The army was now concentrated, the different divisions in sight of one another, and the arrangements made for final operations. On the 13th it was on the Puebla road on the east side of Lake Chalco, advancing on El Penon. On the 18th it was on the Acapulco road, near San Augustine, nine miles from the city of Mexico. The change was made in good order, and the ground to operate on was far better, and the defences in front less. The city of the Spanish-Aztecs was now within the grasp of the arms of the United States, predestined, in the convictions of the people, to be invincible wherever they should be carried. A conviction like this, existing in ages past, alike in the minds of Roman, Mohammedan, and Puritan, often makes the destiny which it affirms and courts. Asserted in the cause of liberty and justice, it would subdue a world to the civilization of Christianity. In any other cause, its predestined glory may fade before a darker fate.

CHAPTER XII.

Mexican Line of Defence.-Position of the American and Mexican Armies.-Action of the 19th.-Position in the Hamlet of Contreras.-Position of General Scott.-Arrangements for the Battle.-Distribution of the American and Mexican Forces.-Battle of Contreras.-Rout of the Mexicans. Surrender of Mexican Generals.-Recapture of the Buena Vista Guns.-Scott's Arrangements.-Evacuation of San Antonia.— Storm of the Tête du Pont.-Battle of Churubusco.-Defeat of the Mexicans.-Loss.-Truce.

THE Mexican plan of defence for the city of Mexico seems to have contemplated two lines of defence-an exterior and interior one. The exterior was composed of a line of forts and fortified eminences. The strongest was EL PENON, On the National Road, completely commanding it, near the edge of Lake Tezcuco. This fortress, as we have already stated, was pronounced impracticable without immense loss. It contained fifty-one guns, disposed in several different batteries, with infantry breastworks, and the whole surrounded by a deep ditch connecting the marshes and waters about it. The next fort of this class was at MEXICALCINGO, at the upper end of Lake Xochimilco, and commanding a narrow causeway to the city. This, also, was defended with batteries and infantry breast works. The next position was the BRIDGE OF CHURUBUSCO, a tête du pont at the crossing of a canal, armed also with cannon, on the Acapulco road. The next, but to the west, and front of this, was the HILL OF CONTRERAS, thoroughly armed with batteries and breast

works. In the route, and still nearer to the city, was the HILL OF CHAPULTEPEC, on which was the Military College. This was at the point where the mountains approached the city. It was a strong position and well armed. It is plain, from an examination of the map, that these positions really commanded all the practicable passes to the city on the whole semicircle, extending round from Lake Tezcuco in the east to where the mountains come near the city on the west. These fortifications were armed with near one hundred pieces of cannon, while the ground between them was either marshy, or covered with volcanic remains, sharp and abrupt, rendering it almost impassable even for footmen. Behind this line of exterior defences General Valencia, with 6,000 of the best troops of the Mexican army, was to manœuvre, and reinforce any point which might be exposed to attack.

The interior line seems to have been only the forts, and canals or ditches of the city itself. These, however, were by no means weak. The city was approached only by causeways. Canals and ditches surrounded it in various directions, and at the gateways were garitas, or small forts, constructed at the angles of the streets or entrances of the causeways, eight in number. These defences of the city were also mounted with a large number of cannon. This interior line, however, was evidently weaker than the exterior one. These various defences were well calculated to protect the city against any thing less than a large army and protracted siege, had the energy

1 This statement corresponds in substance with one made by Captain Lee of the engineers.

'See Scott's Official Report.

of the men, or the ability of their officers, corresponded with the natural strength of the positions. This, however, was not the case. Whether it be a superior strength, innate in the natural constitutions of the inhabitants of the northern temperate zone, or whether it be what is more than equivalent to strength, a higher and better education, it is certain that the arms of England and the United States have exhibited a great superiority over those of more southern nations-a superiority, whose final result on the dominion and civilization of the world is yet to be made known by the events of futurity.

On the 18th of August, the position of the armies, at night, was in the order following, viz.: Worth's division had, during the day, advanced from San Augustine in the direction of San Antonia, whose batteries were brought to bear on his troops, and the first shot killed Captain Thornton, a brave but unfortunate officer of the 2d dra goons. The cavalry had been thrown in front to reconnoitre. The village proved to be strongly fortified, and a bold reconnaissance made by Captain Mason of the en gineers, accompanied by Lieutenants Stevens and Tower, determined that this point could only be approached by the front, over a narrow causeway of great length, flanked with wet ditches of great depth. Worth was ordered not to attack, but to threaten and mask the place. On the left of the road here, extending west, was an immense field of volcanic rocks and lava, called pedregal, and on the east it was wet and boggy. This pedregal was

1 Scott's Official Report.

* Official Report.

'Letter of an officer in the Washington Union.