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hostile to the Government; very bitter and very active, and who misleads the editors of these newspapers by the communication, as from authority, of falsehoods and calumnies. The extent of the mischief done in this way is inconceivable; and it is really necessary to incur some risk and inconvenience in order to deprive this personage of the instruments which he applies to such bad purposes. I always thought that we ought to have adopted this measure at an earlier period; but it is essential to adopt it now.

Ever, &c.,

• WELLINGTON.' Sir Robert Peel entertained the same views of the Duke of Cumberland's intrigues. He wrote to the Duke of Welling. ton:

• The Duke of Cumberland has no sort of influence over public opinion in this country, or over any party that is worth consideration. I do not believe that the most violent Brunswickers have the slightest respect for him, or slightest confidence in him. I think we should be particularly careful to exclude him from all interference, through private influence over the King, with the public measures of the Government. You may rely on my cordial concurrence in any measures, however decided, that are necessary for this purpose, whenever a case arises (as it has arisen in my opinion in the Greek case) of sufficient importance.

With regard to the Lievens, the Duke thought that the wiser and more dignified course was to take no notice of their hostility; but he desired to vindicate himself at the Court of Russia from the calumnious reports they were supposed to be sending home, and with this view the Duke wrote as follows to Lord Heytesbury :

London, September 8, 1829. • My dear Lord, Lord Aberdeen has shown me your several letters and despatches on the subject of the Emperor's displeasure with myself. I have known that since the year 1826 Prince and Princess Lieven have taken pains to represent my conduct, whether in or out of govern. ment, in the most unfavourable manner at St. Petersburg. I believe their displeasure commenced in a conversation which I had with Prince Lieven in the end of 1826, upon the intention then in contemplation of turning the Protocol of April, 1826, into the Treaty of July, 1827, to which I stated my objections so strongly as to declare that as a member of the then administration I never would agree to the plan. I was out of office from April, 1827, to the following January, during which time I know that the Prince and Princess wrote of me all the evil that they thought, and much more than they knew. From the time that I returned to office in January, 1828, the Prince and Princess Lieven have been what is called in regular opposition to the Government. They have misrepresented to their Court all that we have done, and particularly that I have done; they have been parties to all the party


intrigues against the administration; and really if I had not the very best authority for what I say, I could not have believed it possible that persons who have been so long employed in public office in this country would have committed the extraordinary indiscretions in this way of which they have been guilty.

“However, I have never hinted a suspicion of such conduct. I have treated them both, as I do all the other ambassadors, with the highest distinction. I have been always upon cordial terms with Madame de Lieven, but coldly with Monsieur de Lieven since the scene about the Treaty in 1826. This is very much caused by his own manner towards me.

• I thought it right to have with the Russian Ministers the explanation which Lord Aberdeen will send you, in order to put an end to the perpetual suspicions and complaints of which we have heard, and to show the Emperor that we were not aware we had ever given cause of complaint.

"I particularly request, however, to be understood as not making any complaint of Prince or Princess Lieven. I know that all I have stated to you in this letter is true; I know that their misrepresentations of things here, and particularly respecting me, have done all the mischief. But I can prove nothing, and I will not complain of any man so as to deprive him of his office without being able to prove that which I state against him. Besides that, to tell you the truth, I am perhaps vain enough to think that I am too strong for Prince and Princess Lieven, and that I prefer to suffer a little inconvenience to taking a step which might require from me some explanation.

" However, I have thought it as well to let you know how the matter really stands. Believe me, &c.,

"WELLINGTON.' At this period the Duke stood in a very peculiar position. The old Tory party was divided by the more liberal principles of the Canningites, who had recently held office alone, and some of whom now rejoined the Duke in his Cabinet, But the Catholic question remained an impassable barrier of opinion; and though the Duke and Mr. Peel leapt the chasm, they shook the allegiance of their followers for ever. In his foreign relations the Duke was equally embarrassed. He himself had signed, and indeed proposed, the Protocol of April 1826, which had led us to co-operate with Russia on the Eastern Question. That Protocol had been expanded by Mr. Canning into the Treaty of London; and the cannon of Navarino had given deadly effect to it. The Morea, in pursuance of the same policy, had been occupied by French troops, whose presence the Duke viewed with great uneasiness. Although the Conference still continued to sit for the pacification of Greece, this deliberative body was strangely composed; for one of the parties to it, Russia, was actually carrying on war

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against Turkey, not for the general interests, but on her own account; another, France, occupied what was still Turkish territory, and was intriguing for Russian support; Prussia sent General Müffling to Constantinople to urge the Sultan to make peace by throwing himself into the arms or at the feet of Russia, insomuch that the Duke suspected Müffling of being a Russian agent; and Austria was only driven at the last extremity to mobilise a part of her army. England alone was perfectly neutral and sincerely desirous of peace. But England found herself entangled in protocols and engagements which bound her to act with the Powers which the Duke declared to be her worst enemies.' The following Memorandum contains his view of the position in which we stood; and it might be equally applicable to more recent events :

London, August 12, 1829. • It is admitted that the Porte might reasonably entertain doubts of the sincerity of the wishes of the Emperor of Russia for peace, or even of the expediency of complying with his Imperial Majesty's terms. We are required to remove those doubts, and moreover to convince the Ottoman Porte that no assistance will be given by us to enable her to resist the invasion of her territories by the Emperor of Russia.

