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which it now consists. What that order would be it is vain to conjecture; but we may venture to foretell that a final adjustment would not take place till after a series of troubles and disasters, for which the greatest benefits that could be supposed to arise from it could not for many years afford a sufficient compensation."

‘Notwithstanding this disapprobation on our parts of the measures adopted by his Imperial Majesty, we have never ceased from that moment to this to make sacrifices in order to continue to act in the Greek affair with those Powers with which we were engaged in a Treaty, and to bring that question to a settlement, from the conviction that the solution of the difficulties attending that affair would bring the war in the East to a termination. The advice which we have given has been invariably directed to that object; and the delay in the termination of that affair must not be attributed to us. To the paper from which we have extracted what is above stated Count Nesselrode answered :

""Ni la chûte de ce gouvernement, ni des conquêtes n'entrent dans nos vues, parce qu'elles nous seraient plus nuisibles qu’utiles. Au reste, quand même, malgré nos intentions et nos efforts, les décrets de la Divine Providence nous auraient prédestinés à être témoins du dernier jour de l'empire Ottoman, les idées de sa Majesté quant aux aggrandissements de la Russie, seraient encore les mêmes. L'Empereur ne reculerait pas les bornes de son territoire, et ne demanderait à ses Alliés que cette absence d'ambition et de pensées exclusives, dont il donnerait le premier exemple.”

. But we are now to remove the doubts of the Porte of the sincerity of his Imperial Majesty's wishes for peace, and to convince the Porte of the moderation of his demands, and of the expediency of complying with them.

* The difficulty of this question has always consisted in its having been made a personal one. We are told that the Emperor of Russia is a highly honourable individual. He says that he wishes for peace ; and we must not only give credit to his assertions, but we must urge the Porte to give credit

to them. 'I put the honour of the individual out of the question, and I look at the case only as it relates to the powerful monarch of a great empire. When such a one wishes for peace, and is desirous that other Powers should make known his wishes to his enemy, he explains himself to them frankly; and he commits no act which can render the negotiation of a Treaty of Peace more difficult.'

The Duke then passes in review the conduct of the Emperor of Russia, which appeared to be singularly at variance with his assurances; and went on

But we are told that notwithstanding all this his Imperial Majesty intends to make peace; a peace which the Porte can accept, preserving its independent situation and power in Europe; that the King of Prussia is convinced that this is his Imperial Majesty's intention; and we are called upon to assure the Porte that the Sultan can expect no. assistance from us, and that he ought to accept peace upon the terms


offered to him. Such a demand is in itself an insinuation against us. We do wish the Porte to make peace, because it is obvious that she is incapable of carrying on war; because her destruction would entail on Europe fresh misfortunes, and because the unfortunate policy of former years has deprived her of the assistance which she ought to have ex. pected in the circumstances in which she is placed. We are, besides, engaged in a Treaty with the Emperor of Russia, the objects of which have not been accomplished.

But before we can take a more active part in any negotiations for peace, we must know the objects of the peace, and the terms, and the situation in which it will leave the parties.

• WELLINGTON.' And with greater energy in a private letter of August 21, to Lord Aberdeen, he exclaims :

'I confess that it makes me sick when I hear of the Emperor's desire for

peace. If he desires peace, why does he not make it? Can the Turks resist him for a moment? He knows that they cannot. Why not state in conciliatory language his desire for peace, and reasonable terms to which the Porte can accede? This would give him peace tomorrow. He is looking to conquest ; and by-the-bye, the plunder of Constantinople, if nothing else, would satisfy more than one starving claimant upon his bounty, besides what it would give to the public treasury.

• The wisest thing that Metternich ever did was to arm Austria as soon as the Turkish war commenced.

