Prince Gortschakoff did not hesitate to declare in his despatch of November 19th last, to Count Schouvaloff, which has been published in the Standard' newspaper, that these treaties are out of date, and that the objects we now have in view cannot be reconciled with the letter of stipulations concluded in ' other times, in another situation, and other ideas;' and he goes on to argue :

'It is necessary to escape from this vicious circle and to recognise that the independence and integrity of Turkey must be subordinated to the guarantees demanded by humanity, the sentiments of Christian Europe, and the general peace. The Porte has been the first to infringe the engagement which she contracted by the Treaty of 1856 with regard to her Christian subjects. It is the right and duty of Europe to dictate to her the conditions on which alone it can on its part consent to the maintenance of the political status quo created by that treaty; and since the Porte is incapable of fulfilling them it is the right and duty of Europe to substitute itself for her to the extent necessary to ensure their execution.'

That is to say, in other words, it is the duty of Europe to put an end to the Treaty of Paris, and to substitute its own will for the sovereignty of the Porte, which that treaty guaranteed.

The Treaty of Paris was not merely a treaty of peace between Russia and the Porte, but between France and England and Russia, and the interest we have in it is not the protection of the Ottoman Empire but of our own British interests, and no laches on the part of Turkey can diminish our right to maintain stipulations which we conceive to be important to the British Empire and to the peace of Europe. The proposal of Prince Gortschakoff amounts to this, that the Christian Powers of Europe are to assume the government of the Ottoman Empire. Such a measure, as she well knows, can only be carried into effect by war. No Power, except herself, is in the slightest degree prepared or disposed to make war on Turkey for such a purpose. Therefore the whole conduct and direction of these operations would be in the hands of Russia, and she expects Europe to give its assent to the hostile operations she may contemplate.

Therefore we say, that the object of Prince Gortschakoff is to abrogate and destroy the treaties of 1856, without exciting and evoking the direct hostility of the other parties to them. Sadowa and Sedan placed Austria and France to a great extent out of the field-the Prussian alliance secured the neutrality of Germany-Italy was easily bought off; it only

remains to be seen whether Great Britain can be led to undo by her own hands, or to acquiesce in the undoing of engagements which she purchased twenty years ago by great sacrifices, and which were held by the Government of Lord Palmerston and by Parliament to be essential, but not more than essential, to the peace and security of Europe.

We pointed out in our last Number the striking similarity which exists between the present state of affairs in the East and that which preceded and followed the war of 1828. We had agreed in April 1826 to a Protocol which united us to Russia, for the purpose of obtaining from the Porte the autonomy of Greece. The Protocol having proved ineffective, Mr. Canning signed the Treaty of London in July 1827, which provided that the Powers should secure the immediate effect of an armistice between the combatants, and it was for this object that the battle of Navarino was fought. But, said the Duke of Wellington, the battle of Navarino and the withdrawal of the Allied Ministers from the Porte had ' exhausted all the means put forward by the Treaty. They had no effect upon the Porte. The Allies are under the ' necessity of having recourse to ulterior measures, adverted to in the third section of the Secret Article.' That expression, 'ulterior measures,' exactly corresponds to the mesures effi'caces in the tail of the Berlin note the other day. In the meantime the Emperor of Russia resolved to declare war on Turkey on his own account, and communicated a plan of operations to England and France, in which he invited them to join. If the Allies should not consent to adopt that plan of operations, his Imperial Majesty would consider himself at liberty to propose at the conclusion of the war such measures for the pacification of Greece as will suit ses convenances et intérêts-an expression almost identical with that recently employed by the present Emperor of Russia, when he declared that if the other Powers did not agree to the guarantees' proposed by him, he should act independently.' But these words and this conduct roused the indignation of the Duke of Wellington, and, high Tory as he was, banished all confidence in Russia from his mind. He refused to attend the Conference till they were withdrawn. He declared at once that we should express our ' resolution not to become parties to the war into which the Emperor was about to enter, and that we should express our regret that this decision, which is neither more nor less than 'one to break a treaty, should have been thus unnecessarily adopted by his Imperial Majesty.' And shortly afterwards the Duke wrote the following Memorandum for the Cabinet,

which is so striking in its application to current events that we shall quote it here.*

'Memorandum.

'The proposition in the Note of Monsieur de Roth and that of Count Nesselrode's despatch are different. They both indicate measures of war as those to be adopted to force the Porte to consent to the proposals of the Treaty of the 6th of July. These measures are very different in extent; but it is quite obvious that the intention of both will be misunderstood, and that in the existing state of the government of the Porte in Europe and of the countries under its dominion, the adoption of either would be followed by the same fatal consequences.

The Treaty of the 6th of July does not exclude in terms measures of war from the ulterior measures to be discussed and settled by the representatives of the combined Powers in London, of which the adoption might become necessary. But the principle and spirit of the Treaty; the instructions to the negotiators of the Protocol and the Treaty on which those instruments were founded; those to the admirals of the combined fleet; those to the ambassadors of the combined Powers at the Porte; and the interests of all Europe, and most particularly those of Russia, whose Minister has declared himself upon this point, require that, if within the power of possibility, there should be no war; and that whatever is done should be limited in point of locality, and be applied solely to the attainment of the object in view. The propositions that the Russian army should enter the Principalities on the left of the Danube in the name of the three combined Powers, and that the combined fleet should blockade the Dardanelles, if practicable as thus limited and efficient to produce this purpose, would be understood, and must be understood by all Europe, but most particularly by the subjects of the Porte in the countries extending from the Adriatic to the Black Sea, as neither more nor less than war for the purpose of sustaining an insurrection against the Porte, by three of the most powerful monarchs in Europe: the very three who from their geographical position and the nature of their power were the most capable of overturning the dominion of the Porte in Europe.

