation of Cuba.

The more conservative Secretary of State, Mr. Marcy, was driven to a new plan for the settlement of the vexatious Spanish-American question, which plan he hoped would bring about the desired results without a resort to arms. Convinced that continuance of Soulé's efforts in Madrid. would be unprofitable, he proposed (June, 1854) the appointment of an extraordinary commission, to be composed of "two distinguished citizens" who should act in conjunction with Mr. Soulé in reënforcing the demands of the United States against Spain. The project creating such a commission, however, was abandoned, and as a substitute therefor, Mr. Soulé was instructed (August, 1854) to meet and consult with Messrs. Buchanan and Mason, the American ministers in London and Paris.

I am directed by the President to suggest to you a particular step, from which he anticipates much advantage to the negotiations with which you are charged on the subject of Cuba. It seems desirable that there should be a full and free interchange of views between yourself, Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Mason, in order to secure a concurrence in reference to the general object.

The simplest and only very apparent means of obtaining this end is, for the three ministers to meet, as early as may be, at some convenient central point (say Paris), to consult together, to compare opinions as to what may be advisable, and to adopt measures for perfect concert of action in aid of your negotiations at Madrid.

While the President has, as I have before had occasion to state, full confidence in your own intelligence and sagacity, he conceives that it cannot be otherwise than agreeable to you, and to your colleagues in Great Britain and France, to have the consultation suggested, and thus to bring your common wisdom and knowledge to bear simultaneously upon the negotiations at Madrid, London, and

Accordingly, the three American ministers met in conference at Ostend, October 9, 1854, and adjourning to Aix la Chapelle, there signed a report on the 18th of the same month. This series of resolutions is known as the "Ostend Manifesto."

After a lengthy argument in favor of the acquisition of Cuba, and an enumeration of the many advantages which would accrue to both Spain and the United States by virtue of a transfer of sovereignty in Cuba, the report advises the offer to Spain of $120,000,000 for the island. Should Spain decline the offer, the use of force is proposed to accomplish the same end. The advisability of such radical measures was based on the broad principles of self-preservation, — the Monroe Doctrine. "Our past history forbids," it reads, "that we should acquire the island of Cuba without the consent of Spain, unless justified by the great law of self-preservation, but," the authors hasten to add with a flourish of virtue, "we must, in any event, preserve our own conscious rectitude, and our own self-respect. It became a ques

tion, they asserted, whether or not the continued possession of Cuba by Spain amounted to a menace "to our internal peace, and the existence of our cherished Union." If such be the case, as they believed it was, then we would be justified by "every law, human and divine," in wresting it from Spain.

The position taken by Messrs. Buchanan, Soulé and Mason was certainly many degrees beyond the farthest limits of the Monroe Doctrine. The latter called for opposition to foreign aggression in the Western continent, and expressly stated that no action would be taken against those European powers already holding territory in the New World - unless they sought to expand their holdings. The true motives of the Ostend Manifesto were, after all, too thinly veiled. The words of Mr. Monroe had been obviously tortured into the furtherance of a scheme to extend the slave-holding area of the United States. The administration promptly condemned the manifesto.

The policy of forcible acquisition, in case amicable nego

tiations for purchase should fail, was too radical even for President Pierce. Mr. Marcy referred to it as "a robber doctrine," which would bring shame upon the administration, and would disgrace the nation in the eyes of the world. "We cannot afford to get it" (Cuba), he said, "by robbery or by theft."

The Ostend Manifesto was left entirely unmentioned in the President's annual report to Congress. The following winter resolutions in Congress calling for the report, and all the correspondence relating thereto, were suppressed, and every effort was made by the administration to prevent the publicity of the document.

From 1854 to the outbreak of the Civil War, Cuba continued to occupy a prominent place in the foreign affairs of the United States. From the close of the Rebellion down to the late Spanish War, this same interest in Cuba was kept alive, but in the absence of any definite threats by other nations to acquire the island, there were no discussions in Congress relative to the subject. After the collapse of slavery in the United States, the desire for Cuban annexation largely disappeared, nor was it revived until very recently.