• Before I consider of these propositions, I must point out on what ground we have stood since we were first informed that the Emperor of Russia intended to make war upon the Porte. We declined to engage

in or sanction hostilities which we declared that we did not think necessary; and we foresaw and foretold the risk incurred of overthrowing an empire, and of disturbing the peace of Europe. We never doubted the result of this unequal contest, more particularly as two of the Powers interested in the conservation of the Porte as a Power in Europe were engaged in a Treaty with the Emperor for the settlement of Greece; but we foresaw that his Imperial Majesty was about to destroy the work nearly accomplished by seven years of the joint care, anxiety, and negotiations of all the Powers of Europe, including his own august predecessor and brother, and particularly of that very measure which has laid the Porte at his mercy in this contest. We foretold in the following words the consequences of the invasion of the Ottoman empire :The Earl of Dudley to Prince Lieven.

· London, March 7, 1828. "" The Ottoman Empire is not a country like some of those whose example we could cite within our own times, which, after having been invaded, resume their domestic tranquillity and their political existence upon the retreat of the invaders; once broken up, its capital taken, and its provinces in rebellion, the recomposition of it as an independent State would be a work scarcely within the reach of human integrity or human skill. A new order of things must arise in those countries of




which it now consists. What that order would be it is vain to conjecture; but we may venture to foretell that a final adjustment would not take place till after a series of troubles and disasters, for which the greatest benefits that could be supposed to arise from it could not for many years afford

sufficient compensation." “Notwithstanding this disapprobation on our parts of the measures adopted by his Imperial Majesty, we have never ceased from that moment to this to make sacrifices in order to continue to act in the Greek affair with those Powers with which we were engaged in a Treaty, and to bring that question to a settlement, from the conviction that the solution of the difficulties attending that affair would bring the war in the East to a termination. The advice which we have given has been invariably directed to that object; and the delay in the termination of that affair must not be attributed to us. To the paper from which we have extracted what is above stated Count Nesselrode answered:

""Ni la chûte de ce gouvernement, ni des conquêtes n'entrent dans nos vues, parce qu'elles nous seraient plus nuisibles qu’utiles. Au reste, quand même, malgré nos intentions et nos efforts, les décrets de la Divine Providence nous auraient prédestinés à être témoins du dernier jour de l'empire Ottoman, les idées de sa Majesté quant aux aggrandissements de la Russie, seraient encore les mêmes. L'Empereur ne reculerait pas les bornes de son territoire, et ne demanderait à ses Alliés que cette absence d'ambition et de pensées exclusives, dont il donnerait le premier exemple."

* But we are now to remove the doubts of the Porte of the sincerity of his Imperial Majesty's wishes for peace, and to convince the Porte of the moderation of his demands, and of the expediency of complying with them.

* The difficulty of this question has always consisted in its having been made a personal one. We are told that the Emperor of Russia is a highly honourable individual. He says that he wishes for peace; and we must not only give credit to his assertions, but we must urge the Porte to give credit to them.

"I put the honour of the individual out of the question, and I look at the case only as it relates to the powerful monarch of a great empire. When such a one wishes for peace, and is desirous that other Powers should make known his wishes to his enemy, he explains himself to them frankly; and he commits no act which can render the negotiation of a Treaty of Peace more difficult.'

The Duke then passes in review the conduct of the Emperor of Russia, which appeared to be singularly at variance with his assurances; and went on

* But we are told that notwithstanding all this his Imperial Majesty intends to make peace; a peace which the Porte can accept, preserving its independent situation and power in Europe; that the King of Prussia is convinced that this is his Imperial Majesty's intention; and we are called upon to assure the Porte that the Sultan can expect no. assistance from us, and that he ought to accept peace upon the terms,



offered to him. Such a demand is in itself an insinuation against uz. We do wish the Porte to make peace, because it is obvious that she is incapable of carrying on war; because her destruction would entail on Europe fresh misfortunes, and because the unfortunate policy of former years has deprived her of the assistance which she ought to have ex. pected in the circumstances in which she is placed. We are, besides, engaged in a Treaty with the Emperor of Russia, the objects of which have not been accomplished.

• But before we can take a more active part in any negotiations for peace, we must know the objects of the peace, and the terms, and the situation in which it will leave the parties.

• WELLINGTON.' And with greater energy in a private letter of August 21, to Lord Aberdeen, he exclaims :-*

'I confess that it makes me sick when I hear of the Emperor's desire for peace. If he desires peace, why does he not make it? Can the Turks resist him for a moment? He knows that they cannot. Why not state in conciliatory language his desire for peace, and reasonable terms to which the Porte can accede? This would give him peace tomorrow. He is looking to conquest; and by-the-bye, the plunder of Constantinople, if nothing else, would satisfy more than one starving claimant upon his bounty, besides what it would give to the public treasury.

• The wisest thing that Metternich ever did was to arm Austria as soon as the Turkish war commenced.

• If he had not done so, Austria would have been attacked as soo as the Turkish war should be brought to a conclusion. I don't believe one word of the desire for peace of a young Emperor at the head of a million of men, who has never drawn his sword. • Believe me, &c.,

· WELLINGTON. The Treaty of Adrianople was signed on the 14th September, 1829.' To the statesmen and the public of Europe who were led to suppose that Marshal Diebitsch was at the head of a powerful and victorious army, and that he might have made himself master of the Turkish capital and all that belonged to it, it certainly appeared to be a striking sign of the moderation of the Emperor Nicholas that his forces should have been stopped in mid career, and on the eve of so signal a triumph. The truth was not known till long afterwards. The main body of Diebitsch's army at Adrianople was reduced to ten battalions and fifteen squadrons, with which he had to keep possession of a city of 80,000 inhabitants, to face 30,000 Turks in Constantinople and 30,000 Arnauts at Sophia, and to pretend to carry on hostilities. Even in Petersburg the alarm was so great that on the 10th August a new levy of 90,000 men had been ordered. No wonder the Marshal fell down on his knees to thank Almighty God, when the Turkish Plenipotentiaries arrived at his camp, to throw themselves, as they

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