'But the application of this measure thus limited is, in truth, impracticable. A Russian army, of the magnitude of one to produce any effect upon the Porte, could not remain for any length of time in the Principalities of the Danube unless sustained by an enormous expense of money.

'This, indeed, must be the reason for which this limited measure has not been proposed by the Russian Cabinet. In the same manner the blockade of the Dardanelles would be useless for any purpose of

* These references to the proceedings of the British Government in 1828 are all taken from volumes iv. and v. of the New Series of the Duke of Wellington's Despatches,' published by the present Duke in 1871 and 1873-volumes which are full of the most instructive lessons of politics and of war, and we seem to gather from them the opinious and advice of the Great Duke on the present crisis.

annoyance to Constantinople. The navigation of the Mediterranean and the communication by sea with Egypt are not, as is supposed, necessary for the supply of food to Constantinople.

"This cccupation of the Principalities and the blockade of the Dardanelles, as proposed in Monsieur de Roth's Note, would produce nothing but general alarm and distrust in Europe, and those consequences in the Turkish dominion which will be discussed more fully presently.

:

'I now come to consider the proposition made by Count Nesselrode, viz. That the Russian army is not to occupy the Principalities on the Danube alone, in the name of the three Powers, but is to continue its march across and its operations on the right of that river. That this operation is to be attended by an attack by the combined fleet on the Dardanelles, co-operating with one by the Russian fleet from the Black Sea; and that these fleets are, under the walls of the Seraglio, to dictate the terms of peace.

'These are, certainly, really efficient military operations, to which it is obvious that those proposed by the French Minister must have tended and ultimately have come. But no man in his senses will believe that the combined Powers can have any object in view by such operations excepting the overthrow of the Ottoman dominion in Europe, the maintenance of which dominion is stated and avowed to be the object of some, and to be consistent with the interests of all. It is impossible that three such Powers as England, France, and Russia can make war upon such a Power as the Porte without shaking it to its foundations. But when that war is made avowedly to force a settlement of the insurrectionary contest in Greece, and that its operations are of a nature and extent to tend to the dissolution of the government, it is obvious that every people submitted to the government of the Porte along the frontier of the Austrian dominions will be in a state of insurrection. The shedding of human blood, which it was one of the objects of the Treaty of the 6th of July to prevent, and the evils of all descriptions which must be the consequence of the prolongation of the state of things supposed to exist in Greece, for which it was another object of the Treaty to find a remedy, would become general throughout the dominions of the Porte in Europe; and for these evils there would be no remedy excepting the interference of the combined Powers by means of their armies and fleets.

'The application of this remedy is founded upon the hypothesis that in such a state of things it would be possible for the combined Powers to maintain, or that they would think of maintaining, the dominion of the Porte in Europe. This is not probable. The most probable result would be that, contrary to their now declared views, intentions, and interests, they would be under the necessity of annihilating the Ottoman Government in Europe. Whether the combined Powers should determine to leave the Government of the Porte in existence in Europe, to suppress all insurrectionary movements by means of their own armies, or to destroy the Government of the Porte and to dispose of its dominions, either by the establishment of another dynasty at Constantinople, or to partition those dominions, it is quite obvious that

these measures must occasion a general armament throughout Europe, even if it can be hoped that such events would not give fresh grounds for general war.

Surely it cannot be wise to adopt measures which must place the combined Powers under the necessity of making the choice among such extreme difficulties.

'WELLINGTON.'

Lord Ellenborough used still stronger language. In a memorandum written for the Cabinet in September, 1828, he said:

'Russia has, from the first, endeavoured to make a cat's-paw of England, and the Treaty has too much enabled her to do so in spite of ourselves. The object was to commit this country and France against the Porte at the moment when she made war. . . . We have likewise been distinctly informed that the Russians, notwithstanding all their solemn declarations, mean to keep Anapa and Poti; that is the only places they have got. We have to do with a Power in which no trust can be placed, and which will make the disposition of its army an excuse for violating its word.' (Wellington Despatches. New Series, vol. v. p. 55.)

We shall conclude these extracts with two or three sentences from a paper addressed by that judicious old Whig, Sir Robert Adair, in 1828, to the Duke of Wellington-the more remarkable as he is the very man who was accused in early life of being Mr. Fox's emissary to the Court of Catherine. After retracing the courses of the negotiations and the probable results of the war, then going on, Adair says:

'We must look forward to new pretensions on the part of Russia, even if the Principalities should be ceded to her. One of these pretensions-there may be more behind, but of this one we may be sure -is the acquisition of a free military passage at all times to Constantinople. Russia, as now advised, never will lay down her arms without obtaining by an express article free ingress and egress to and from the Black Sea and the Archipelago for her ships of war. This will be the conditions of her foregoing any further advantages which the events of war may throw into her hands. If those events should finally put her in possession of that capital, she never will evacuate it, without establishing there a government immediately dependent on herself. . . . All that is intended by this writer is to invite attention to the means of defeating dangerous projects, of the existence of which, from what he has observed, he is morally convinced. These projects are no longer the reveries of the age of Peter and Catherine II. They are designs, matured under the direction of some of the ablest statesmen in Europe, and the execution of which, in whatever manner we may resolve to deal with them, we must prepare ourselves to see attempted.' (Wellington Despatches. New Series, vol. iv. p. 295.)

Russia did not obtain her object in 1829, for her victory was