• If he had not done so, Austria would have been attacked as soon as the Turkish war should be brought to conclusion. I don't believe one word of the desire for peace of a young Emperor at the head of a million of men, who has never drawn his sword.

me, &c.,

· WELLINGTON. The Treaty of Adrianople was signed on the 14th September, 1829. To the statesmen and the public of Europe who were led to suppose that Marshal Diebitsch was at the head of a powerful and victorious army, and that he might have made himself master of the Turkish capital and all that belonged to it, it certainly appeared to be a striking sign of the moderation of the Emperor Nicholas that his forces should have been stopped in mid career, and on the eve of so signal a triumph. The truth was not known till long afterwards. The main body of Diebitsch's army at Adrianople was reduced to ten battalions and fifteen squadrons, with which he had to keep possession of a city of 80,000 inhabitants, to face 30,000 Turks in Constantinople and 30,000 Arnauts at Sophia, and to pretend to carry on hostilities. Even in Petersburg the alarm was so great that on the 10th August a new levy of 90,000 men had been ordered. No wonder the Marshal fell down on his knees to thank Almighty God, when the Turkish Plenipotentiaries arrived at his camp, to throw themselves, as they


had been recommended to do by General Müffling, upon the generosity of the Czar. But the Duke of Wellivgton took a very different view of this Treaty. He judged it, not with reference to Turkey or the Turks, but with reference to the promises and engagements of Russia to the other Powers of Europe, to Great Britain, and personally to himself. It stung the Duke to think that the Treaty of Adrianople of September 1829 should trace its descent by the process of evolution from the Protocol of April 1826 ; and his rernarks on the subject are extremely keen and important.

Whilst the progress of the campaign still hung in the balance, and it was doubtful whether Diebitsch could be stopped, the Duke wrote to Lord Aberdeen :

'It appears to me that Diebitsch ought to halt and negotiate if it be true that the Emperor wishes for peace. If he is not sincere in that wish, the relative military position of the parties leaves Constantinople, in my opinion, at Diebitsch's

mercy. There is nothing to oppose him in front. His rear is to the Black Sea, of which he commands the navigation; and his communications with Burgbas, &c., are secure. Even if the Grand Vizier, Hussein Pasha, and others could do anything from Schumla, they would not hurt General Diebitsch.

'I think that the King of Prussia as well as the King of France are pledged to enforce peace upon the terms which General Müffling and General Guilleminot have encouraged the Porte to offer, if the Emperor or General Diebitsch should decline to accept them; if there should be an opportunity for their interference and for such enforcement. But there will be no such opportunity. The whole case depends upon the construction he will give to the instructions which he will have received ; if he should have received any. If General Diebitsch should have halted and should treat, the whole case is safe. If he should not have halted, and should have got possession of Constantinople, and have brought Heyden's fleet into the Dardanelles, there is an end to the Greek affair, and to the Turkish empire in Europe; and there will be no ground for Prussian or French interference on the score of either of the Emperor's promises, or of any former transaction. The world must then be reconstructed; and there is no doubt that the best ground for a satisfactory reconstruction would be a cordial co-operation between England and France, that is to say, if the French Government has a will of its own.

Upon such a subject it is not for me to give an opinion suddenly. My opinion is that the Power which has Constantinople, and the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, ought to possess the mouth of the Danube; and that the sovereign of these two ought not to have the Crimea and the Russian empire. We must reconstruct a Greek empire, and give it Prince Frederick of Orange, or Prince Charles of Prussia; and no Power of Europe ought to take anything for himself excepting the Emperor of Russia a sum for his expenses.'

General Müffling, the Prussian emissary, certainly believed

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that Diebitsch's instructions were to march on Constantinople without a pause, and he claims for himself some credit (in a letter to the Duke of the 30th Sept., p. 191) for the result. For he argues (and the observation deserves to be remembered) that the allied fleets in the Mediterranean could not have stopped the march of the Russian army, or come to the relief of Constantinople, because Diebitsch at Adrianople was nearer to the Dardanelles than to the capital, and had only to fall down upon the forts of the Dardanelles on the land side to isolate Constantinople from the forces of Europe. The occupation of the Thracian Chersonesus is a primary condition, sine quá non, to the defence of Constantinople by the western or maritime Powers.