During the past thirty-five years, several revolutions in Cuba brought about relations between the United States and Spain which were substantially similar to those which existed prior to the breaking out of the late Spanish-American War, -conditions with which every one is familiar. If not actually desiring annexation, the United States has, upon all occasions, manifested a deep interest in Cuban independence, and has sometimes with difficulty preserved a neutral attitude.

In this relation, one incident is noteworthy in its bearings upon the Monroe Doctrine. The Cespides rebellion in Cuba had dragged along for many years, with the customary record of cruelties and barbarities which seems generally to have marked Spanish-Cuban warfare. The inability of Spain to suppress the rebellion induced President Grant, in his annual message of December 7, 1875, to hint at intervention. Spain had stubbornly refused to listen to mediation; and

as the conditions seemed to warrant the United States in recognizing the independence of the island, intervention was looked to as the only means left for ending a hopeless conflict. In his note of November 5, 1875, to Mr. Cushing, the American Minister in Madrid, the Secretary of State, Mr. Fish, had already anticipated these suggestions of the President. He wrote:

In the absence of any prospect of a termination of a war, or of any change in the manner in which it has been conducted on either side, he [the President] feels that the time is at hand when it may be the duty of other governments to intervene, solely with a view of bringing to an end a disastrous and destructive conflict, and of restoring peace in the island of Cuba. No government is more deeply interested in the order and peaceful administration of this island than is that of the United States, and none has suffered as the United States from the condition which has obtained there during the past six or seven years. He will, therefore, feel it his duty at an early day to submit the subject in this light, and accompanied by an expression of the views above presented, for the consideration of Congress.

Copies of this note were sent to the American ministers at the various European courts for the purpose of ascertaining the attitude of these governments toward intervention in Cuba. It seems also to have been Mr. Fish's desire to secure Great Britain's coöperation. The replies of all the governments which had thus been approached, were unfavorable, and the matter was put aside. In a short time, however, the fact that Mr. Fish-had seen fit to admit indeed, to invite European councils upon a matter so essentially American in all its bearings, brought, upon him the odium of having neglected the proper observance of his country's traditions, and to having violated the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. Mr. Fish appears to have been sensitive to this accusation, and to have evaded an explanation of his course in seeking aid from abroad to oust Spain from Cuba.

Intervention in behalf of Cuba in 1898 was not predicated directly upon the Monroe Doctrine, although the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs in April of that year, sub

mitted a report upon United States relations with Spain and with Cuba, in which the following significant words occur: "We cannot consent upon any conditions that the depopulated portions of Cuba shall be recolonized by Spain any more than she should be allowed to found a new colony in any part of this hemisphere or islands thereof. Either act is regarded by the United States as dangerous to our peace and safety." Intervention was therefore favored upon the grounds of necessity as contemplated by the Monroe Doctrine, it being justified by the Cuban situation, which had "become a menace to the world, and especially to the peace of the United States."

The resolution of Congress declaring war upon Spain for the relief of Cuba (April 19, 1898) was not, however, based upon the Monroe Doctrine. It merely recited the fact that the people of Cuba were, and of right ought to be, free. The United States also disclaimed any intention or disposition "to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people."

VIII. TEXAS AND OREGON

James K. Polk entered upon the presidency in 1845, pledged to his party to complete the annexation of Texas, and to secure the whole of Oregon, to the Russian frontier of 54° 40' north latitude. The slavery question underlay both propositions, and the principles of the Monroe Doctrine were appealed to by the President in both cases. The South, in order to maintain strength in Congress, was determined to acquire more territory open to the extension of slavery, and the North found a parallel necessity equally pressing to increase anti-slavery votes in Congress by the acquisition of more free-soil domain. For the South, the Western progress of slavery was checked at the Sabine River, which, by agreement with Spain in 1821, was recognized to be the boundary line between Louisiana and Texas. Texas