A little later, when the terms of the Treaty of Peace could hardly be known in London, the Duke wrote in a still more desponding strain, as if he thought the final catastrophe inevitable and had made up his mind to face it. To the Earl of Aberdeen.

*London, October 4, 1829. My dear Lord Aberdeen,-I return your paper. It would be ab. surd to think of bolstering up the Turkish Power in Europe. It is gone, in fact; and the tranquillity of the world, or what is the same thing the confidence of the world in the permanence of tranquillity, along with it. I am not quite certain that what will exist will not be worse than the immediate annihilation of the Turkish Power.

• It does not appear to me to be possible to make out of the Greek affair any

substitute for the Turkish Power; or anything of which use could be made hereafter, in case of its entire annihilation and extinction. All I wish is to get out of the Greek affair without the loss of honour, and without inconvenient risk to the safety of the Ionian Islands.

• The choice of the Prince is very important, if we are to have a Prince; but that choice will not rest with us. It will be carried against our views and interests, and we must adopt other measures to secure these interests.

• After all, you must not be quite certain of Prince Philip.* I know him; and I believe him to be as little friendly to this country as any other Prince on the Continent. "Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON. A week later, however, on the 18th October, the Duke wrote an elaborate Memorandum on the terms of the Treaty, which he conceived to be all but fatal to the sovereignty of the Porte in the Principalities and in its own waters. The conclusion of this important paper may be said to have a direct

* Prince Philip of Hesse Homburg.

bearing on the present state of affairs and the future relations of all the European Powers to Turkey. After discussing the provisions of the Treaty in detail, he goes on :

* These views are quite inconsistent with the Emperor's professions and promises, and with the security of other Powers; most particularly of Austria, to whom the occupation of the Principalities for eleven years, after the professions made, are not only a serious injury but an insult. This injury and insult are aggravated by the prospect, afforded by recent transactions and by this peace, that the Ottoman Power must crumble to pieces, and that the Principalities must remain in the hands of Russia, and with them and with Silistria alone, the command of the navigation of the Danube and of the Black Sea.

. These are the considerations arising out of recent transactions and the Treaty of Peace.

. In discussing the effects of this Treaty of Peace I see that I have omitted to state the influence which it is calculated to give to the Emperor of Russia over the Christian subjects of the Porte of all denominations.

• The whole of Armenia, Persian as well as Turkish, is now the dominion of his Imperial Majesty. The Servians, Wallachians, Moldavians, Greeks of the Morea, and the Islands, &c., will have been delivered from the Turkish domination; and it cannot be doubted that the measures completed by this Treaty of Peace must encourage other nations of Christians to endeavour to attain the same advantages by similar means.

• The other Powers of Europe and all parties in Europe must view this Treaty of Peace in the same light as we do. They may not have such reasons as we have to look with jealousy and anxiety at its consequences; but they must all consider it in the same light as the deathblow to the independence of the Ottoman Porte, and the forerunner of the dissolution and extinction of its power. Some may look to advantage from the partition of the spoil, as France and possibly Austria ; others may consider the general war, which will be the consequence of the dissolution of the Turkish empire, as affording a chance of new combinations and a fresh partition of territory, as the Liberal party in France and elsewhere, and possibly Prussia. But the attention, the hopes, and expectations of all will be excited, and there is no chance of any Power disarming.

"There is no doubt that it would have been more fortunate and better for the world if the Treaty of Peace had not been signed, and if the Russians had entered Constantinople, and if the Turkish empire had been dissolved. The natural course would then have been for the great Powers of Europe to concur in discussing the disposition to be made of the wreck of the Turkish monarchy, including those important parts of it which the Emperor of Russia has taken to himself. It is difficult now to have such a discussion.

* If France or Prussia were disposed to take any steps in concert with this country to prevent the evils which must be the consequence of this Treaty of Peace, they would before this time have approached us.

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